Accuracy, gender and race in tort trials : a (behavioral) law and economics perspective by Dominioni, G. (Goran)
 Accuracy, Gender and Race in Tort Trials
A (behavioral) law and economics perspective
Accuratesse, geslacht en etniciteit in
aansprakelijkheidszaken:
Een (gedrags)rechtseconomisch perspectief
Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam op gezag van
de rector magnificus
Prof.dr. H.A.P. Pols
en volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties
De openbare verdediging zal plaatsvinden op
vrijdag 9 maart 2018 om 09.30 uur
door
Goran Dominioni
geboren te Cantù (CO), Italië
 
Promotiecommissie
 
Promotor: Prof.mr.dr. L.T. Visscher
Overige leden: Prof.dr. M.G. Faure LL.M.
Prof.dr. T. Eger
Prof.dr. J.J. Rachlinski
Co-promotor: Dr. P.T.M. Desmet
 
 
 
This thesis was written as part of the European 
Doctorate in Law and Economics programme
 
An international collaboration between the Universities 
of Bologna, Hamburg and Rotterdam. 
As part of this programme, the thesis has been submitted 
to the Universities of Bologna, Hamburg and Rotterdam 
to obtain a doctoral degree. 

  
 
 
 
To mom and dad 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Chapter I - Introduction ........................................................................................... 11	
1.	 Aim and Scope ........................................................................................................... 11	
2.	 Methodology .............................................................................................................. 14	
3.	 Scientific and Societal Relevance ........................................................................... 16	
4.	 Limitations ................................................................................................................. 21	
5.	 Summary of the Chapters ........................................................................................ 23	
Chapter II - Coherence vs Correspondence: Some Clarification on 
the Fundamental Attribution Error in Tort Law (and Economics) ........ 27	
1.	 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 27	
2.	 Truth in Adjudication and JDM ............................................................................. 28	
4.  An Example: Correspondence and Coherence in Attribution and Their 
Misuse in Legal Scholarship ........................................................................................... 35	
4.1 Correspondence and Coherence in Attribution	..............................................................	35	
4.2 Overestimation and Underestimation: Empirical Studies on the Fundamental 
Attribution Error and Their Interpretation	..........................................................................	39	
4.2.1 The Milgram’s Experiment	........................................................................................	40	
4.2.2 The Quiz Game Experiment	......................................................................................	41	
4.2.3 The Castro Essay Experiment	...................................................................................	42	
4.3 The Fundamental Attribution Error in Legal Scholarship	...........................................	44	
Chapter III - The Fundamental Attribution Error  and Accuracy in 
Trial Settings: Individual and Contextual Determinants of the 
Attribution Error ......................................................................................................... 55	
1.	 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 55	
2. Background literature ................................................................................................. 58	
2.1 A Short Introduction to the Economics of Evidence Law	.............................................	58	
2.2 The Fundamental Attribution Error: Contextual and Individual Determinants	.......	60	
2.3 The Fundamental Attribution Error and Expert Adjudicators’ Decision-Making	....	63	
3. The Experiment ............................................................................................................ 69	
3.1 Participants	.........................................................................................................................	69	
3.2 Design	..................................................................................................................................	70	
3.3 Stimuli and Measures	........................................................................................................	71	
4. Hypotheses ................................................................................................................... 73	
5. Results ........................................................................................................................... 73	
5.1 Manipulation check:	...........................................................................................................	73	
5.2 Attribution of causality:	.....................................................................................................	74	
5.3 Responsibility:	....................................................................................................................	74	
5.4 Percentage of Damages Awarded:	....................................................................................	75	
6. Discussion ..................................................................................................................... 76	
7.	 Limitations ................................................................................................................. 79	
Appendix Chapter II ........................................................................................................ 83	
Chapter IV - Implicit Racial Biases in Tort Trials .......................................... 91	
1.	 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 91	
2. The Economics of Discrimination: an Introduction ............................................... 93	
3. IRBs: an Introduction ................................................................................................. 95	
4. IRBs and Evidence in Tort Trials ............................................................................. 100	
4.1 The Presentation and Evaluation of Brute Facts	..........................................................	101	
4.1.1  Implicit Biases and the Presentation of Evidence	....................................................	101	
4.1.1.1 Brute Facts, IRBs and the Creation of Evidence at the Trial	.................................	102	
4.1.1.2 Brute Facts, IRBs and Pre-Constituted Evidence	...................................................	104	
4.1.2 Implicit Biases and the Evaluation of Evidence Regarding Brute Facts	................	108	
4.2 The Evaluation of Facts Evaluatively Determined	.......................................................	110	
5. The Effect of IRBs on the Functioning of Tort Law .............................................. 112	
5.1 Setting the Stage	...............................................................................................................	113	
5.2 The Effects of IRBs on Deterrence	.................................................................................	114	
5.2.1 Direct Harm and Implicit Biases	.................................................................................	114	
5.2.2 Implicit Bias and Signalling Direct Harm	.................................................................	116	
5.3 Impact Size on Trial Outcomes	......................................................................................	117	
4.4. IRBs and Deterrence	......................................................................................................	121	
4.4.1 IRBs and Tort Law When the Victim is a Member of a Discriminated Group	......	121	
4.4.2 IRBs and Deterrence When the Tortfeasor is a Member of a Discriminated 
Group	.......................................................................................................................................	127	
4.5 Stereotypes and Deterrence	............................................................................................	129	
4.5.1 On the (In)Accuracy of Stereotypes	............................................................................	129	
4.5.2 Beyond Accuracy: Implicit Stereotypes and the Economics of Character 
Evidence	...................................................................................................................................	131	
4.5.3 Beyond Accuracy: Other Relevant Aspects	................................................................	133	
4.6 Implicit Racial Biases in the Cathedral: Issues of Optimal Deterrence	....................	134	
5. Policy Responses ........................................................................................................ 135	
5.1 Debiasing and Insulating Implicit Biases	......................................................................	135	
5.2 Looking Beyond Behavioral Strategies: Traditional Instruments to Solve a New 
Problem?	..................................................................................................................................	139	
6.	 Conclusions .............................................................................................................. 141	
Chapter V - Gender and Race-Based Statistical Tables in European 
Tort Trials: A Behavioral/Comparative Law and Economics 
Perspective ................................................................................................................... 143	
1.	 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 143	
2.	 The Economics of Accuracy in the Determination of Damages ....................... 145	
2.	 Race and Gender-Based Statistical Tables and Targeting ................................ 147	
3.	 Gender and Race-Based Statistical Tables: A Comparative Analysis .............. 151	
3.1 Gender and Race-Based Statistical Tables in the US	...................................................	152	
3.2 Gender and Race-Based Statistical Tables in Italy	......................................................	155	
3.3 Gender and Race-Based Statistical Tables in England	................................................	159	
3.4 Gender and Race Based Statistical Tables in French Law	..........................................	161	
3.5 Comparative Analysis on Targeting Incentives	............................................................	163	
4.	 The Neoclassical Law and Economics Arguments in Favour and Against 
Targeting ......................................................................................................................... 164	
5.	 A Behavioral Perspective of the Use of Blended vs Non-Blended Tables ....... 171	
5.1 Outgroup Homogeneity Bias and Non-Blended Tables	..............................................	172	
5.2 WTA-WTP Gap and Non-Blended Tables	.....................................................................	176	
5.3 Anchoring and Non-Blended Tables	..............................................................................	180	
6.	 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 184	
Chapter VI - Concluding Remarks ..................................................................... 187	
1.	 Main Findings ......................................................................................................... 187	
1.1 Summary of Single Chapters ................................................................................... 187	
1.2 The Interplay Between Accuracy and Behavioral Law and Economics ..................... 189	
3. Future Research ......................................................................................................... 194	
Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 199	
 
 
	
	 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
First, and foremost I am deeply grateful to my supervisors Louis Visscher and 
Pieter Desmet for having wonderfully supervised, supported and guided me 
throughout the whole PhD experience. Without them this book, as well as 
many of the other accomplishments achieved during this PhD, would not have 
been possible.  
I want to thank Michael Faure, Christopher Reinders Folmer, Klaus Heine, 
Peter Mascini and Ann-Sophie Vandenberge as well as the other BACT 
members, and the EDLE and RILE faculty and staff for their useful feedback, 
discussions and for their support that have significantly enriched this book 
and my time in EDLE. 
I am also grateful to the people that I met at Cornell Law School and at the 
World Bank Group for having made the last year of my PhD a particularly 
interesting and pleasant one. Among them, a particular thanks goes to Jeffrey 
Rachlinski, for being a great host and advisor.  
In my experience, a good part of the fun and learning during a PhD is also due 
to your peers. I am therefore very thankful to my colleagues and friends of the 
EDLE program; of the International Max-Planck Research School 
"Uncertainty" and of the Copenhagen University. A special thanks goes to Bea, 
Dirk, Elena, Joe and Sandro. Each of them has contributed a lot to make the 
PhD period a great experience.  
Last, but not least, I am very grateful to Alessandro and Olivia, to whom this 
book is dedicated and to Samuele, Corinna, Raffaele, Leonardo, Agata and 
Alessio for having supported me, in various ways, throughout the whole PhD 
period, as did Chiara, Elodie, Tate, Yolanda and Zulli. A special thanks goes to 
Samuele. It is a very rare and beautiful experience to write a PhD thesis and 
having a brother that is doing the same thing at only few hundreds kilometres 
of distance. 
 
Goran Dominioni 
  
		 	
		
List of Abbreviations 
EU: European Union 
FAE: Fundamental Attribution Error 
fMRI:	Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
IAT: Implicit Association Test 
IRBs: Implicit Racial Biases 
JDM: Judgment and Decision-Making 
R.D.: Royal Decree 
SES: Socioeconomic Status 
WTA: Willingness to Accept 
WTP: Willingness to Pay 
 
 
------------------ 
 
 
Tables 
Table 1: Mean Response (Causality, Responsibility and Damages Award) by Condition…  67 
Table 2:  Impact of Implicit Racial Biases on Trial Outcomes....…………………………. 115 
Table 3: Use of Non-Blended Tables for Damages Awards………………………………. 157 
 
Figures 
Figure 1: social cost of accidents when victim is member of discriminated group……….. 111 
Figure 2: Social cost when the tortfeasor is a member of a discriminated group…............. 115   
	
	
	
	
	
	
		
	
	
	 11 
	
Chapter I  
 Introduction 
1. Aim and Scope 
A fundamental issue underlying the regulation of human societies via law is 
whether and to what extent we are able to accurately describe and predict 
how legal rules affect behavior.1 When drafting laws legislators can (and 
hopefully do) take into account how the law will affect the behavior of the 
relevant population. In doing so, they may (and, again, hopefully do) 
consider how individuals called to enforce these laws are likely to perform. In 
addressing these issues, traditional legal scholars often rely on implicit 
assumptions based on intuitions.2 While acting on the basis of intuitions can 
sometimes lead to desired outcomes, it may also leave several problems 
unaddressed or lead to undesired consequences. In this regard, law and 
economics represents a major advancement in legal scholarship towards the 
explicitation of the behavioral assumptions underlying policymaking. Based 
on rational choice theory, law and economics has powerfully improved our 
ability to accurately predict the effects of legal rules on human conduct. In 
addition, the explicitation of the assumptions underlying rational choice 
theory has allowed their rigorous testing which, in turn, has led to a more 
refined understanding of human behavior. A main result of this scientific 
endeavour in the legal sphere is a strand of legal literature that builds on 
both economics and psychology and which is referred to as behavioral law 
and economics.3 The main aim of this thesis is to study the interplay of 
accuracy and the behavioral economics of evidence law in tort trials. In 
particular, the main research question addressed here is: What can we learn 
																																								 																				
1 Langevoort D. (1998) Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in 
Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1499. 
2 Tor, A., (2008) The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law. 4 Haifa Law 
Review, 239.  
3 Jolls, C., Sunstein, C. R., & Thaler, R. (1998). A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics. 50 (5) Stanford Law Review, 1471; Korobkin, R. B., & Ulen, T. S. 
(2000). 88(4) Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption 
from Law and Economics. California Law Review, 1051. 
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from behavioral law and economics regarding the behavior of judges, the 
accuracy of their decisions and the consequences of these decisions? 
As highlighted by the main research question the interplay between accuracy 
and behavioral economics is discussed here from three perspectives, each of 
which refers to one of three related streams of literature. The first question 
that is addressed here is: can the alleged increased accuracy of behavioral 
economics vis-à-vis neoclassical economics in describing human behavior 
lead to policy-relevant insights? Here accuracy refers to whether our 
understanding of human behavior improves when insights from neoclassical 
economics are combined with behavioral ones. While most authors believe 
that indeed a behavioral approach can lead to a more accurate description of 
human behavior, the extent to which this increased accuracy can be useful 
for policy-making is a much more controversial issue.4 Besides a general 
skepticism of economically minded scholars and policy-makers towards 
some of the methods adopted in behavioral sciences, a potential limit of 
behavioral economics to inform policymaking is that it does not provide a 
unified theory of human decision-making.5 The primarily inductive method 
adopted by behavioral studies may lead to results that do not provide clear-
cut predictions of how people will behave in a given situation, thus limiting 
their usefulness for ex-ante regulation.  
Throughout this thesis, I will argue that the behavioral insights can be useful 
for policymaking in the areas of evidence and tort law in two main ways. i) 
Focusing on the decision-making of trial participants (judges, witnesses, 
expert testimonies) allows understanding how different items of information 
that enter the trial context are likely to affect courts’ decisions. Thus, a 
behavioral approach can unveil hidden patterns in the functioning of tort law 
systems. These patterns can be clear-cut and thus offer straightforward 
predictions for policymakers. This is even more so when multiple behavioral 
phenomena point in the same direction. ii) Once discovered, these patterns 
can be left untouched or (maybe partially) addressed depending on the costs 
																																								 																				
4 Faure, M. G. (2010). Behavioural Accident Law and Economics. 4 Journal of 
Applied Economics 11. 
5 Posner, R. A. (1998). Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the 
Law. Stanford Law Review, 1551; Faure, M. G. (2010).  
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and benefits of doing so in light of the normative criterion/a adopted in the 
analysis. In this regard, it is often the case that the most effective and 
efficient policies to address these unwarranted patterns build on behavioral 
sciences.  
Overall, this thesis highlights that a behavioral approach can contribute to 
reveal the effects of existing procedural rules and court practices. As such, 
this type of analysis can complement neoclassical studies in providing 
guidance to policy-makers regarding how to best regulate a particular 
activity. In this connection, while most of the issues addressed in this thesis 
are relevant for the study of tort law from the perspective of corrective justice 
and distributive justice, the approach taken here is purely welfarist. 
The second perspective from which this thesis addresses the interplay 
between accuracy and behavioral law and economics is captured in the 
following questions: Does behavioral economics suggests that we should 
trust courts to make accurate decisions at trial? If yes, under what 
circumstances? Contrary to above, accuracy refers here to the 
correspondence of courts’ decision-making with the empirical reality of the 
facts under scrutiny at trial (what in legal jargon is usually referred to as 
absence of errors in fact). As I will discuss in the following pages, accuracy in 
adjudication is commonly seen as valuable in law and in the law and 
economics of tort law, as it is related to justice and welfare maximization. 
This thesis highlights that indeed findings in behavioral sciences cast doubts 
on courts’ ability to make accurate decisions. Yet, the analysis also reveals 
that the link between behavioral findings and accuracy at trial is often more 
complex than generally assumed by legal scholars. Thus, I call for more 
caution when applying behavioral findings to the study of law and 
policymaking.  
Lastly, the third question addressed in this thesis is:  does a behavioral 
approach makes accuracy (i.e. correct decisions) a less compelling aim of 
adjudication? In this connection, in neoclassical law and economics it is 
often argued that in a world in which increasing accuracy of adjudication is 
costless, social welfare maximization can be reached via the pursue of 
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accuracy at trial.6 Throughout the thesis I will show that, contrary to this 
conventional wisdom, a more accurate decision can sometimes be 
detrimental to social welfare maximization regardless of the procedural costs 
of making the decision more accurate. 
Notice that in this thesis these three questions are analyzed neither 
singularly nor in their whole, but by means of Chapters that address a 
particular topic in the behavioral analysis of evidence law in tort trials. As 
such each Chapter may provide an answer to a question that is only partially 
overlapping to the one discussed above. It is only when the analysis is seen in 
its entirety that an answer to the three main questions arises.  
A latent theme that permeates a large part of this thesis - circumscribing its 
scope - is the behavioral economics of ingroup-outgroup biases. 
Psychologists have long shown that human judgment and decision-making is 
often influenced by whether the information processed by our mind relates 
to someone that we perceive as belonging to our social group (being it 
gender, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, etc.) or to another social group. 
These biases are often related to the reality that individuals experience 
(directly or indirectly, e.g. via the media) and as such, this theme is strongly 
linked to the accuracy of judgment, here in a considered from a statistical 
perspective.  
From a legal perspective, the analysis is confined to European and US tort 
trials. Existing literature on the behavioral economics of evidence law in tort 
trials is mainly concerned with US law. This thesis aims to broaden the scope 
of this inquiry by focusing on European legal systems. The parallel with US 
law creates synergies in linking the present findings with those of the 
existent literature.  
2. Methodology 
From a methodological standpoint this thesis takes a multifold approach. 
Concerning the legal analysis, I adopt a comparative methodology  when this 
																																								 																				
6 Kaplow, L. (2015). Information and the Aim of Adjudication: Truth or 
Consequences. 67 Stanford Law Review, 1303. 
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approach is instrumental to answer the specific questions addressed in a 
Chapter. In this connection, Chapter II makes a comparison between  Italian 
and US law as it addresses the question of whether country differences in the 
regulation of character evidence can be justified in light of the use of juries 
vis-à-vis judges in adjudication. Chapter IV broadens the scope to encompass 
an analysis of English, French, Italian and US law as it aims scrutinize how 
these different jurisdictions deal with the use of gender and race-based 
statistical tables to award damages at trial.  In other Chapters a thorough 
comparative analysis is less relevant for the research question inquired and 
therefore sporadic reference is made to rules or practices adopted in one or 
more legal system. In this regard, in Chapter III, the legal analysis is 
concerned with whether and how implicit racial biases can affect tort trial 
outcomes in several European countries, but without the aim of making a 
comparison between the situation prevailing in different jurisdictions.  
The thesis adopts a multifold approach also concerning the behavioral law 
and economics side of the analysis. The starting point of each topic analyzed 
is the neoclassical economic approach to the issue. Subsequently I expand 
the analysis to take into account insights from psychology and behavioral 
economics. Generally, this expansion can take a theoretical or an empirical 
approach. The analysis provided in this thesis takes both forms.  
Following a well-established methodology, the theoretical Chapters build on 
existing studies in the abovementioned disciplines and draw parallels 
between the judgments and decisions made by subjects in experimental 
settings and evaluations that individuals involved in tort trials (e.g. judges, 
expert testimony, policemen) perform on a regular basis. In this connection, 
theoretical research in behavioral law and economics can take two different 
approaches, either consider what are the consequences of a particular 
behavioral phenomenon for a branch of the law or, alternatively, analyze a 
particular legal issue by drawing on multiple behavioral findings.7 Both 
approaches are embraced in different Chapters of this thesis. 
																																								 																				
7 Tor, A., (2008) The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law. 4 Haifa Law 
Review,p. 239.  
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An empirical approach is taken in Chapter II. In the plethora of possible 
empirical methods used in behavioral law and economics, 8 I carry out a 
quasi-experimental vignette study. In vignette studies, subjects read a 
hypothetical scenario and are requested to answer one or more questions 
related to it. In a fully experimental between subjects study participants are 
randomly assigned to different scenarios, so that differences in responses 
can be linked to the variations in vignettes. In a quasi-experimental design, 
subjects are not randomly assigned to different conditions. In this case, 
differences between conditions can be traced back to either subjects 
characteristics or differences in scenarios. Since the aim of my study is to test 
whether individuals with different degrees of expertise in adjudication are 
differently prone to commit a cognitive error in trial settings, the adoption of 
a quasi-experimental design is an appropriate methodological choice. 
3. Scientific and Societal Relevance 
From a scientific perspective, each Chapter contributes to a particular strand 
of literature. Generally, the fields of research to which this study contributes 
are tort law, evidence law, judicial decision-making and behavioral law and 
economics. Besides contributing to specific strands of literature, the thesis 
generally highlights that relying on neoclassical economics provides only a 
limited picture of the functioning of tort law systems. in this regard, a major 
contribution of law and economics to the study of tort law is its focus on the 
incentives that different rules, standards and court practices provide to 
potential tortfeasors and victims.9 Thus, for instance, neoclassical economics 
provides useful insights on which of two liability regimes (e.g. negligence vs. 
strict liability) provides stronger incentives to tortfeasors and victims to 
invest in precautionary measures.10 The power of law and economics, 
however, goes even further than this, as it allows assessing the performance 
of different rules, standards and practices to achieve social welfare 
																																								 																				
8 Engel, C. (2013) Behavioral Law and Economics: Empirical Methods, MPI 
Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2013/1.  
9 Shavell, S. (2009). Economic Analysis of Accident Law. Harvard University Press. 
10 Shavell, S. (1980). Strict liability Versus Negligence. 9(1) The Journal of Legal 
Studies, 1. 
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maximization. This, in turn, can provide insightful perspectives for welfare-
based policymaking.11   
Yet, a necessary (and obvious) limit of law and economics is that economic 
models can capture only a part of reality. For this reason, developments in 
the literature show that sometimes results that were once well established, 
might turn out to be weaker when additional factors are taken into account.12 
In this connection, to the extent that policy makers choose to pursue social 
welfare maximization as the normative aim, the policy recommendation to 
be followed may change. Traditionally, the increase in analytical complexity 
of the functioning of tort law systems was achieved by considering for 
instance, different types of risk preferences or by adding institutional details 
previously ignored.13 Behavioral law and economics could be seen as a 
specific type of this developments, which is characterized by complementing 
or substituting rational choice theory with other models of decision-making 
borrowed from psychology and behavioral economics. As I will argue below, 
the expansion of the analysis to alternative models of decision-making can 
sometimes highlight that the incentives set by rules, standards and practices 
might be different from those resulting from a rational choice analysis. As a 
consequence, the welfare effects of these legal instruments and practices can 
be shown to be different from the one previously thought.  
To the extent that these alternative models of decision-making capture 
systematic trends in the way individuals form their judgment and behave, 
policymaking based solely on rational choice theory may lead to states of the 
world in which social welfare is lower than if behavioral insights were taken 
into account. In this connection, there is an overwhelming amount of 
evidence that derives from studies in psychology and behavioral economics 
showing that rational choice theory fails to predict human judgment and 
decision-making in a wide variety of settings.14 This evidence provides strong 
indication that even if a system was shaped to accommodate 
																																								 																				
11 See, for instance: Faure, M. (2015). Private Liability and Critical Infrastructure. 
6(2) European Journal of Risk Regulation, 229. 
12 See, for instance the literature discussed in Section II.3.  
13 See, generally: Faure, M. (2009) Tort Law and Economics (Vol. 1). Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
14 Jolls, C., Sunstein, C. R., and Thaler, R. (1998).  
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recommendations that derive from taking an economic approach to study 
law, there are good reasons to believe that this system would not maximize 
social welfare. This can happen, for instance, in contexts in which an analysis 
based on rational choice theory suggests that social welfare is higher if rule A 
is implemented compared to rule B, but the reverse is true when behavioral 
insights are taken into account. Behavioral law and economics is therefore a 
useful complement to more traditional rational choice-based welfare 
analyses.  
Its usefulness is even more manifest if one considers that sometimes the best 
policy response to decision-making that does not conform to rational choice 
theory is not to change the rule from A to B, but to combine rule A with 
another rule. Imagine, for instance, that if rule C complements rule A, social 
welfare is higher than under rule B and rule B+C. In this case, if A, B and C 
are the full set of rules available, A+C is the best policy choice. In this 
respect, an aspect that makes behavioral law and economics a very useful 
complement of neoclassical law and economics is that  the most efficient and 
effective policy strategies that aim to address reductions in social welfare due 
to departures from rational choice, are often based on behavioral insights.  
For example, this is the case of strategies that align the decision-making of 
the individual with the predictions of rational choice. In this sense, the thesis 
highlights the importance of complementing neoclassical economics with a 
behavioral approach to the study of the functioning of tort law, evidence law 
and judicial decision-making. 
More generally, thesis analyzes an issue that is relevant for evaluating the 
performance of any legal system. Indeed, how accurately we can predict the 
influence of a legal rule on human behavior is a relevant issue for any 
policymaker interested in the consequences of her policy choices. This is a 
non-trivial issue, especially in an era in which behavioral policymaking is 
becoming more and more pervasive at all levels of governance.15  
In addition, the accuracy of fact-finding is a major concern of any legal 
system as it is linked to the achievement of various aims, such as deterrence 
																																								 																				
15 See for instance: http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/gini; 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/research/crosscutting-activities/behavioral-insights.  
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and justice.16 Evidentiary rules as well as rules of substantive law are often 
justified and reformed on the basis of their alleged ability to increase 
accuracy in adjudication. As it will be discussed extensively in the following 
pages, the ability of a legal system to reach this goal is not independent from 
the way in which judges perceive and evaluate items of evidence presented at 
trial and make decisions on their basis. A behavioral law and economics 
approach to the study of accuracy at trial can therefore enlighten the 
strengths and weaknesses of formal and informal rules regulating the trial as 
well as the training and selection of judges.  
Furthermore, given this widespread belief that accuracy should be a major 
aim of adjudication, highlighting limits of accuracy for the achievement of 
other normative values is a non-irrelevant issue. 
The societal relevance of this thesis goes beyond the practical importance of 
accuracy. A major focus of the present work is on ingroup-outgroup biases, 
and more specifically on gender and racial issues. In this connection, 
nowadays a large proportion of European residents is of non-European 
ancestry.17 This proportion is likely to increase in the near future manly due 
to migratory fluxes that Europe is expected to experience in the coming 
years.18 Significant demographic changes of this type may trigger (conscious 
and unconscious) negative reactions of the majoritarian racial group.19 These 
reactions can add up to preexisting expressions of discrimination. One 
possible context in which discrimination can occur is the courtroom. In this 
																																								 																				
16 Garoupa, N., and Rizzolli, M. (2012) Wrongful Convictions Do Lower Deterrence. 
168(2) Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 224; Grunewald, R. 
(2013) Comparing Injustices: Truth, Justice, and the System. 77 Albany Law 
Review, 1139. 
17 In 2009, Germany hosted 10.8 million immigrants; France and Italy respectively 
6.7 million and 4.5 million. (see: IOM, World Migration Report, 2010) While not all 
immigrants are necessarily non-white, the proportion of immigrants that are likely 
to be identified as such is non-trivial. Exact numbers are obviously not available, 
but proxies such as the country of origin confirm this. For instance, at the end of 
2014, more than 1 million individuals with African origins were legally resident in 
Italy (official statistics available at: http://demo.istat.it/str2014/index.html. 
Forecasts suggest that these numbers are likely to increase in the next years due to 
the large scale immigration from Africa and the Middle-East (see: EPSC, Legal 
Migration in the EU, Issue 2, 2015). 
18 EPSC, Legal Migration in the EU 2, 2015. 
19 See for instance: Craig, M. A., and Richeson, J. A. (2014) More Diverse Yet Less 
Tolerant? How the Increasingly Diverse Racial Landscape Affects white Americans’ 
Racial Attitudes. 40(6) Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 750. 
	 20 
connection, racial discrimination in criminal trials has been long studied in 
both psychology20 and economics21. This literature offers evidence that 
members of racial minority groups are discriminated against in the criminal 
law systems of various Western countries.  Conversely, research on the 
impact of race on tort trial outcomes is much more limited. Besides some 
anecdotal evidence,22 only two quantitative studies have inquired the 
presence of discrimination across racial/ethnic groups in these settings.23 In 
line with the results obtained in criminal settings, both studies found that 
members of minority groups are discriminated against in civil trials.  
Similarly, despite improvements achieved in the last decades, gender 
discrimination remains a major issue in Europe.24 In this regard, besides 
some exceptional study,25 the issue of gender discrimination in tort trials 
remains widely understudied. This is surprising. Indeed tort law plays a key 
role in regulating the conduct of individuals and private/public entities in a 
wide variety of settings such as environmental protection, consumer 
																																								 																				
20 For meta-analytical studies on existing literature on the subject see: Mitchell, T. 
L., Haw, R. M., Pfeifer, J. E., & Meissner, C. A. (2005). Racial Bias in Mock Juror 
Decision-making: a Meta-analytic Review of Defendant Treatment, 29 Law and 
Human Behavior 627; Devine DJ Caughlin DE (2014) Do They Matter? A Meta-
Analytic Investigation of Individual Characteristics and Guilt Judgments (2014) 
20(2) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 109.   
21 See Abrams, D. S., Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2012) Do Judges Vary in 
Their Treatment of Race?. The Journal of Legal Studies, 41(2), 347; Gazal-Ayal, O., 
& Sulitzeanu-Kenan, R. (2010). Let My People Go: Ethnic In-Group Bias in Judicial 
Decisions—Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment. 7(3) Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies, 403; Grossman, G., Gazal-Ayal, O., Pimentel, S. D., & 
Weinstein, J. M. (2016). Descriptive representation and judicial outcomes in 
multiethnic societies. 60(1) American Journal of Political Science, 44. 
22 For a discussion of racial discrimination in tort trials during the XIX and XX 
century in the US, see: Wriggins, J. B. (2007). Damages in Tort Litigation: Thoughts 
on Race and Remedies, 1865-2007. 27(1) Review of Litigation 37. See also, 
generally: Chamallas, M., & Wriggins, J. B. (2010). The Measure of Injury: Race, 
Gender, and Tort Law. NYU Press. 
23 See  Chin A. and  Peterson M.A. (1985) Deep Pockets, Empty Pockets: Who Wins 
in Cook County Jury Trials RAND Report; Shayo M. and Zussman A., (2011) 
Judicial Ingroup Bias in the Shadow of Terrorism 126(3) Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 1447. 
24 See: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/ 
25 Chamallas M and Wriggins JB (2010)  The Measure of an Injury: Race, Gender, 
and the Law of Torts NYU Press. 
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protection and workplace safety.26 This thesis aims to fill the knowledge gaps 
in this field and open a debate on these issues. 
4. Limitations 
As in any comparative legal study, I have limited the scope of the analysis to 
a restricted number of legal systems. As mentioned above, the focus is here 
on some European legal systems and on the US. I have included the US 
system because of the major role that American scholarship has in 
promoting the application of behavioral insights to law and policymaking. By 
expanding the analysis to European law, the thesis aims to circumscribe the 
scope of the analysis to a number of legal systems that, for historical reasons 
share common roots and that in more recent years have experienced forms 
of (attempted) harmonization under the umbrella of the European 
integration.27 The choice of these countries is therefore strategic from three 
perspectives: i) Similarities between countries make comparison more 
tractable; ii) this inquiry expands beyond a pure legal analysis to touch upon 
behavioral law and economics aspects of the functioning of different legal 
systems. As such, the present work can be seen as complementing well 
established strands of comparative legal research that focuses on European 
and the US legal systems;28  iii) Future  harmonization attempts may benefit 
from this comparative analysis.  
Nonetheless, to the extent that situations similar to those considered here 
prevail also in other legal systems, the informative scope of the analysis 
provided in this thesis can be extended beyond the countries explicitly 
considered here. In this regard, it is worth nothing that many behavioral 
																																								 																				
26 Generally, various streams of evidence indicate that private law plays an 
important role in determining inequalities among social groups. Sandefur, R. L. 
(2008). Access to civil justice and race, class, and gender inequality. 34 Annuual 
Review of  Sociology, 340. 
27 See, for instance, the projects brought forward by the European Group on Tort 
Law (available at: http://www.egtl.org/) and the recent European Parliament study 
on the harmonization of European civil procedural law (available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/559499/EPRS_IDA(
2015)559499_EN.pdf)  
28 See, for instance, the well established work that the European Centre of Tort and 
Insurance Law (http://www.ectil.org/) has produced in the last decades. 
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patterns highlighted by psychology and behavioral economics have (often 
strong) cross-country validity so that research conducted with citizens of one 
country often provides insights on the decision-making of citizens of other 
countries.29 Research has also highlighted that there are sometimes 
exceptions to these uniform trends.30 For this reason, throughout the thesis, 
I will discuss whether and to what extent the behavioral phenomena on 
which the analysis focuses is relevant also for the decision-making of the 
populations considered. 
In addition, since each Chapter addresses a selected topic in tort and 
evidence law the overarching issue of accuracy and behavioral law and 
economics is touched upon in a scattered manner. The thesis therefore does 
not aim at providing a definitive answer to the debates on the interplay 
between accuracy and behavioral law and economics. Instead, it discusses 
various issues related to this central topic, contributing to the debate on the 
issue from different angles.  
Furthermore, the thesis has a strong empirical focus. When possible, I 
support theoretical arguments with empirical evidence and Chapter II 
provides some empirical evidence itself. Yet, for obvious reasons linked to 
the necessarily circumscribed scope of a PhD dissertation, I develop some of 
the issues discussed only at a theoretical level. Ideally, these theoretical 
arguments can set the basis for future empirical research in this field.  
Lastly, a large part of the thesis is descriptive in nature. In this sense, the 
present work does not offer any definitive answer to normative questions 
related to tort and evidence law. Yet, as mentioned above, the thesis 
highlights how behavioral insights can be relevant to answer different 
normative questions that arise in relation to the regulation of these branches 
of the law. As such, the present work has a clear policy relevance.  
																																								 																				
29 Berry, J. W. (2002). Cross-cultural Psychology: Research and Applications. 
Cambridge University Press. 
30 Berry, J. W. (2002). 
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5. Summary of the Chapters 
Chapter II introduces the role of accuracy in adjudication from a legal and 
economic perspective. Building on similarities in the role of truth (accuracy 
is a form of truth) within these fields of research, the Chapter discusses 
various issues that derive from the adoption of different truth standards in 
studies in judgment and decision-making when findings in this field are used 
to evaluate courts’ performance in adjudication. Indeed, accuracy and 
coherence in adjudication are generally seen as major criteria for the 
assessment of the truthfulness of courts’ decisions. Similarly, accuracy and 
coherence are two main truth criteria adopted in behavioral economics to 
evaluate human judgment and behavior. Both in law and in judgment and 
decision-making , judgments that are accurate are not necessarily true also 
under the coherence criterion. For this reason, the Chapter argues that 
scholars that rely on studies in judgment and decision-making to evaluate 
the legal rules and practices, should pay careful attention to differences in 
truth standards adopted by different strands of literature within judgment 
and decision-making. A failure to do so may create confusion regarding 
whether, to what extent and why a certain behavioral phenomenon 
represents a problem than needs to be addressed in the courtroom. In 
addition, the appropriateness of a behaviorally informed policy that aims at 
addressing a policy failure is often strictly related to the type of truth 
standard adopted in the relevant psychological literature. The Chapter 
illustrates the importance of these issues by making reference to the legal 
scholarship on the fundamental attribution error (FAE).  
Chapter III presents an empirical study on whether legally trained 
individuals commit the fundamental attribution error (FAE) in trial settings. 
Expanding the scope of previous research, I focus on two triggers 
of the FAE: the individual characteristics of the adjudicator (i.e. implicit 
theories of moral character) and a contextual factor (i.e. character evidence). 
In addition, to assess the influence of legal training on individuals’ ability to 
avoid committing the FAE at trial, I compare the decisions made by law 
students and those made by individuals that are enrolled in the post-master 
course that prepares to enter the Italian judiciary. I find that subjects 
	 24 
enrolled in a post-master course are better able than law students to 
disregard character evidence when expected to do so. Yet, I observe that in 
both groups adjudicators are not able to prevent their personal inclinations 
to influence their decisions on causality and responsibility. These findings 
inform the debate on whether strict evidentiary rules might be less necessary 
when fact-finding is performed by expert adjudicators. In addition, overall, 
the study highlights a more positive picture of judicial decision-making than 
what often assumed in legal scholarship on the FAE. 
Chapter IV has five main aims. I first introduce the psychological research on 
implicit racial biases (IRBs) to an audience of European legal scholars. Thus, 
in the literature review I focus on the main concepts related to the study of 
IRBs and discuss how these biases have been shown to be present also in the 
European population. Second, I argue that IRBs are likely to exist in tort law 
settings. In this connection, I describe how the biases are likely to affect the 
evaluation of different types of items of evidence and thus, ultimately, tort 
trial outcomes. Third, I argue that because in tort law IRBs can play a role at 
various stages of a trial, their combined effect can be substantial. In doing so, 
I highlight criteria that may help understanding in which types of trials IRBs 
are more likely to be problematic. This, in my perspective is of interest to 
policymakers. Fourth, I argue that the effect of IRBs on trial outcomes can 
frustrate the achievement of the goals attributed to tort law. Fifth, I discuss 
options for debiasing and insulating, explaining also that in my view the 
mere existence of IRBs does not per se imply that these techniques should be 
implemented (as, for instance they impose costs on society). Thus, my 
analysis goes beyond merely identifying a (potential, yet, given existing 
evidence very likely) problem in tort law. I also offer solutions that take into 
account the legal institutions in which tort law trials take place in 
contemporary Europe. 
Chapter V discusses the use of gender and race-based statistical tables (e.g. 
life expectancy; work-life expectancy and average wage tables) for the 
estimation of damages for future losses in tort trials. Building on a recent 
paper by Avraham and Yuracko in which the authors argue that the use of 
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non-blended tables in US tort trials may decrease social welfare,31 the 
Chapter addresses the same issue from a behavioral perspective. In addition, 
it offers a comparative analysis of the use of non-blended tables between the 
English, French, Italian and the US legal systems. The Chapter finds that 
contrary to the US experience, race and gender based tables play a minor 
role in the European legal systems considered. In addition, the behavioral 
analysis supports the conclusion of Avraham and Yuracko that the use of 
non-blended tables is likely to decrease social welfare. 
Chapter VI concludes by bringing together the insights proposed in the 
previous Chapters to provide an answer to the three questions listed above 
on the interplay between accuracy and behavioral law and economics. In 
particular, it argues that, on the basis of the analysis proposed in the thesis, 
there are good reasons to believe that behavioral insights can improve our 
understanding of human behavior and that these insights are relevant for 
policymakers.  In addition, the thesis provides mixed findings regarding 
whether a behavioral perspective casts doubts on courts’  ability  to reach 
accurate decisions. On the one hand, behavioral studies often show that 
human JDM is not as accurate as we would like it to be. On the other hand, 
the thesis highlights a number of reasons why an (in)accurate judgment 
relative to one trial issue (e.g. the evaluation of one item of evidence) does 
not necessarily translate into an (in)accurate decision. Lastly, the Chapter 
shows that when taking a behavioral perspective to study evidence in tort 
trials, accuracy at trial loses some of its normative stance. This is because the 
behavioral insights highlight discrepancies between the pursuit of accuracy 
and the achievement of other normative goals of the trial. 
																																								 																				
31 Avraham, R and Yuracko, K.  (Forthcoming 2017) Torts and Discrimination, Ohio 
State Law Journal. 
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Chapter II   
Coherence vs Correspondence: Some 
Clarification on the Fundamental Attribution 
Error in Tort Law (and Economics) 
1. Introduction 
Truth (in either one or both of its forms, accuracy and coherence) is widely 
considered a major aim of adjudication.32 In legal scholarship, institutional 
settings are therefore often evaluated, compared and sometimes reformed on 
the basis of whether and the extent to which they help and compel 
adjudicators to reach truthful decisions. These evaluations and reforms have 
often been informed by studies in judgment and decision-making (JDM) and 
with the relatively recent  of behavioral law and economics this trend is 
growing at a fast pace. Similar to adjudication, many studies in JDM assess 
the human competence to form judgments and decisions with reference to 
their ability to achieve truth.33 Thus, trial settings are often evaluated and 
reformed on the basis of truth standard adopted in JDM. In this connection, 
as recently highlighted by Hammond and by a special edition of Judgment 
and Decision Making,34 studies in JDM often adopt different truth 
standards. This Chapter argues that to the extent that legal scholarship relies 
on JDM to evaluate the legal rules and practices, it should not ignore the 
differences in truth standards adopted in JDM.  
Three main reasons support this claim: first, taking into account differences 
in truth standards adopted in JDM is sometimes important to identify 
whether a given behavioral phenomenon has to be considered problematic in 
light of the normative truth criterion according to which adjudication is 
assessed. Second, as it will be shown below, JDM sometimes adopts 
questionable truth standards, which, if used to evaluate courts’ performance, 
																																								 																				
32 Taruffo, M. (2014) Evidence, in M. Cappelletti eds, International Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law - Civil Procedure Vol XVI. 
33 Hammond, K. R. (2007). Beyond Rationality: The Search for Wisdom in a 
Troubled Time. Oxford University Press. 
34 Dunwoody, P. T. (2009). Theories of Truth as Assessment Criteria in Judgment 
and Decision Making, 4(2) Judgment and Decision Making 116. 
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may not lead to improvements in, and maybe even worsen, adjudication. 
Third, depending on which truth criterium is adopted, the strength of the 
evidence supporting behavioral responses to determined policy failures 
changes. To the extent that behavioral law and economics is (or wants to be) 
an empirically driven field of research, this is a non-trivial issue.  
To illustrate these points, the Chapter builds on studies of one of the most 
influential behavioral phenomena in legal scholarship, namely the 
fundamental attribution error (FAE). In addition, particular attention will be 
given to the use of truth standards to evaluate courts’ performance in law 
and economics, which is one of the strands of legal scholarship  that is more 
heavily influenced by behavioral insights. The focus will be on the economics 
of judicial errors in the imposition of liability, as most legal literature on the 
FAE focuses on this issue. 
The Chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses truth as a criterion 
to evaluate courts’ decisions and human decision-making. Section 3 
addresses the issues of truth in adjudication with regards to the imposition 
of liability in the economics of tort law. Section 4 discusses the problems that 
arise from mismatches between the psychological use of truth standards in 
experiments on the FAE and their interpretation in legal scholarship. Section 
5 concludes.  
2. Truth in Adjudication and JDM 
Legal scholars generally agree that truth is a main aim of adjudication.35 
From this perspective, procedural rules and practices should be shaped to 
nudge courts in establishing the truth of the facts considered.  
Building on the epistemological debate on truth, legal scholars distinguish 
between two types of judicial truth that a legal system can aim to achieve: 
correspondence and coherence.36 The focus of the correspondence theory is 
empirical truth. In this perspective, a court decision is true only when it 
																																								 																				
35 For different perspectives on the aim of adjudication see: Kaplow, L. (2015); 
Damaska, M. (1997). 49 Truth in adjudication. Hastings LJ 289. 
36 Taruffo, M. (2014) 
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corresponds to the empirical facts that occurred outside the trial.37 The basic 
tenets of this theory are that facts are understandable and there is only one 
truth. 38   This seems the conception of truth that part of the law and 
economics scholarship adopts when discussing judicial errors (see below 
Section 3).39 Correspondence is also the most ancient theory of truth among 
those that permeate the current debate on the philosophy of JDM and it is 
often seen as the closest to the common sense view of truth. In this view, a 
judgment is true only when it is factually (empirically) accurate and 
regardless of whether the cognitive process that led to the judgment could be 
somehow justified or even illustrated.40  
The second, most prominent theory of truth in evidence law and JDM is 
coherence. The coherence theory of truth is more recent than the 
correspondence theory41 and its central tenet is that facts as such are 
generally not knowable to humans because the understanding of facts is 
itself made through perception and judgment.42 Since facts are only 
knowable trough senses, what we refer to as facts are beliefs themselves.43 
Given the impossibility to empirically assess the truthfulness of our beliefs, 
the way to establish truth is to determine the coherence of beliefs.44 Thus, 
only a coherent set of beliefs can be said to be true.45  
 Coherence can refer to interpersonal coherence or intrapersonal 
coherence.46 On the one hand, a set of beliefs held by a person can be said to 
be true from an intrapersonal perspective if, and only if, all its separate parts 
are consistent with one another.47 For instance, in the field of JDM 
																																								 																				
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Garoupa, N., & Rizzolli, M. (2012) 
40 Hammond, K. R. Human Judgment and Social Policy: Irreducible Uncertainty, 
Inevitable Error, Unavailable Injustice, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 106.  
41 For a brief overview of the historical roots of coherence theory, see: Dawson, N. 
V., & Gregory, F. (2009). Correspondence and Coherence in Science: A Brief 
Historical Perspective. 4(2) Judgment and Decision Making, 126. 
42 Dunwoody, P. T. (2009). Theories of Truth as Assessment Criteria in Judgment 
and Decision Making. Judgment and Decision Making, 4(2), 116.  
43 Ibid 
44 Ibid. 
45 Hammond, K. R., (1996) . 
46 Dunwoody, P. T. (2009). 
47 Hammond, K.R (2009); P.T. Dunwoody, (2009). 
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transitivity is an issue of intrapersonal coherence.48 On the other hand, from 
an interpersonal point of view the beliefs of an individual are true only if they 
are consistent with the beliefs that are largely shared by other individuals.49  
The assumption underlying the coherence theory is that truth cannot be 
inconsistent. However, the coherence theory does not imply that every set of 
coherent beliefs is necessarily true from a correspondence perspective, 
meaning that a set of coherent beliefs can be empirically inaccurate.50 
Indeed, it is not clear when increases in coherence of beliefs triggers an 
increase in correspondence.51 Thus, given that coherence is a necessary but 
not sufficient element of truth, it has been argued that truth requires both 
correspondence and coherence.52 Generally, neither in JDM nor in legal 
scholarship there is agreement on which is/are the standard(s) of truth that 
should be adopted.53 Yet, as I argue below, the economics of tort law seems 
to give more prominence to correspondence than to coherence as standards 
to evaluate courts’ performance.  
3. The Economic Value of Truth in the Imposition of Liability   
Rationality in economics is defined according to coherence criteria.54 Indeed, 
a large part of law and economics assumes that judges make coherent 
decisions. For instance, Posner describes judges as Bayesian updaters in 
																																								 																				
48 Transitivity refers to the fact that it would be incoherent for an individual to 
prefer x to y, y to z and not prefer x to z. See on this: Korobkin R. B. and Ulen T. S., 
(2000). 
49 K.R. Hammond K.R. (1996). Dunwoody, P. T. (2009). 
50 Dunwoody, P. T. (2009).  
51 Ibid. 
52 Dunwoody, P. T. (2009). Dawson, N. V., & Gregory, F. (2009). Correspondence 
and Coherence in Science: A Brief Historical Perspective. 4(2) Judgment and 
Decision Making, 126. 
53 Hammond K.R. (1996); Taruffo, (2104); Haack, S. Justice, Truth, and Proof: Not 
So Simple, After All, 2014. 
54 Generally rational choice theory assumes that: 1) Individuals are able to compare 
goods and rank them according to their preferences (completeness); 2) Individuals 
rank alternative outcomes in a consistent way according to their preferences 
(transitivity, as defined above). 3) Individuals make choices considering the payoffs 
of their actions and not on the basis of how the choice is framed (invariance); 4) The 
choice between options should depend on the features that distinguish them 
(cancellation); 5) Between the option x and option y, and individual should always 
choose x when x is at least as good as y for every features and dominates y in at least 
one feature (dominance). See: Korobkin, R. B., & Ulen, T. S. (2000).  
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several of his writings.55 Yet, in this context coherence is adopted as a 
descriptive criterion and not as a normative one. This is because in law and 
economics truth is not seen per se as an independent goal of adjudication. 
Instead, the normative standard endorsed by this strand of literature for the 
evaluation of legal systems is social welfare maximization. With specific 
regards to tort law, this aim is translated into the minimization of the social 
cost of accidents.56 To the extent that the failure to make coherent decisions 
does not systematically increase the costs of accidents, neoclassical law and 
economics does not see it as a problem.57 The same applies to 
correspondence. Yet, in this regard, law and economics scholars have long 
highlighted that correspondence in adjudication (often referred to as 
accuracy) is a major driver of social welfare maximization. To understand 
why, let us first briefly introduce the economic model of tort law.  
When viewed through the lenses of economics, the primary aim of tort law is 
to incentivize potential tortfeasors and victims to make optimal investments 
in precautionary measures. This aim is achieved by allocating the expected 
losses of the accident between the tortfeasor and the victim.58 Since the 
discussion of the economic model of tort law is here merely instrumental to 
illustrate the relevance of truth criteria in assessing courts’ performance, the 
discussion is here limited to unilateral accidents. Unilateral accidents are 
those where only injurers can influence the probability and the magnitude of 
the loss. In this framework, according to the marginal Hand formula this 
allocation should take place so that the tortfeasor has an incentive to take 
optimal care. Optimal care is the level of care at which marginal cost of 
taking care equals the marginal benefit from the reduction in expected 
accident losses. When the injurers’ level of activity is taken into account, the 
goal of tort law becomes to maximize the utility that injurers derive from 
																																								 																				
55 Posner, R. A. (2010). How Judges Think. Harvard University Press. 
56 G. Calabresi (1970). The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis. New 
Haven; London: Yale University Press.  
57 The argument made here is not that incoherent judgments never lead decreases in 
social welfare. More simply, my point is that the link between these two elements is 
not necessarily obvious, especially when one considers the large variety of 
coherence criteria that can be adopted to evaluate human judgments (for instance, 
see below Section 4.1.2).  
58 Shavell, S. (1987) Economic Analysis of Accident Law. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge. 
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carrying out their activities less the sum of the expected damages of 
accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents.59 The increase in utility that an 
injurer enjoys from engaging in the activity an additional time is referred to 
as the marginal utility of the activity. Conversely, the cost of avoiding 
accidents is equal to the product of the level of activity and the level of care.60 
In this context, social welfare is maximized when the marginal utility that 
injurer derives from engaging an additional time in their activity equals the 
sum of the increase of the cost of taking due care and the increase in the 
expected accident losses.61 In absence of tort law injurers may have an 
incentive to engage too much in their activity.62 This is because the additional 
risk created by increases in activity levels would not be internalized.63  The 
aim of tort law is to remedy to this market failure by imposing optimal 
deterrence.64 
Legal economists have long highlighted the importance of accuracy (read 
correspondence) in the establishment of liability for the achievement of 
optimal deterrence.65 Accuracy is here defined as the degree by which courts 
commit false positive (or type I) errors – i.e. they impose liability on 
individuals that did not violate a legal command – and false negative  (or 
type II) errors - i.e. they do not impose liability on individuals that did 
violate a legal command.66 The basic mechanism via which accuracy is 
related to deterrence was first described by Png in 1986 and it goes as 
follows67: ceteris paribus, improvements in accuracy increase the cost of 
																																								 																				
59 Shavell, S. (1987). 
60 Mueller-Langer, F., and Schäfer, H. B. (2009). Strict Liability Versus Negligence. 
In Tort Law and Economics, Chapter IEdward Elgar.  
61 Shavell, S (1987). 
62 Shavell, S. (2004).  
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid.  
65   Png, I. P. (1986). Optimal Subsidies and Damages in the Presence of Judicial 
Error. 6(1) International Review of Law and Economics101; Kaplow, L. (1994). The 
Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis. 23(1) The Journal of 
Legal Studies 345. Notice that accuracy in adjudication does not have similar 
importance for other types of decisions made in tort trials. This is the case for 
instance with regards to damages awards, where only average accuracy matters. See 
on this: Kaplow, L., & Shavell, S. (1996). Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages. 
The Journal of Law and Economics, 39(1), 191-210 (see also Chapter V). 
66 Kaplow, L. (1994).  
67 Png, I. P. (1986).  
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committing a tortious act and decrease the cost of not committing it.68 To see 
why this is the case imagine a legal system in which sanctions are imposed at 
random. Here, the expected liability of an individual is independent from 
whether - and to what extent - he engages in a potentially tortious activity. 
Therefore, the legal system does not provide any incentive to individuals not 
to engage in an activity. Starting from this situation, a shift from this state of 
the world to one in which courts are more likely to impose liability on 
subjects that have committed a tort than on those that did not, will increase 
the cost of engaging in tortious activities. In addition, reductions in false 
positives will decrease the expected liability of those that act in accordance 
with the legal command. 
This conclusion has been questioned by Lando,69 who distinguishes between 
wrongful convictions based on errors of acts and errors of identity. The 
former occur when a person is made liable for a tort that has actually not 
occurred (e.g. if no harm was caused). The second type of wrongful 
convictions takes place when a person is made liable instead of someone else. 
According to Lando, errors of identity are often unlikely to decrease 
deterrence because in this case both tortfeasors and non-tortfeasors can 
suffer liability for the mistake of the judge, for this reason none of them have 
an incentive to change behavior.  
Garoupa and Rizzolli argue that Lando’s perspective captures the effect of 
wrongful convictions only in a limited set of circumstances.70 This is because 
for each wrongful imposition of liability, a tortfeasor escapes liability. In 
addition, the probability of being wrongfully made liable is higher for 
tortfeasors than for non-tortfeasors as, for instance, they engage in the 
tortious activity more than non-tortfeasors. From this it follows that the 
wrongful imposition of liability decreases the expected liability of 
committing a tort and increase the expected liability of not committing one.  
																																								 																				
68 Kaplow, L. (1994).  
69 Lando, H. (2006). Does Wrongful Conviction Lower Deterrence?. 35(2) The 
Journal of Legal Studies 327.  
70 Garoupa, N., and Rizzolli, M. (2012).  
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Lando and Mungan contest this view.71 In particular, they argue that there 
are various situations in which a wrongful imposition of liability does not 
necessarily lead to a missed imposition of liability to the actual tortfeasor. 
This occurs, for instance, when both the actual and the wrong tortfeasors are 
made liable.72  In addition, Lando and Mungan argue that also for wrongful 
imposition of liability based on act, Png’s theory fails to describe the effect of 
accuracy on deterrence for two reasons. First, under a negligence rule, a 
tortfeasor that takes due care but anticipates the possibility of being 
wrongfully made liable receives an incentive to increase investments in 
precautions. Thus type I errors may increase deterrence.  In addition, if the 
probability of type I and II errors is conditional on adjudication, type I errors 
affect deterrence less than type II errors. This holds as long as adjudication is 
more likely when the injurer has acted in violation of the law than otherwise. 
Thus, overall, according to Lando and Mungan, Type I errors related to acts 
may either increase deterrence or reduce it less than type II errors.  
Overall, this brief overview of the current economic debate on accuracy in 
tort trials highlights that, with some qualification, there is general consensus 
that accuracy in adjudication moderates deterrence, which in turn affects the 
production of social welfare. Thus, in the context of the economics of liability 
law correspondence is a primary criterion to evaluate the performance of 
judges. Indeed, Kaplow recently argues that if perfect accuracy could be 
achieved at no cost, social welfare maximization could be achieved by 
focusing exclusively on courts’ accuracy.73 Conversely, coherence in 
adjudication has a less manifest goal in the minimization of the social costs 
of accidents. 
Having clarified the role of truth in adjudication from the perspective of the 
imposition of liability in law and in law and economics, the next session 
illustrates how ignoring differences in truth standards adopted in JDM can 
lead legal analysis astray. I elaborate this point by building on a specific 
branch of behavioral literature referred to as attribution theory. 
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72 Ibid. 
73 Kaplow, L. (2015). 
35	
	
4.  An Example: Correspondence and Coherence in 
Attribution and Their Misuse in Legal Scholarship 
Attribution theory is one of the theories in psychology that has been more 
widely applied to judicial decision-making, i.e. the study of how individuals 
explain the events that they witness. Conventionally, scholars identify the 
work of Heider as a cornerstone in the studies on attribution.74 Heider was 
interested in analyzing how individuals understand the world that surrounds 
them. According to Heider, the behavior of a person is the result of two 
variables: the person and the situation.75 Thus, a person that aims to 
understand the determinants of human behavior has to find a method to 
distinguish the causal contribution of each of the two variables.  
Within attribution theory, legal scholars have given particular attention to 
the Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE),76 which refers to the human 
tendency to underestimate the power of situational factors and overestimate 
the influence of dispositional factors in causing human behavior. This 
Section discusses the use of truth standards in the study of the FAE and the 
(mis)use of these studies to evaluate the functioning of trial systems. 
4.1 Correspondence and Coherence in Attribution 
The starting point of this analysis is that the use of the terms 
overestimation/underestimation in the definition of the FAE implies the 
existence of a reference point from which the estimation is made. In 
addition, the qualification of the FAE as a judgment that does not 
correspond to the truth implies that this reference point has to be a truthful 
one. Following Hammond,77 Dunwoody78 and Jennings,79  this Section 
discusses correspondence and the various coherence criteria adopted in the 
context of attribution theory.  
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4.1.1 Correspondence in Attribution 
As discussed above, the correspondence focuses on empirical truth. 
Attribution theorists often consider the issue of correspondence as a troubled 
one.80 Determining the empirical accuracy of causal attributions requires 
first to be able to determine the empirically true determinants of human 
behavior, however the latter are difficult to establish.81  
Ross argues that despite the difficulties of determining the true causes of 
human behavior, it is still possible to establish the accuracy of attributions 
when the attributer is asked to predict the behavior of others.82 In these 
cases, the accuracy of the attribution could be determined by comparing the 
prediction with the actual (observed) behaviors.83 For instance, 
psychologists have often devised experiments in which a pool of participants 
was asked to predict the behavior of other participants in presence and 
absence of some situational factor. The analysis was aimed at understanding 
and tested whether the predictions matched the observed behavior in the two 
conditions, i.e. whether participants could predict the behavioral influence of 
the situational factor.84 
4.1.2 Coherence in Attribution Theory 
Attribution theorists have prevalently used coherence as theory of truth.85 
Most of these theories adopted an intrapersonal definition of coherence, and 
only few of them grounded their normative standard of reference into an 
external logical system.86 This section begins with introducing some of the 
earlier theories of attribution and some of the key concepts in attribution 
theory. Subsequently it discusses two of the most influential normative 
																																								 																				
80 See for instance: Funder, D.C. (1987) Errors and Mistakes: Evaluating the 
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81 Jennings, K.E. (2010). 
82 Ross, L. (1977).  
83 Causal judgment of an observed behavior and prediction of behavior are not 
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L. (1977).  
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theories of attribution. These normative criteria are used in Section 4.2 as 
benchmarks for the evaluation of empirical findings on the FAE.  
A normative theory of attribution aims to illustrate when and by how much 
individuals ought to discount the causal contribution of one factor to an 
event in presence of an alternative plausible cause. Thus, for instance, a 
normative theory of attribution elaborates on how a judge should infer the 
presence of a human error from the observation of an accident when an 
alternative plausible situational cause of the accident is present as well (eg. a 
mechanical failure).87 Notice that here the judge is trying to establish what is 
the plausible causal contribution to the occurrence of an event (the accident), 
of two probabilistically independent sufficient causes (the human error and 
the mechanical failure). In order to establish a normative standard for 
discounting, attribution theories address two main issues:88 1) When an 
individual should discount; 2) What is the right amount of discounting.  
With regards to when to discount, in a seminal work that builds on Heider’s 
framework,89 Kelley argues that discounting for one cause should occur 
when another plausible cause is also present.90 Thus, a judge should be less 
convinced that the cause of the accident under scrutiny at trial was a 
negligent conduct of the driver when the expert testimony highlights a 
mechanical failure in the brakes of the car. This, rather intuitive, finding has 
been upheld by subsequent normative studies.91 
In addition, in relation to how much to discount, Kelley makes a positive 
statement that describes the behavior observed in laboratory experiments 
according to which subjects do not attribute an effect (eg. behavior) to a 
causal factor (eg. disposition) when another sufficiently strong plausible 
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cause (eg. situation) of the same effect is also present.92 Surprisingly, this 
positive statement has been subsequently adopted as a normative criterion of 
attribution.93 In 1977 Ross writes that the discounting principle can be 
described as follows: “To the extent that situational or external factors 
constitute a “sufficient” explanation for an event, that event is attributed to 
the situation and no inference logically can be made (and, presumably, no 
inference empirically is made) about the disposition of the actor”94. 
Hereafter I will refer to this argument as to Ross’s criterion. Gilbert and 
Malone describe this normative criterion as the attribution theory’s 
fundamental rule of logic.95 
Following this earlier contributions, other authors have discussed criteria 
according to which individuals should rationally discount.96 Among these, a 
widely known normative theory of attribution has been proposed by Morris 
and Larrick (hereafter Morris and Larrick’s criteria).97 This model addresses 
both the questions of when and to what extent discounting of one cause is 
normatively warranted when another plausible cause of an observed 
behavior is present.98 Building on Kelley’s model, Morris and Larrick answer 
the question regarding “when to discount” as follows: the probability of a 
particular cause of a behavior being present should be discounted when 
another cause is also present.99  
The second issue that this model addresses regards the amount by which the 
presence of a particular cause of an event (i.e. an accident) should be 
discounted given the presence of another cause. In this regard, they argue 
that the right amount of discounting depends on the attributor’s prior 
probability that a certain cause is present (e.g. a mechanical failure) given 
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the observation of the event (e.g. the accident).100  The lower is this 
probability and the more the observation of the cause calls for discounting. 
For instance, let’s consider two versions of a stylized world. In one version of 
this world (A), judges believe that mechanical failures and negligence driving 
account only for 10% of the accidents, respectively. Therefore, when 
informed that an accident has occurred, they think that there are 10% 
probability that a mechanical failure has caused it and 10% probability than 
the negligent behavior of the driver was the actual cause.  In another version 
of this world (B), judges think that mechanical failures cause 20% of the 
accidents and an equal probability applies to negligent driving. Imagine now 
that an expert testimony provides evidence that a mechanical failure has 
occurred in relation to an accident under scrutiny at trial. Here, judges in 
world A should discount more that probability that the driver was negligent 
than in world B. This is because in world A, mechanical failures are less 
frequent than in world B. 101  
Attribution theorists have widely adopted the truth theories illustrated above 
to determine whether and under which circumstances humans overestimate 
the role that dispositional factors have in shaping human behavior, i.e. to 
study the prevalence of the FAE in a given population. Following Jennings102  
the next section illustrates how empirical findings on the FAE can be 
interpreted on the basis of these coherence-based theories of truth and the 
correspondence theory of truth accepted in attribution theory.  
4.2 Overestimation and Underestimation: Empirical Studies 
on the Fundamental Attribution Error and Their 
Interpretation  
This section illustrates some of the studies that are used to support the 
existence of the FAE. This review does not aim at completeness, conversely 
attention is given to the studies that are most often cited in the legal 
literature on the FAE and tort law.  
																																								 																				
100 Notice that this model provides a normative standard that allows testing only for 
internal consistency of beliefs. 
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4.2.1 The Milgram’s Experiment  
A first study that is often interpreted as showing the existence of the FAE is 
the Milgram’s study on obedience. As I will discuss below, this experiment 
does not deal directly with explaining an observed behavior. Conversely, it 
focuses on predicting future behaviors. As explained above (Section 4.1.1), 
within attribution theory testing the accuracy of predictions is considered a 
meaningful way to determine the accuracy of judgement.   
In the Milgram’s study participants were asked to take a role in an 
experiment that was allegedly aimed at improving both the learning capacity 
and the memory skills of another person through the use of punishment. 
Participants had to take the part of the “teacher”, while an actor that 
pretended to be a subject to the experiment took the part of the “learner”. 
The learner had to memorize a set of pairing words. During the experiment 
the teacher was required to mention one word of the pair and the learner had 
to recall the associated word. When the answer provided by the learner was 
correct, the teacher had to verbally reward the learner. Conversely, when the 
learner answer was wrong, the teacher was asked to punish him by delivering 
an electric shock. The teacher delivered the shock by pushing a lever on an 
apparatus connected to the body of the learner. At the first mistake made by 
the learner, the delivered shock was of 15 w. At each additional error the 
intensity of the shock increased by 15 w, up to 450 w. Of course, the electric 
shocks delivered were not real ones. Nonetheless, the actor pretended to 
receive pain from the punishment. Depending on the degree of punishment 
received, the learner could start complaining about the pain, ask to stop the 
experiment, scream and at higher levels of punishment pretending to have 
lost his senses.  
Milgram asked 40 US psychiatrists to predict how many of the subjects in 
the role of teachers would have accepted to deliver shocks for each level of 
punishment. The average prediction was that most people would have 
refused to deliver the shock at 150 w and that only 1 out of 1000 (the sadists) 
would have gone all the way up to 450 w. The actual result from the Milgram 
experiment shows that 65% of the participants went on up to the maximum 
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level of punishment. The participants to the experiment themselves did not 
predict that they would have behaved as such.103  
From a correspondence perspective the prediction made by both the 
participants to the experiment and third parties are mistaken because they 
do not match the actual behavior observed in the experiment. As mentioned 
above, studies on the accuracy of prediction of behavior do not directly 
address the causal judgment issue, nonetheless the two types of judgment 
are greatly interdependent.104 Thus, these results are interpreted as showing 
the existence of the FAE because the failure to predict the behavior of 
teachers would be due to an underestimation of the power of situational 
factors (the requests of the experimenter) and an overestimation of the 
dispositional factors (unwillingness to harm the learner) in determining 
teachers’ behavior.105 These findings are one of the few that provide 
information regarding the accuracy of human general theories on human 
nature, i.e. they assess whether a set of attributions are true from a 
correspondence perspective.106 However, they leave open the question of 
which is the correct ratio between dispositional and situational attribution, 
i.e. these studies provide no guidance regarding whether attributions are 
coherent.  
4.2.2 The Quiz Game Experiment 
In another experiment widely cited to support the existence of the FAE 
subjects participated in a quiz game. Participants were randomly assigned in 
two different groups: the members of one group (the questioners) were 
required to ask questions to the other group (the contestants). The questions 
were general-knowledge type questions formulated by the questioners 
themselves. Contestants were asked to correctly answer the questions but 
usually failed in answering some of them. Another group of subjects was 
asked to witness the experiment and rate the general knowledge of both 
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groups. Despite knowing that subjects had been randomly assigned to the 
two groups, observers rated the questioners as more knowledgeable than the 
contestants. In addition, both contestants and the questioners themselves 
rated questioners as more knowledgeable than contestants.  
From a coherence perspective this experiment may show the existence of the 
FAE. As mentioned above, one of the earlier and most widely accepted 
normative canons (Ross’ canon) of attribution has been defined as follow: 
“To the extent that situational or external factors constitute a “sufficient” 
explanation for an event, that event is attributed to the situation and no 
inference logically can be made (and, presumably, no inference empirically is 
made) about the disposition of the actor”107. In this case the sufficient 
explanation for the relative performance of the two groups should have been 
found in the advantage of questioners over contestants given by the auto-
selection of the questions by the questioners.108 Thus, if we adopt the 
abovementioned standard as normative, the fact that the questioners were 
evaluated as having a broader general knowledge than the contestants has to 
be interpreted as an underestimation of the situational factors in 
determining human conduct. However, this experiment does not provide 
insights regarding whether attributions were accurate. 
4.2.3 The Castro Essay Experiment 
In a third, often cited, experiment used to support the existence of the FAE 
individuals were asked to write either a pro- or an anti- Castro essays (in 
other versions of this experiment on the legalization of marijuana). Other 
subjects to the experiments were then asked to read these essays. The 
readers were informed that the writers had been paid to write the essay and 
that the assignment either to pro-Castro or anti-Castro positions had been 
random. Subsequently, readers were asked to declare the extent by which 
they believed that the author of the essay they had read had either a pro- or 
an anti-Castro attitude. Subjects who had read pro-Castro essays rated the 
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authors of the pro-Castro essays as more pro-Castro compared to the 
subjects who had read anti-Castro essays.109   
From a correspondence point of view, the Castro essay experiment supports 
the existence of the FAE.110 In some version of this experiment, writers were 
first asked to state their opinion on Castro (legalization of marijuana).111 The 
attributions made by the readers were subsequently matched with those of 
the writers. The results show that attributions were significantly more in line 
with the content of the essay than with the actual opinion of the writers. This 
suggests that the readers failed to take into account the situational pressure 
that the request of the experimenter had on writers’ essay.  
Conversely, from a coherence perspective, whether the Castro essay 
experiment shows inconsistency of belief is not straightforward, because it 
depends on how consistency is defined. According to the widely accepted 
normative criteria of attribution illustrated above, subjects should not infer 
dispositional traits from an observed behavior when the conduct can be 
explained by the presence of a sufficiently strong situational factor.112 In the 
Castro essay experiment the “sufficient explanation for the event” is 
identified with the request of the experimenter to write either a pro- or an 
anti- Castro essay. Therefore, given the existence of a sufficient explanation 
for the essay, no inference should have been logically made about the true 
opinion of the writer. Thus, given that readers’ inferences regarding the true 
attitude of the writers seemed to be influenced by the content of the essay 
they had read, the existence of the FAE would have been shown.  
Nonetheless, a change in the normative canon of attribution may lead to a 
different conclusion. Morris and Larrick repeated the original Castro essay 
experiment with a variation. The variation consisted in asking readers to 
declare their beliefs regarding the probability that: 1) A pro-Castro person 
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would have been assigned to write a pro-Castro essay; 2) A person that is 
instructed to write a pro-Castro essay would comply with the request.113 
These data were gathered before and after the readers read the essay. Only 
after having gathered these data the reader was made aware of the fact that 
writers had been constrained (through the request of the experimenter), in 
their choice regarding whether to write a pro- or an anti- Castro essay. After 
this disclosure, readers were asked to indicate their belief that the author of 
the essay was a pro-Castro person. With these data Morris and Larrick 
analyzed the internal consistency of the belief of the readers by applying the 
normative canon of attribution developed by themselves in 1995. Their 
findings showed that reader’s belief were almost perfectly internally 
consistent.114 In other words, the attributions made by the subjects were 
perfectly consistent with the normative criteria tested.  
Thus, overall, attributions that are considered as true under one coherence 
perspective are not true under another. As it is explained in Section 4.4, this 
discrepancy of results regarding the human competence to make true 
attributions is often ignored in legal scholarship. 
4.3 The Fundamental Attribution Error in Legal Scholarship 
The empirical studies examined in the previous pages had an important 
impact on the positive and normative study of tort law as well as other 
branches of the law. This influence is manifest when reviewing the legal 
literature on the FAE. 
This scholarship has focused mainly on criminal law and tort law. In the tort 
law sphere, various authors highlight how the FAE leads to unjust and 
inefficient determination of causation.115 For instance, Levinson and Peng 
argue that the FAE unduly increases the set of circumstances in which a 
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defendant is likely to be regarded as the cause of a harm.116 This in turn, may 
prevent tort law from achieving fairness and optimal deterrence. Similarly, 
Prentice discusses the role of the FAE in determining investors’ 
compensation in securities fraud law and argues that it is likely that this 
phenomenon leads to inaccurate findings with regards to the causation 
requirement.117 Along these lines, Quintanilla argues that the FAE may lead 
courts to too easily find intention in the application of federal security law.118 
Because of this, managers are unjustly made liable for their unintentional 
actions. In addition, Feigenson warns that experienced lawyers may take 
advantage of courts’ propensity to commit the FAE to favour their clients.119 
European tort law scholars are not foreign to literature on the FAE. Giard 
argues that because of the FAE, obstetricians are exposed to a too high level 
of liability as they are accused of losses that they could have not prevented.120 
Similarly, Giesen121 discusses the role of the FAE in relation to the 
determination of causation and argues that it may lead to inaccuracies in fact 
finding. Similar conclusions have been recently put forward by Graziadei.122  
A recent strand of literature on the FAE in tort relates to the debate on the 
role of race and gender at trial as various studies have shown that people are 
more prone to commit the FAE when observing negative behaviors of 
outgroup members than when confronted with unwarranted conducts of 
ingroup members.123 In particular, Chamallas and Wriggins argue that the 
development of tort law remedies (for instance, what type of conducts are 
susceptible to give rise to a right to compensation), is unduly skewed by 
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courts’ propensity to commit the FAE in favour of males.124 Similar claims 
have been recently proposed by Bussani and Infantino in explaining the role 
of culture in the development of tort law.125 
Part of the legal scholarship on the FAE has taken a radical step in 
highlighting the relevance of this phenomenon for the study of tort law. This 
strand of literature - which builds on the highly debated strand of psychology 
referred to as  situationism126 - “[i]s premised on the social scientific insight 
that the naïve psychology—that is, the highly simplified, affirming, and 
widely held model for understanding human thinking and behaviour - on 
which our laws and institutions are based is largely wrong.”127  Situationists’ 
main claim is that current legal scholarship in general, and the law and 
economics’ rational actor model in particular, is built on an erroneous 
conception of the determinants of human behavior, which ignores the crucial 
role that situations play in shaping behavior.  Starting from these premises, 
Hanson and Yosifon argue that the human tendency to deny the appropriate 
role played by situations in determining human conduct may have 
contributed to produce an unjust tort law system in which, for instance, 
smokers bear the harm of their smoking habits despite corporations largely 
influence these habits through advertisement.  Hanson and Yosifon bring 
their reasoning a step further. According to their thesis, cigarette producers 
consciously take advantage of the existence of the FAE by advertising 
smoking as an expression of freedom, thus spreading the idea that smokers 
freely choose to smoke.  This, in turn, would influence court’s perception of 
the determinants of smoking behavior and thus indirectly affect the 
attribution of liability in cigarettes related tort law cases to the advantage of 
producers. Part of this scholarship goes so far as to argue that to avoid 
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inaccuracies due to the FAE, we should reform the way in which tort law is 
taught in law school. In particular, Hanson and McCann propose a 
situationist model of teaching tort law that is alternative to the standard 
Langdellian model which focuses mainly on training law students in applying 
legal rules and principles to new situations.128 In their view a tort law course 
should also teach students to look for situational forces that shape human 
behavior.  
In criminal law, Dripps has argued that the FAE is a key factor in the 
development of various criminal doctrines.129 For instance, he claims that the 
wider scope of the duress defence compared to necessity is due to the fact 
that the former prevents the defendant from being punished by blaming 
another person. Conversely, necessity achieves the same outcome but in 
instances in which only situational factors could be blamed. Dripps argues 
that it is because of the FAE and the consequential need to blame a person 
for the crime which explains the broader applicability of duress compared to 
necessity. On a normative level, he invites considering the FAE as one of the 
main risks for legal decision-making and proposes, for instance, that 
legislators should be more attentive to acquittals based on defences that 
redirect the blame towards a person than of those in which non-human 
factors justify or excuse the conduct of the defendant. Along these lines, Ross 
and Shestowsky maintain, for instance, that dispositionism (i.e the tendency 
to attribute one’s behavior to his/her disposition) among adjudicators over-
restricts the scope for the recognition of mitigating circumstances that would 
warrant a more lenient treatment of criminal defendants.130 Similarly, 
Koppel and Fondacaro argue that the FAE is one of the causes of 
retributivism and hard punishments in criminal settings.131  
Lastly, studies on the FAE have been used by legal scholars to propose 
debiasing strategies, i.e. policies that aim to improve the decision-making of 
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the individual without foreclosing her ability to make a decision. For 
instance, it has been argued that a potential debiasing strategy for the FAE is 
to make a judge accountable.132 The use of accountability as a debiasing 
strategy for the FAE is based on Tetlock’s study of 1985.133 Tetlock’s 
experiment shows that individuals that expect to be called to motivate their 
judgment regarding a particular behavior before witnessing it, are less likely 
than others to infer dispositional traits from the observed behavior.134 These 
results have been interpreted as indicating that accountability induces 
individuals “to process social information in a more analytic and complex 
way and that can check judgmental biases such as… the fundamental 
attribution error”135.  
4.5 Fundamental Attribution Error in Legal Scholarship: Truth 
Related Issues 
The previous section has illustrated the widespread use that legal scholarship 
has made of studies on the FAE. Most of the legal literature on tort law and 
the FAE tend to discuss this phenomenon in a correspondence 
perspective.136 Nonetheless, others explicitly refer to the FAE as a judgment 
that does not correspond to some normative canon of attribution.137  This 
section argues that both strands of legal scholarship have sometimes failed to 
take due account of differences between the coherence-based and the 
correspondence based interpretations of studies on the FAE. On the basis of 
this analysis, I argue that this lack of attention is undesirable for the 
development of behavioral law and economics for at least three main 
reasons. 
First, depending on which truth criterion one adopts to evaluate a given trial 
setting, the literature on the FAE may or may not highlight the existence of a 
problem. This is particularly true for scholars that support coherence as the 
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criterion to assess judges’ performance. Indeed, whether and to what extent 
the literature on the FAE highlights an issue that should be considered 
problematic, depends on the normative criterion of attribution adopted. This 
applies, for instance, with regards to the Castro essay experiment. As 
explained above, depending on the normative criterion of attribution 
adopted, the Castro essay experiment may (if one adopts Ross’s criterion) or 
may not (if one adopts Morris and Larrik’s criterion) highlight a failure to 
reason coherently. Failing to recognize this may lead to weakly empirically 
supported arguments. 
The same applies for scholars that think that the only relevant truth criterion 
to assess procedural law is correspondence. Here, for instance, the evidence 
arising from the Quiz experiment is relevant solely to the extent that 
increases in coherence (under Ross’s criterion) lead to improvements in 
correspondence. Yet, part of the literature seems to ignore this issue. In this 
regard, an important example are situationist. For instance, Benforado and 
Hanson propose a radical reform of tort law and the way in which it should 
be taught in law school by making reference to the substantial amount of 
evidence supporting the existence of the FAE. In doing so, they discuss the 
literature that employs the Quiz Game paradigm, which, as explained above 
supports the existence of the FAE merely from the perspective of some 
normative theory of attribution. Similarly, with regards to legal scholarship 
that builds on economic insights, Levinson and Peng argue that the evidence 
gathered in the Quiz essay experiment suggests that the influence of the FAE 
on courts’ decisions may lead to the wrongful establishment of causation and 
prevent the achievement of optimal deterrence.138 Yet, given what is 
discussed above it is not evident that the Quiz experiment can tell something 
about the ability of judges to make accurate decisions.  
Second, some scholar argues that we should require judges to decide cases 
following normative theories of attribution.139 As discussed above, 
attribution theorists have elaborated a number of normative theories of 
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attribution with the aim of improving previous normative models. Each of 
these models proposes a different normative rule according to which 
attributors should perceive the determinants of human behavior. Thus, 
without a specification of which normative theory of attribution we should 
require judges to follow, the claim that judges should make decisions 
according to one these theories is empty. Before suggesting changes in the 
tort law system based on a departure from a normative model of judgment, it 
would be necessary to indicate the model at which reference is made to and 
make a case for requiring judges to follow this particular model. 
Nonetheless, it might be difficult to do so because even among attribution 
theorists it is widely debated whether we should rely on these models to 
evaluate humans’ performance in judgment. Indeed, the existence of 
multiple models of rational attribution is due to the attempt of scholars to 
improve previous normative models. Thus, it seems that even within the field 
of attribution theory there is not full consensus regarding which normative 
criteria should be followed to make attributions.140  
In addition, some of the normative standards of attribution that have been 
elaborated until now would not necessarily be considered criteria of good 
judgment in every situation in which individuals may find themselves.141  
Arguably this in the case for some normative theory of attribution in the 
context of trial settings. Indeed, some of the normative theories of 
attribution seem to be not well suited to serve as a criterion for evaluating 
judges’ performance. For instance, Ross’s argument that “To the extent that 
situational or external factors constitute a “sufficient” explanation for an 
event, that event is attributed to the situation and no inference logically can 
be made (and, presumably, no inference empirically is made) about the 
disposition of the actor”142 is a clear example of an ill-suited criterion. 
Despite Ross’ argument has been dubbed attribution’s theory fundamental 
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rule of logic, it is not necessarily logical as the existence of an alternative 
sufficient situational cause cannot exclude that a disposition played a role in 
determining the observed behavior. For instance, in a car accident, the 
presence of a strong gust of wind that may have caused the accident (a 
sufficient situational cause) does not exclude the possibility that the driver 
was extremely tired (because he has a propensity to drive long hours without 
resting) and that the accident was caused by his behavior. As such, 
attribution theory’s fundamental rule of logic would represent a questionable 
criterion to evaluate courts’ performance.  
Third, once identified whether the literature on the FAE poses a particular 
issue to be addressed, the policy responses to the problem depend, once 
again, on the normative criterion adopted. To illustrate, let’s consider 
debiasing strategies. Above, I have discussed the use of accountability to 
reduce the effect of the FAE on courts’ decisions. Nonetheless, the nature of 
the evidence provided by Tetlock’s experiment grants limited support to the 
claim that human attributions could be made more accurate by making 
individuals accountable for their judgments. This is because this study 
interpreted the FAE from a coherence perspective.143  In other words, Tetlock 
showed that accountability makes individuals less likely to infer dispositional 
traits from observed behaviors, but it did not deal with issues of 
correspondence.144 Thus, it could be that these less dispositionally oriented 
judgments may not completely offset the effect of the FAE on subjects’ 
attributions or, even worse, make the judgment even less accurate by 
overcorrecting it. This, implies that legal scholars that support a 
correspondence theory of judicial truth should be cautious in suggesting 
debiasing strategies on the basis of studies that look at debiasing from a 
coherence perspective.  
5. Conclusions 
This Chapter has discussed the role of truth as a standard to evaluate human 
competence in making judgments and its use to assess the courts’ 
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performance at trial. Legal scholarship that applies behavioral insights to 
understand and predict courts’ decisions translates judgment errors 
committed in experimental settings into mistakes committed in trial settings. 
This scholarly practice, while potentially highly informative, can also lead to 
misleading findings when little attention is paid to differences in truth 
standards adopted in judgement and decision-making. The main 
contribution of this Chapter is to stress the importance of this issue for a 
scientifically sound development of behavioral law and economics. In 
particular, by focusing on the psychological literature on the FAE and its 
application to judicial decision-making, the Chapter highlights the following 
three issues related to the application of behavioral findings to trial settings 
to which legal scholarship may want to pay greater attention. 
First, scholars that adopt coherence as the relevant criterion to evaluate trial 
performance, should be wary of blindly translating normative criteria 
adopted in JDM to assess the decision-making of judges. Indeed, as 
highlighted above, coherence criteria adopted in JDM are sometimes 
questionable. This applies, for instance to what I dubbed the “Ross’ 
criterion”, according to which “to the extent that situational or external 
factors constitute a “sufficient” explanation for an event, that event is 
attributed to the situation and no inference logically can be made (and, 
presumably, no inference empirically is made) about the disposition of the 
actor”145.Second, depending on the normative criterion/a adopted to 
evaluate a legal system, JDM findings can or cannot highlight the existence 
of a problem. In this connection, the strength of the evidence supporting the 
existence of a problem is often strictly dependent on the criteria adopted. 
Third, also the set of policy responses available to address the identified 
problem and their desirability depend, once again, on the normative 
criterion adopted.  
A failure to carefully consider these three issues when applying behavioral 
insights to the study of judicial decision-making may lead to undesirable 
consequences, such as: identification of inexistent problems; overestimation 
of the policy relevance of a problem; application of (maybe partially) 
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ineffective or even counterproductive remedies to identified problems. To 
the extent that behavioral law and economics wants to be an empirically 
driven field of research that aspires to provide useful policy-relevant insights 
these are non-trivial issues to be considered. 
This Chapter has discussed the relevance of these issues by making reference 
to studies on the FAE. It has highlighted how all the three types of problem 
discussed above apply to part of the legal literature on this behavioral 
phenomenon. It is not my contention that all literature on the FAE suffers 
from these problems. Yet, it is clear that a substantial part does. In this 
regard, what is very surprising is that even situationists, which ground their 
whole literature on in psychological studies on the FAE, pay little attention to 
these issues.  
It is possible that other strands of literature within behavioral law and 
economics are less affected by these problems than the one specifically 
concerned with the FAE. As such, this Chapter should not be seen as a 
general critique to behavioral law and economics. Instead, it highlights some 
issues that, perhaps, are easily overlooked by legal scholars and call for more 
attention towards these problems.  
More generally, by discussing the role of truth standards in JDM and judicial 
decision-making, this Chapter provides a general introduction to the study of 
the interplay between accuracy and behavioral law and economics that is 
relevant for understanding some of the arguments put forward in the 
remaining part of this thesis. In addition, the Chapter has also reviewed the 
legal literature on the FAE, which is also the starting point of the analysis for 
the following Chapter. 
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Chapter III 
The Fundamental Attribution Error  and 
Accuracy in Trial Settings: Individual and 
Contextual Determinants of the Attribution 
Error146 
 
 
1. Introduction 
As discussed in the previous Chapter, studies on the FAE had a prominent 
influence on tort legal scholarship. Several authors have raised concerns that 
judges may systematically misattribute blame to the detriment of accuracy as 
well as lead to unwarranted developments of legal rules and practices. 
Despite this importance, extant empirical studies largely ignore whether 
expert adjudicators commit the FAE in trial settings. In particular, while 
psychological research indicates that the FAE is caused both by contextual 
factors and by individual tendencies of the adjudicator,147 existing legal 
research has focused solely on the interplay of expertise and some type of 
contextual triggers of the FAE.148 In addition, the few studies that have 
addressed this issue provide mixed results and focus on adjudicators with 
substantial experience.149 This leaves uncertainty regarding whether and 
under which conditions individuals trained in law are likely to fall prey to 
this error in legal settings.  
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This Chapter aims to shed new light on the influence of the FAE in 
adjudication by focusing on two sources of the FAE: the individual 
characteristics of the adjudicator and the situational context in which 
adjudication takes place. More specifically, I assess the inclination to commit 
this error by eliciting subjects’ implicit theories of moral character,150 
meaning their unconsciously held beliefs regarding the malleability of moral 
traits. Regarding the contextual determinants of the FAE, I focus on the 
effectiveness of rules that aim at preventing the commission of this error at 
trial. In particular, here I focus on rules that limit the use of character 
evidence. Character evidence is generally seen as a strong contextual factor 
that triggers the FAE in trial settings.151 I acknowledge that the use of 
character evidence does not necessarily lead to the commission of the FAE. 
Indeed, character evidence can have probative value and thus I remain 
agnostic regarding whether the use of character evidence generally improves 
or decrease accuracy at trial. My argument is simply that to the extent that 
character evidence generally triggers this error, rules that effectively limit the 
use of this type of evidence will generally decrease the commission of the 
FAE in trial settings.  
I perform the experiment with law students and individuals that are 
attending a post-master course that prepares to enter the Italian judiciary. 
Existing scholarship has claimed that expert adjudicators should be less 
influenced by the FAE than laypeople.152 Both self-selection in the profession 
and training can allegedly account for these differences. Yet, these claims 
await being tested. By comparing results between these two samples, I aim to 
shed new light on this issue. Given the composition of my samples, I do not 
compare directly laypeople and judges, but individuals that have a different 
degree of expertise in law and that, on average, have a different desire to 
become judges. 
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I find that, contrary to law students, people enrolled in the program that 
prepares to access the judiciary are indeed better able to disregard contextual 
triggers of the FAE when expected to do so. In other words, they are better 
able to apply rules aimed at reducing the influence of the FAE on courts’ 
decisions This suggests that adjudicators may indeed be better able to ignore 
situational information that may trigger the FAE. Yet, I observe that, for both 
samples, subjects that have an individual tendency to explain human 
behavior in terms of dispositional traits (as compared to situational 
determinants) consistently assign greater responsibility to tortfeasors. The 
results suggest that whereas legal training to access the judiciary can be 
effective in improving decision-makers’ abilities to avoid falling prey to 
contextual triggers of the FAE, it fails to inhibit the individual tendencies of 
individuals that are preparing to enter the judiciary to commit this error in 
adjudication.  
Overall, the results suggest that law students and individuals that are 
preparing to enter the judiciary are likely to commit the FAE in trial settings. 
This is confirmed by the predictive validity of the individual tendencies to 
commit the FAE on trial outcomes for both groups of individuals. Yet, this 
study does highlight a more positive picture of judicial decision-making than 
the one often depicted in legal scholarship on the FAE: the assumption that 
the FAE is a widespread phenomenon in the courtroom might sometimes be 
misplaced, as more training in adjudication seems to improve the ability to 
correctly handle contextual triggers of the FAE.153 In this connection, this 
study informs the debate on whether strict evidentiary rules are less 
necessary when fact-finding is performed by legally trained subjects.154 It 
does so with specific regard to the regime regulating the admissibility of 
character evidence in light of the risks arising from the influence of the FAE 
on trial outcomes.155 These findings cautiously suggest that, expertise in 
adjudication can sometimes make a strict ban on character evidence less 
warranted. Of course, these results do not provide a definitive answer on 
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whether, to what extent, and under which circumstance the FAE is present in 
trial settings and, thus, there is a need for additional research in this 
direction.  
This work unfolds as follows: Section 2 introduces the economic literature on 
evidence law and its relation to studies on the FAE. Section 3 discusses the 
contextual and individually-based determinants of this phenomenon and 
their relevance in trial settings. Section 4 describes the experiment. The 
results are reported in Section 5 and discussed in Section 6. Section 7 
concludes.  
2. Background literature 
2.1 A Short Introduction to the Economics of Evidence Law 
As discussed above, procedural rules of evidence regulate what type of 
information courts receive at trial and how this information should be used 
under different circumstances. From the perspective of law and economics 
this information flow and usage should be regulated to attain social welfare 
maximization.156 In designing legal rules and practices that move towards 
this aim, economically minded scholars often assign an important role to 
accuracy in adjudication. As discussed in Chapter II, in a world in which the 
achievement of perfect accuracy is not costly, adjudication would attain 
social welfare maximization by pursuing accuracy at trial.157  Yet, to the 
extent that obtaining perfect accuracy in adjudication is costly, one of the 
main aims of procedural law becomes the minimization of the social cost of 
errors in adjudication and their avoidance.158 This optimal outcome is 
attained when the marginal benefit of an additional item of evidence equals 
the marginal cost of obtaining it.159 
While theoretically intuitive, the achievement of social welfare maximization 
via procedural law finds three main obstacles in practice. First, the private 
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and the public interest in accuracy in adjudication are not perfectly 
aligned.160 While the collective aim is to maximize social welfare, private 
litigants maximize their own utility (e.g. the expected value of litigation). 
Second, some of the information that is needed for accurate findings at trial 
is private or unavailable.161 For instance, with regards to private information, 
a tortfeasor may know whether he was speeding at the moment of the 
accident, but this information might not be available to the court. In 
addition, whether a certain conduct (e.g. the release of pollution) has caused 
a certain harm (e.g. a cancer) might not be known by anyone. Given the 
diverging interests of trial parties and those of society, there is a risk that the 
former take advantage of courts’ inability to observe information to pursue 
their private interests.162 Third, when behavioral insights are taken into 
account, the information that parties provide to the court can influence 
courts’ JDM in an unwarranted manner. For instance, in the case of the FAE, 
when informed of past accidents, courts may overestimate the degree by 
which a particular conduct was due to the dispositions of the tortfeasor, and 
thus overestimate the probability that the accident under scrutiny at trial was 
due to the negligent behavior of the driver. In order to minimize the costs of 
a miss-allocations of liability, legal systems rely on different types of 
evidence rules.  
Law and economics has long studied remedies to the problems highlighted 
above. This strand of research suggests that legal systems can obviate these 
issues by regulating standards and burdens of proof, provide incentives to 
trial parties to provide truthful information, steer errors in the imposition of 
liability or limit/forbid the admission of information at trial.163 As discussed 
in Chapter II, behavioral law and economics has built upon and expanded 
the sets of remedies available by focusing on the interplay between the 
contextual environment in which adjudication takes place and human 
motivation/cognition. The next section further elaborate on this point with 
specific regard to the issue addressed in this Chapter. 
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2.2 The Fundamental Attribution Error: Contextual and 
Individual Determinants 
Research in psychology has highlighted a multitude of triggers of the FAE.164 
These triggers can be located either in the person of the observer or in the 
situation surrounding her. On the situational side of the coin, existing 
scholarship often mentions character evidence as a main trigger of the 
FAE.165 This type of evidence provides adjudicators with information about 
past behaviors of one of the parties at trial to be used to evaluate the 
epistemic status of the claims made by the plaintiff/defendant. Thus, for 
example, the victim of a car accident may present evidence regarding past 
car accidents caused by the defendant to prove her negligent behavior in the 
case at hand. However, the concern with the FAE is that the observer (i.e. the 
adjudicator) will overestimate the likelihood that the accident under scrutiny 
was caused by the negligent behavior of the target (the defendant) instead of, 
for instance, poor road conditions. Thus, the availability of character 
evidence may trigger the FAE. 
Indeed, in behavioral law and economics the possibility of committing the 
FAE is often cited as a major rationale underlying the existence of rules that 
aim to inhibit the misuse of character evidence.166 Under US law, the ban on 
character evidence is set forth by Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 404. This 
provision is part of a broader set of rules inspired by epistemic paternalism 
that regulates the admissibility of evidence at trial with the aim of preventing 
the jury from taking a decision on the basis of items of evidence whose 
“probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of […] unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury”. Interestingly, the 
legislative ban on character evidence in US law is rarely mirrored by a 
similar rule in Continental Europe. As a consequence, Civil law judges are 
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routinely exposed to a considerable amount of propensity evidence.167 For 
instance, under Italian law,168 with some exceptions, this type of evidence is 
freely admissible at trial. Yet, even in Europe the use of character evidence is 
not completely unregulated. In fact, while the principle of free evaluation of 
evidence is a core principle of evidentiary rules in many European countries, 
adjudicators are expected to evaluate evidence according to rational 
standards.169 In this connection, character evidence is often considered an 
item of evidence with the lowest probative value.170 Therefore, legal scholars 
argue that adjudicators cannot hold the defendant liable when the only 
evidence available at trial is character evidence.171 In this sense, European 
adjudicators are expected to not overestimate the probative value of this type 
of evidence. This expectation can be seen as an attempt by the legal system to 
avoid the influence of the FAE on judicial decisions. In the present work, I 
test the effectiveness of this (unwritten) rule to reduce the use of character 
evidence at trial. In doing so, I shed new light on whether rules that aim to 
reduce the influence of the FAE are effective achieving their aim. 
Besides situational factors, empirical research has also highlighted the 
existence of stable individual differences in the propensity to commit the 
FAE across and within cultures.172 This literature has found that a major 
predictor of the tendency to commit this error are implicit (or lay) 
theories.173 Lay theories are not scientific theories nor are they necessarily 
consciously held. Yet, individuals often use them in an unconscious way to 
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understand their own behavior and that of others.174 Implicit theories are 
categorized as tending either more towards situationism or to 
dispositionism. The more a person’s implicit theory is situationist, the more 
she tends to explain human behavior in terms of situational, contextual 
factors. Conversely, the less the person is situationist (i.e. the more she is 
dispositionist), the more she stresses the role of personality. Substantial 
evidence indicates that lay theories are a strong predictor of attributional 
processes and of the commission of the FAE.175 In particular, individuals 
holding a dispositionist lay theory are more inclined to commit the FAE than 
people adhering to situationist beliefs.  
Within the lay theories strand of research, studies conducted by Chiu and 
colleagues on implicit theories of moral character are particularly relevant 
for the study of attributions in trial settings.176 Based on implicit theories of 
moral character, individuals can be categorized as either entity theorists 
(which corresponds to dispositionists) or incremental theorists (i.e. 
situationist). Entity theorists have a relatively higher propensity to believe 
that moral traits are non-malleable, meaning that they believe moral traits to 
be part of the dispositions of a person. Entity theorists are therefore more 
prone to commit the FAE than incremental theorists.177 In mock trials, for 
example, adherence to an entity theory of moral character has shown to 
predict a higher use of character evidence to establish guilt.178 In a similar 
vein, Tam and co-authors found that entity theorists tend to hold stronger 
beliefs in criminal recidivism, dispositionally driven crime, and, as a result, 
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impose higher punishments.179 Furthermore, Tam and colleagues also found 
that higher punishments imposed by entity theorists were mediated by 
dispositionally oriented attributions.  
This section has discussed the relevance of the situational and dispositional 
triggers of the FAE for the study of judicial decision-making and evidence 
law. The next section reviews the extant literature on the FAE and expertise 
in adjudication. 
2.3 The Fundamental Attribution Error and Expert 
Adjudicators’ Decision-Making 
One of the most controversial issues in judicial decision-making is whether, 
to what extent and in which circumstances expertise reduces biases in 
adjudication.180 Are expert adjudicators indeed less influenced by the FAE 
than laypeople when making decisions at trial?  
Building on existing behavioral literature on laypeople, but without testing 
their hypothesis, Benforado and Hanson put forward the idea that in trial 
settings judges are more likely to hold relatively more situationist views than 
the average population.181 While their claim is restricted to the American 
judiciary, the factors that they identify to support their conclusion are widely 
shared by European judiciaries. In fact, their claim is based on the following 
observations:  
i) judges are routinely confronted with the task of making attributions for 
human behavior. This, in their view, should allow them to test their implicit 
and explicit theories of behavior and thus bring them towards a more 
situationist view of the world. 
ii)  judges, because of their role, are expected to make decisions that are fair, 
legitimate and well-reasoned. This again, may bring them to look more 
carefully at situational cues to make sense of the facts under scrutiny at trial.  
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iii) judges’ attention to situational factors might be enhanced by institutional 
mechanisms and procedures of the trial. For instance, by debating in front of 
the court, trial parties may highlight various contextual factors that might 
have influenced the conduct under scrutiny.  
iv) individuals that are more prone to understand the complex influence of 
situational factors on human behavior may self-select in the judiciary. This 
in turn, may create an environment in the judiciary that further promotes 
situationists views.   
v) situationism in the judiciary is enhanced when judges are provided with the 
time and support (e.g. law clerks) to make their decisions. This in fact should 
help them to undergo a more thorough deliberation on the facts under 
scrutiny at trial.  
vi) judges are routinely confronted with opposing views (those of the parties and 
other trial participants such as, e.g. experts) on a subject matter. This 
diversity of encounters may help judges to learn how to distinguish 
situational from personality based determinants of human behavior. For, 
instance this may occur, when subjects with very different backgrounds act 
similarly in a certain situation.  
vii) the accountability mechanisms (appeal review, publication of the motivation, 
etc.) that surround the adjudication process foster situationists views by 
pushing judges to think more thoroughly when making a decision.  
The overall outcome of their analysis is that, at least in trial settings, judges 
are likely to hold a relatively more situationist lay theory of behavior than the 
general population. Yet, this hypothesis awaits being tested.  
Notice that the prediction proposed by Benforado and Hanson is not 
obvious. In fact, extant research casts some doubt on the effectiveness of 
some of the mechanisms described above to promote situationism.  For 
instance, while it is true that their role as well as the institutional 
environment in which they operate should motivate judges to make accurate 
decisions, the feedback they receive on their performance is often rather 
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limited.182 Similarly, while judges receive support in performing their role, it 
is not uncommon that they operate under time pressure and with relatively 
scarce resources to accomplish their role. In addition, while it might be the 
case that individuals that tend to look for complex explanations for human 
behavior self-select in the judiciary, this is not the only relevant demographic 
variable. For instance, high status people tend to hold more dispositionist lay 
theories and reject restorative views of punishment than low status people.183 
Judges are indeed a high status group in Western societies.  
In this connection, as discussed above, existing literature indicates that 
implicit theories predict attributions and decisions at trial. Yet, these studies 
were conducted with undergraduate students who had no experience in 
adjudication. Recent studies show that research on the FAE conducted with 
undergraduates may not always provide an accurate picture of attributions 
made by non-undergraduates.184 Generally, research on judicial decision-
making indicates that expert adjudicators are only sometimes better able 
than laypeople to prevent biases to influence trial decisions.185 This literature 
suggests that judges’ decisions are influenced by their political beliefs,186 
identity,187 emotions188 and biases.189 Yet, there are some important 
exceptions to this trend.190 A first important question therefore remains 
whether judges really hold different implicit theories or whether they are less 
influenced by their individual implicit theory in their decision making. If 
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indeed it is the case that individuals that decide to enter the judiciary tend on 
average to be more situationist than the rest of the population, we can expect 
subjects that (after law school) embark on a judicial career to be more 
situationist than, at least, the average law student. This is for two reasons: i) 
there is no rationale to believe that the average law student should hold 
implicit theories that are less dispositionist than the general population; ii) 
unless one believes that lawyers are also a category that sparks situationism 
in society as much as the judiciary, we should observe a certain degree of 
self-selection among law students. In other words, individuals enrolled in the 
post-master course that prepares to enter the judiciary should be on average 
more situationists than the average law student. For this reason, a 
meaningful comparison can be made between law graduates that self-select 
in a judicial career and other law students. 
A second question remaining is whether expert adjudicators are also better 
able to respect limitations that legal systems set to reduce the influence of 
situational cues that may trigger the FAE, such as character evidence. As 
mentioned above, when it comes to character evidence, European Civil law 
systems adopt looser regulatory safeguards against the FAE than those found 
in US evidence law. This institutional arrangement is often justified under 
the assumption that expert adjudicators are able to correctly handle 
character evidence.191  According to this latter view, judges are unbiased fact 
finders which are able to avoid cognitive errors arising from exposure to this 
type of evidence.192 
Yet, does expertise in adjudication improve the ability to assign character 
evidence its legally prescribed probative value? To my knowledge, the only 
strand of literature that sheds some light on this issue is the one on judges 
and laypeople, which however provides mixed results. Various studies 
indicate that evidence of prior convictions has some impact on laypeople’s 
decisions in mock trials,193 a result that was replicated with judges in a 2005 
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study.194 Wistrich and co-authors tested 265 US judges’ propensity to use 
inadmissible evidence in a series of civil and criminal cases. In each case, 
judges in the treatment group were presented with various forms of 
inadmissible evidence. Of particular relevance for the present work are the 
third and fourth study, which inquired the effect of parties’ previous 
conducts (tendency to sexual promiscuity and previous convictions) on trial 
outcomes. These studies find that judges are not able to disregard this 
information. This holds regardless of the years of experience of the judge in 
this role. While certainly informative, the study by Wistrich and co-authors 
does not fully capture the dynamics underlying the functioning of the FAE in 
relation to character evidence. In presence of character evidence the FAE 
may lead individuals to overestimate the probability that a person’s conduct 
will be repeated in the future. For this reason, it is important that the 
previous conduct (presented with the evidence) matches the one under 
scrutiny at trial. In the study conducted by Wistrich et al.,195 previous 
criminal convictions for fraud are introduced in a tort trial to undermine the 
credibility of the plaintiff, but the conduct for which the plaintiff had been 
convicted were different from the facts of the case on which the subjects were 
called to decide. Similarly, in the sexual promiscuity evidence scenario, this 
evidence was provided to hint to the fact that the woman that was allegedly 
raped had in fact given her consent to the alleged rapist. Thus, in both 
scenarios the evidence of the previous conduct was only partially related to 
the one under scrutiny at trial. In this regard, this study differs from the one 
by Wistrich and Co-authors, as I test the effect of previous convictions on the 
decisions made in a case that presents very similar facts. This is the most 
suitable way to test the FAE in relation to character evidence. 
Another strand of literature that is relevant for the present study is the one 
that, more generally, analyses judges’ ability to disregard inadmissible 
information. Landsman and Rakos test in a tort law scenario whether judges 
and lay adjudicators differ in their ability to disregard evidence of 
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subsequent remedial measures. This study found no differences between the 
two groups.196 Similar findings were obtained in a recent work by Wallace 
and Kassin.197 Here judges were not able to disregard information obtained 
with coercion during an interrogation. Again, this result was not dependent 
on judges’ experience. This study replicated with judges a result that was 
obtained in an early analysis conducted with laypeople.198 When taken 
together, this research suggests that the two groups (judges and laypeople) 
were similarly prone to use inadmissible evidence. Importantly, the study by 
Wallace and Kassin provides indirect evidence that judges are not immune to 
the FAE.199 This is because, in line with many paradigms used to study this 
phenomenon, participants inferred a disposition of the defendant (being 
guilty) from his conduct (having confessed) even when the behavior was the 
result of a situational constraint (the coercive interrogation). Against these 
findings, Guthrie and co-authors found that American administrative judges 
are able to ignore improperly authenticated evidence in a hypothetical trial 
scenario.200 Along similar lines, a recent study shows that judges, regardless 
of years of experience at the bench, make similar decisions in hindsight and 
foresight when establishing probable cause.201 This suggests that judges are 
not unduly influenced by the hindsight information. Overall, research on the 
effect of inadmissible evidence on experts’ decision-making indicates that 
judges might sometimes be able to provide inadmissible evidence its due 
probative value. Yet, given the mixed findings of this literature, it is difficult 
to predict under which conditions this occurs.  
To sum up, existing evidence does not provide a clear answer on whether and 
under which conditions expertise in adjudication helps reducing the effect of 
the FAE on trial outcomes. The present work aims to shed new light on this 
issue in three main ways:  
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i) I study the influence of the FAE on trial outcomes both at the individual and 
contextual level. Given both contextual factors and by individual tendencies 
can trigger the FAE, and that previous studies focused solely on the 
contextual side of the issue, my analysis is more comprehensive than the one 
provided by extant research.  
ii) my focus on evidence regarding conducts that are qualitatively very close to 
the one under scrutiny in the case presented to the subjects allow us to best 
capture the effect of character evidence as a contextual trigger of the FAE.  
iii) I compare the effect of both contextual and person-based determinants of 
the FAE on the decision-making of subjects that are enrolled in a program 
that prepares to enter the judicial career with the one of law students. This is 
a meaningful comparison to test whether either self-selection or training can 
lead to differences in the susceptibility of the two groups to the FAE.  
3. The Experiment 
3.1 Participants 
For the present study, I recruited two independent samples of subjects. The 
first sample is composed of 100 individuals (male = 35%; average age = 25.9; 
SD = 1.22) enrolled in a Scuola di Specializzazione per 
le Professioni Legali (hereafter SSPL). SSPLs are two-year post master 
schools that prepare law graduates to become Italian magistrates. 60 of the 
SSPL subjects were enrolled in the second year of the SSPL, while the 
remaining were enrolled in the first year. Attendance to a SSPL provides 
direct access to the competitive public exam to access the judicial career. 
Nowadays, SSPLs are the main route via which magistrates are recruited in 
Italy. Indeed, most Italian judges are selected among individuals that are 25-
30 years old.202 Participation was incentivized through the offer of a buffet 
and a lottery with a 100 euro prize.  
To make sure that subjects in the sample were attending the school to 
subsequently join the judiciary, I asked participants after completion of the 
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experiment whether they intended to enter the judiciary. Out of the 100 
participants 94 replied that they desire to enter the judiciary after 
completion of the school. This sample is therefore composed of subjects that 
are very close to complete the education necessary to access the exam to 
enter the Italian judiciary and that, at the time of the experiment, were to a 
large extent still motivated to pursue the judicial career.203 
The second group was composed of 129 university students (male = 32,56%; 
average age = 21,2; SD = 2.28) enrolled in a law school (both at the graduate 
and undergraduate level, as Italian law schools are not divided into bachelor 
and master). No incentive was provided for participation. They were 
recruited in university libraries of the same city in which the SSPL is located. 
Subjects were selected with these criteria to provide some basic control for 
specific educational differences between universities and geographical 
location.  
I controlled whether the samples differed in terms of age and gender 
composition. I found no differences in terms of gender. In addition, since 
SSPL is a post-master course, (not surprisingly) I found that SSPL subjects 
were significantly older than law students.  Notice that the major difference 
between the educational curricula at a law school and an SSPL is that the 
former has an almost exclusive focus on learning positive law and legal 
reasoning. Conversely, the SSPL training has a stronger practical focus, 
which integrates theoretical learning with internships in courts and various 
practical courses (case law reading and drafting; legal counselling, mock 
trials, etc.). The present study tries to isolate the effect of these differences in 
court experience and/or self-selection into the judicial career path on the 
influence of the FAE on trial decisions.  
3.2 Design 
I used a 2 × 2 quasi-experimental design. This independent between subject 
variables were training (SSPL or law students) and character evidence (yes - 
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no). Respondents in each group were randomly assigned to one of the 
conditions (character evidence vs. non-character evidence).  
3.3 Stimuli and Measures 
All respondents were given a questionnaire divided in two parts. In the first 
part, I tested respondents’ implicit theories of moral character via the 
standard questionnaire developed by Chiu and colleagues.204 As discussed 
above, extant literature indicates that this scale is well-suited to study 
individual differences in: 1) the inclination to commit the FAE; 2) the effect 
of attributional style (person/situation) on trial decisions.  
The questionnaire was translated in Italian by a professional translator (see 
appendix for the English version). The questionnaire is composed by the 
following three items: “A person’s moral character is something very basic 
about them, and it can’t be changed much”; 2) “Whether a person is 
responsible or sincere or not is deeply ingrained in their personality. It 
cannot be changed very much.”; 3) There is not much that can be done to 
change a person’s moral traits (e.g. conscientiousness, uprightness and 
honesty).” Subjects were requested to express their agreement with each of 
the three statements on a 1 to 6 point scale and the answers were then 
combined in a scale to form a measure of implicit beliefs of moral character. 
The higher the score on this scale the more the respondent can be seen as an 
entity theorist. I observe that the scale had an excellent internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s α = .84).  
In the second part of the questionnaire, which contained the character 
evidence vs. non-character evidence treatment, respondents read a 
hypothetical tort law case in which a self-employed bricklayer was asked by a 
client to repair the roof of his house. 12 years after the reparation took place, 
a violent whirlwind hit the roof, hereby damaging it. The client was said to be 
suing the bricklayer arguing that the damage would have not occurred had 
the bricklayer used due care to repair the roof. The bricklayer, however, 
denied not having taken due care. It was explained that evidence at trial 
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an experiment that reproduced the Castro essay paradigm (see above Chapter II). 
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showed that it was more than 100 years ago that a whirlwind hit that area. In 
addition, the expert report established that it is possible for a badly repaired 
roof to last 12 years, but the expert was not able to establish whether the 
bricklayer exercised due care when repairing the roof. Important to note is 
that the strong and unforeseeable whirlwind was mentioned in the scenario 
to introduce a situational factor that could explain the accident. Respondents 
in the character evidence condition in addition received the information that 
on two previous occasions the bricklayer was found liable for having 
negligently repaired a roof. On both occasions the bricklayer was said to have 
denied responsibility and to have shown little consideration for the loss of 
his clients. This is the typical situation in which, under Italian law, judges are 
expected to ignore character evidence. In fact, given the low probative value 
attached to items of character evidence and the absence of other items of 
evidence against the plaintiff, the judge is expected to ignore this evidence 
(Grossi and Pagni 2010). Participants in the no character evidence condition 
did not receive the information.  
Thus, the second part of the questionnaire tests whether subjects are able to 
provide character evidence its legally prescribed probative value. As 
mentioned above, this does not tests directly whether subjects commit the 
FAE, but only whether they abide the evidence rules that the legal system 
poses to avoid the misuse of this type of evidence. Notice that given the 
specific features of this case, subjects have a relatively simple rule to follow 
(i.e. ignore character evidence). Thus, if they fail to correctly apply this rule 
in this occasion, it is plausible that they would not follow it in situations 
where the rule is less clear-cut. For instance, when expert adjudicators are 
called to give some weight to the item of evidence presented. 
The dependent variables in each condition were the following: 1) I assessed 
respondents’ attribution of the incident to situation vs. person by asking 
them to identify the cause/s of the accident on a 1-7 point scale (1 the sole 
cause of the accident was the violent whirlwind - 7 the sole cause of the 
accident was the conduct of the bricklayer); 2) subjects were asked to assign 
responsibility to the bricklayer for the accident. The answer had to be given 
on a 1-7 point scale (1 the bricklayer is not responsible at all - 7 the bricklayer 
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is fully responsible); 3) subjects were asked which percentage of the damages 
had to be compensated by the bricklayer.   
4. Hypotheses 
Based on what is discussed in the background section, I test the following 
hypotheses: 
• H1: Respondents who received character evidence attribute more 
causality and responsibility to the plaintiff and require him to compensate a 
larger percentage of the harm compared to subjects did not receive character 
evidence. 
• H2: SSPL and law students’ score on the implicit theories dimension 
predicts the attribution of causality, responsibility and damages awards.  
5. Results 
Before testing the hypotheses, following the procedure described by Dweck 
and co-authors I compute the proportion of entity and incremental theorists 
in both samples. I find that respectively 48% and 49% of the SSPL subjects 
and law students are incremental theorists. This finding is in line with the 
general results according to which approximately 50% of the subjects are 
classified as incremental theorists. This indicates that the degree of 
dispositionism among individuals that can take part in the Italian national 
competition to enter the judiciary is not different from that of the previous 
studies conducted in the US. In line with previous literature on implicit 
theories, the remainder of the analysis used the implicit theories of moral 
character as a scale variable.  
General Linear Models were used to estimate the effect of the independent 
variables (training; character evidence, implicit theories) on the dependent 
variables.  
5.1 Manipulation check: 
To verify whether the manipulation was successful, I asked participants on a 
7-point Likert scale to what degree they believed that the defendant had a 
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history of not repairing roofs properly (1 not at all - 7 very much). A General 
Linear Model with the manipulation (character evidence),, training, 
standardized scores on the implicit theories scale and their interaction as 
predictors revealed only a main effect for character evidence, F(1, 222) = 
172.50, p < .001, ƞ2 = .44, indicating that participants in the character 
evidence condition (M = 5.14, SD = 1.38) were more inclined to believe that 
the defendant had a history of not repairing roofs properly than participants 
in the no character evidence condition (M = 2.65, SD = 1.49). This indicated 
that the manipulation was successful.  
5.2 Attribution of causality: 
The same analysis as for the manipulation check was conducted for the 
dependent variable attribution of causality. Results revealed a main effect for 
character evidence, F(1, 222) = 8.27, p < .005, ƞ2 = .04, indicating that 
participants in the character evidence condition (M = 3.10, SD = 1.16) were 
more inclined to attribute the incident to the defendant’s conduct (or less 
inclined to attribute to the situation) than participants in the no character 
evidence condition (M = 2.63, SD = 1.15). This analysis also revealed a 
significant main effect of training, F(1, 222) = 8.15, p = .005, ƞ2 = .04, 
indicating that law students (M = 3.05, SD = 1.17) were more inclined to 
attribute the incident to the defendant’s conduct (or less inclined to attribute 
to the situation) than SSPL subjects (M = 2.61, SD = 1.14). The analysis 
revealed no other effects, except for a marginally significant main effect of 
implicit theories, F(1, 222) = 2.67, p = .10, ƞ2 = .01, indicating that the more 
participants are dispositionally inclined to attribute to dispositions, the more 
they did attribute the accident to the defendant’s conduct. This effect as well 
as the one relative to character evidence did not differ between first and 
second year SSPL subjects. 
5.3 Responsibility: 
The analysis was repeated for the responsibility variable. I find a main effect 
for character evidence, F(1, 222) = 9.07, p < .005, ƞ2 = .04, suggesting that 
subjects in the character evidence condition (M = 3.08, SD = 1.45) had a 
tendency to judge the defendant to be more responsible than participants in 
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the non-character evidence condition (M = 2.48, SD = 1.32). I find also a 
significant main effect of training, F(1, 222) = 12.00, p = .001, ƞ2 = .05, 
suggesting that SSPL subjects (M = 2.42, SD = 1.34) were less  inclined to 
assign responsibility to the defendant than law students (M = 3.05, SD = 
1.42). These main effects were, however, qualified by a marginally significant 
interaction, F(1, 222) = 2.69, p = .10, ƞ2 = .01. Closer inspection (Pairwise 
comparisons with Bonferroni adjustments) showed that whereas law 
students receiving character evidence did assign more responsibility (M = 
3.45, SD = 1.35) than law students who did not receive character evidence (M 
= 2.64, SD = 1.37), for SSPL subjects this was not the case: subjects who 
received character evidence did not assign significantly more responsibility 
to the defendant (M = 2.57, SD = 1.43)  than subjects who did not receive 
character evidence (M = 2.42, SD = 1.33).  I also find a significant, yet 
marginal, main effect of Implicit theories, F (1, 222) = 3.36, p < .10, ƞ2 = .01, 
indicating the existence of a positive correlation between dispositionism and 
the attribution of responsibility. As above, a more fine-grained analysis 
showed that the effect of character evidence and implicit theories was not 
different between the first and second years SSPL subjects.  
 
5.4 Percentage of Damages Awarded: 
Lastly, the same analysis was conducted with percentage of damages 
awarded as the dependent variable. Since a finding of responsibility is a 
precondition for requiring the defendant to compensate losses I excluded 
Table 1: Mean Response (Causality, Responsibility and Damages Award) by Condition 
 
Evidence Type 
SSPL  Law Students 
Character Non-
Character 
 Character Non-Character 
Causality 2.82 2.41  3.34 2.80 
Responsibility 2.57 2.27  3.48 2.64 
Damages Award 21.94 18.24  32.54 22.89 
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from the sample the subjects that did not assign responsibility to the 
defendant (i.e. I took into account only those that answered the 
responsibility question with a number ˃ 1). I find no significant main effect 
of treatment. In addition, the analysis also reveals the absence of a 
significant main effect of implicit theories.  
6. Discussion 
Are legally trained individuals influenced by individual propensities to 
commit, and contextual factors that trigger, the FAE when making decisions 
at trial? This study provides mixed results. Concerning the influence of 
individual differences on the propensity to commit the FAE at trial, I find 
that for both groups higher adherence to dispositionism is associated with 
higher attribution of causality and responsibility to the plaintiff. In this 
connection, when read in conjunction with the studies on implicit theories, 
FAE and punishment,205 the result suggests that in the present study entity 
theorists may have attributed higher responsibility because of a failure to 
correct their dispositional inferences for situational factors. In this sense, 
this result is consistent with previous studies that find judges to rely on the 
same cognitive processes that trigger the FAE. For instance, US and Dutch 
judges have been found to rely on anchoring and adjustment,206 which is one 
of the mental processes that give rise to the FAE.207 Feldman et al. find 
similar results with law students and experienced lawyers.208 Yet, I find only 
a marginal correlation. Therefore, further research should test the validity of 
this finding.  
Another interesting finding concerning individual propensities is that that 
law students and SSPL subjects do not differ in terms of scores on the 
implicit theories of moral character. In this connection, the hypothesis put 
forward by Benforado and Hanson,209 according to which people that 
embark on a judicial career tend to be more situationist than the rest of the 
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population is not supported by the data. Of course, law students are not a 
representative sample of the general population. Yet, there is no reason to 
believe that they are different from the general population in terms of the 
implicit theories they hold. In addition, unless ones want to argue that 
lawyers are a professional group that foster situationism in society at least as 
much as judges, we should have observed some self-selection in the subjects 
enrolled in the SSPL.  
In relation to the effect of character evidence on trial outcomes the results 
show that, contrary to law students, SSPL students were able to disregard 
this information when adjudicating the case. This holds true for the causality 
and responsibility variables. The result is consistent with the literature on 
the effect of character evidence on lay adjudicators, which shows that 
laypeople’s trial decisions are affected by knowledge of prior convictions for 
similar actions.210 In addition, this result is also consistent with the findings 
of Guthrie and co-authors, which revealed that US administrative law judges 
are able to disregard inadmissible information.211 Similarly, this study is in 
line with the recent finding by Rachlinski and co-authors that judges are able 
to disregard hindsight information when expected to do so.212 This study 
contributes to this literature as I focus on the effect of an item of evidence 
relative to a conduct that is qualitatively very similar to the one presented at 
trial. These results therefore seem to suggest that when it comes to 
situational triggers of the FAE, individuals that pursue a judicial career are 
able to give character evidence its legally prescribed probative value. To the 
extent that a legal system prescribe judges to provide character evidence an 
accurate probative value, the employment of expert adjudicators limits the 
influence of the FAE on trial decisions. What can explain this result? Given 
that I found no differences in terms of dispositionism among the two groups 
which excludes self-selection as an explanation, it is plausible that the results 
were due to differences in familiarity with handling case materials and/or 
understanding of the law between the two groups.  
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These results are surprising. Indeed, they are somewhat difficult to reconcile 
with part of the previous literature that finds that even professional judges 
are not always able to handle inadmissible evidence as expected (Wistrich et 
al. 2005; Wallace and Kassin 2012).213 Yet, a common finding in this 
literature is that, when it comes to ignoring inadmissible evidence the years 
of experience in the judiciary are irrelevant in predicting performance.214 It 
can therefore be the case that there are types of character evidence that are 
easy to ignore after having received little training in adjudication; while 
others are very difficult to ignore, regardless of experience. Yet, on the basis 
of current data, it is difficult to identify which types of character evidence are 
more easily ignored. Further research is needed in this direction. Indeed, if 
little expertise is sufficient to ignore some type of character evidence but not 
others, one could conceive tailoring evidence law on the specific type of 
evidence considered.  
Concerning the influence of individual differences on the propensity to 
commit the FAE at trial, I find that for both groups higher adherence to 
dispositionism is associated with higher attribution of causality and 
responsibility to the plaintiff. In this connection, when read in conjunction 
with the studies on implicit theories, FAE and punishment,215 the result 
suggests that in the present study entity theorists may have attributed higher 
responsibility because of a failure to correct their dispositional inferences for 
situational factors. In this sense, this result is consistent with previous 
studies that find judges to rely on the same cognitive processes that trigger 
the FAE. For instance, US and Dutch judges have been found to rely on 
anchoring and adjustment,216 which is one of the mental processes that give 
rise to the FAE.217 Feldman et al. find similar results with law students and 
																																								 																				
213 Wistrich, A.J., Guthrie, C. and Rachlinski, J.J., (2005); Wallace D.B. and Kassin 
S.M., (2012). 
214 Wistrich, A.J., Guthrie, C. and Rachlinski, J.J., (2005); Rachlinski, J. J. (2011). 
Wallace D.B. and Kassin S.M. (2012).  
215 Tam K. et al., (2013). (see also: D.H. Silvera et al., 2000). 
216 Rachlinski J.J. et al. (2015). 
217 Nisbett R. and Ross, L. (1980), p. 123; 
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experienced lawyers.218 Yet, I find only a marginal correlation. Therefore, 
further research should test the validity of this finding.  
These findings contribute to the literature in various ways. First, these 
results expand the current understanding of the determinants of the FAE at 
trial by: i) inquiring the role of stable individual tendencies; ii) focusing on 
new forms of evidence rules that aim at reducing the effect of the FAE at 
trial. Second, the marginal differences in results between law and SSPL 
students suggests that training in adjudication can have a positive impact on 
how adjudicators handle rules aimed at reducing the influence of contextual 
determinants of the FAE. Second, it indicates that even looser regulation 
than the one adopted under US law (i.e. rationality criteria coupled with a 
shared belief that character evidence has little probative value) may 
sometimes be effective in steering adjudicators’ decisions, thus preventing 
the misuse of character evidence at trial. In fact, as highlighted above, Italian 
law does not forbid the use of character evidence tout-court, but it requires 
the adjudicator to ignore it when it is the only item of evidence available. 
SSPL subjects have shown to be able to act upon this prescription. Overall, 
these findings offer some support to the idea, often held in legal scholarship, 
that a ban on character evidence is not always necessary in legal systems that 
employ professional judges.219 In this connection, more generally, the study 
tests an assumption often made in legal scholarship, that the pervasiveness 
of the FAE among laypeople necessarily implies that expert adjudicators 
commit the same error in adjudication. These findings provide only limited 
support to this hypothesis. In particular, the ability of SSPL subjects to 
correctly apply rules aimed at limiting the use of character evidence coupled 
with the marginal effect of implicit theories on the dependent variables 
(causality and responsibility), suggests that the FAE might play a more 
limited role in trial settings than previously thought.  
7. Limitations 
Despite my efforts, the present work has various limitations. A first limit, 
common to all vignette experiments, is that the behavioral responses of the 
																																								 																				
218 Feldman, Y., Schurr, A. and Teichman, D. (2016). 
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subjects were given in a hypothetical scenario and did not test the effect of 
the manipulation on real behaviour. in addition, this methodology does not 
replicate the emotional and institutional incentives that adjudicators receive 
in real life settings, and therefore the results have only a limited external 
validity. Yet, the methodology allows to test the effect of a fairly realistic 
context on behaviour. In addition, isolating the effects of the FAE on judicial 
decision-making is already a challenging task in artificial settings. Studying 
this phenomenon in the field would be even more difficult.   
Second, subjects were law students and SSPL subjects that were approached 
in the same city. Despite the fact that the two groups are similar on many 
levels and different for training received, it is possible that the result was 
driven by another factor. In this connection, a clear difference between the 
two samples was age (as gender was found not to differ between groups). I 
therefore conduced the analysis controlling for age. The results were 
replicated.    
Third, one could object that SSPL subjects are not judges and that therefore, 
the results have limited external validity with regards to decisions made by 
judges. However, I believe that these results are relevant for the study of 
judicial decision-making. expertise is rarely a black or white issue. This is 
very much true also with regards to adjudication. Yet, a large part of the 
literature on judicial decision-making treats judges vs laypeople as a clear-
cut dichotomous choice. This approach is justified by the choice of samples 
adopted in the literature. In fact, most of the studies mentioned above were 
conducted with judges that had, on average, substantial experience serving 
the bench. For instance, in Wistrich et al.,220 Guthrie et al.221, Rachlinski et 
al.222 and Wallace and Kassin,223 a large proportion of the subjects had more 
than 10 years of experience in adjudication. In addition, studies on expertise 
and decision-making often compare experts with subjects that have no 
																																								 																				
220 Wistrich, A.J., Guthrie, C. and Rachlinski, J.J., (2005).  
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experience whatsoever in performing tasks tested in the experiment.224 
Comparing senior experts with individuals that have no experience in 
performing adjudication tasks is certainly a meaningful enterprise to spot 
differences among the two groups. However, this clear-cut distinction 
captures only one part of reality.  In fact, nowadays most Western legal 
systems employ a large number of non-professional judges that serve the 
bench for very limited periods of time and that often have broad jurisdiction 
in civil and criminal cases. The selection criteria and appointment status vary 
from legal system to legal system as well as across different sub-categories of 
non-professional judges. For example, in Italy more than 3704 honorary 
judges (vis-a-vis 6485 professional judges) routinely carry out judicial 
activities both in criminal and civil law trials. Italian honorary judges are 
nominated for a limited period of time (three or four years, renewable only 
once) and are chosen among individuals that have some degree of familiarity 
with the law (depending on the type of honorary judge either a standard law 
degree or having passed the bar exam).225 Similarly, non-professional judges 
play a major role in the justice system of several EU countries.226 In addition, 
the use of non-professional judges is not confined only to the European 
experience. For instance, US justice courts employ a large number of non-
professional judges with functions that vary from state to state.227 In this 
connection, it can be interesting to expand the inquiry of the influence of 
cognitive errors in adjudication to samples of subjects that have only a 
limited experience in adjudication, as this can shed new light on the 
decision-making of judges that have served only for a relatively short period 
of time (e.g. judges in their early career and non-professional judges).  
 
																																								 																				
224 Belton, I. K., Thomson, M., and Dhami, M. K. (2014). Lawyer and Nonlawyer 
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8. Conclusion 
Building on existing literature in behavioral law and economics, this Chapter 
has analyzed the influence of contextual factors and individual tendencies to 
commit the FAE in trial settings. The analysis has been performed on two 
populations of legally trained individuals: law students and individuals 
enrolled in a post master course that prepares to enter the judiciary. I find 
that  the post-master students are better able to handle potentially biasing 
situational factors when making decisions. Yet, the same subjects are still 
marginally influenced by their personal inclinations when attributing trial 
relevant behavior to the dispositional traits of the defendant. This suggests 
that, to the extent that the FAE is the result of implicit theories of behavior, 
this phenomenon may sometimes be present in the courtroom. 
These results inform the debate on whether stricter evidentiary rules are 
sometimes less needed when adjudication is performed by experts vis-à-vis 
laypeople. Specifically, this study provides some support to the idea that 
expertise in adjudication may increase the effectiveness of rules aimed to 
limit the use of character evidence. This also suggests that a strict ban on 
character evidence might  not always be needed when adjudication is 
performed by experts. Yet, when read in conjunction with previous studies 
on this issue, it seems that limited training has a positive influence on the 
use of character evidence only with certain sub-set types of this evidence. 
These findings speak also to the large legal literature that has drawn insights 
from classical studies on the FAE to explain and critically assess legal 
doctrines and practices. In particular, this study invites for more caution in 
assuming that expert adjudicators are strongly affected by attributional 
biases. Of course, the study does not provide a definitive answer on whether 
training in adjudication prevent experts from committing the FAE at trial. 
Further research in this direction is needed.  
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Appendix Chapter II 
 
2/1/1 
 
Age: ___ 
Gender:      M         F 
 
 
 
You are being asked to participate in a study about decision 
making.  
You will read statements and will be asked to answer questions 
related to these statements. Subsequently you will read a case and 
then you will be asked to answer questions related to the case. 
All responses are anonymous. In accordance with privacy law 
(Decreto Legislativo n. 196/2003), the data gathered in this study 
will be analysed and used only in an aggregate form and only for 
scientific purposes.  
 
Turn the page to start the study. 
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Please read the following statements and answer to questions on a 
1 to 6 degree scale (1 strongly disagree – 6 strongly agree). Please 
provide your answer by circling a number:  
 
1) A person’s moral character is something very basic about them, and it 
can’t be changed much. 
 
Strongly disagree 1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6 Strongly agree 
 
                                      
2) Whether a person is responsible or sincere or not is deeply ingrained 
in their personality. It cannot be changed very much. 
 
Strongly disagree 1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6 Strongly agree 
 
 
3) There is not much that can be done to change a person’s moral traits 
(e.g. conscientiousness, uprightness and honesty). 
 
Strongly disagree 1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6 Strongly agree 
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Please read the following story very carefully before you answer 
the questions  
Mr. X is a self-employed bricklayer who works as an independent contractor 
specialized in the restoration of house roofs. One day, Mr. X is asked by Mr. 
Y to repair his tailed house roof. 12 years after Mr. X had repaired the roof, a 
violent whirlwind hits the roof. When hit by the whirlwind the roof is 
severely damaged.  In the state in which the accident occurred house owners 
are not required to insure their house and independent contractors are not 
required to buy liability insurance. In the case above, neither Mr. X nor Mr. Y 
were insured. Because Mr. Y believes that flaws in the roof reparation made 
the roof more vulnerable to the whirlwind, he decides to sue Mr. X for 
damages. 
At the trial, Mr. Y argues that Mr. X did not exercise due care when repairing 
the roof and that the roof would have not been damaged had it been properly 
repaired. Mr. X denies not having taken due care. In addition, Mr. X argues 
that he cannot be held liable for the accident because the whirlwind was so 
violent that it would have damaged the roof regardless how much care was 
exercised when repairing it. Meteorological data show that it was the first 
time in the last century that a whirlwind hit that area. The expert report 
establishes that it is possible for a badly repaired roof to last 12 years. 
However, in the present case the expert report is not able to establish 
whether Mr. X exercised due care when repairing the roof. 
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After you have carefully read the story above, please answer the 
following questions:  
 
1) To what extent do you think that Mr. X has a history of not repairing 
roofs properly? Please answer on a 1 to 7 degree scale (circling a number). 
 
 
2) What do you personally think was/were the cause/s of the accident? 
Please answer on a 1 to 7 degree scale (circling a number). 
 
 
3) If you were the judge presiding over this case, to what extent would 
you rule that Mr. X is responsible for the accident? Please answer on a 1 to 7 
degree scale (circling a 
number). 
 
 
4) If you were the judge presiding over this case, which percentage of the 
damage would you require Mr. X to pay? Answer this question indicating a 
percentage.  
            
0%   ______  100% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not at all	 Very much 
	1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7	
The only cause of the 
accident was the violent 
whirlwind	
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7	
The only cause of the 
accident was the conduct 
of Mr. X	
Mr. X is not responsible at 
all	
Mr. X is fully responsible	
0% Mr. X does not 
compensate the loss	
100% Mr. X compensates 
the full loss	
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7	
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1/1/1 
 
Age: ___ 
Gender:      M         F 
 
 
 
You are being asked to participate in a study about decision 
making.  
You will read statements and will be asked to answer questions 
related to these statements. Subsequently you will read a case and 
then you will be asked to answer questions related to the case. 
All responses are anonymous. In accordance with privacy law 
(Decreto Legislativo n. 196/2003), the data gathered in this study 
will be analysed and used only in an aggregate form and only for 
scientific purposes.  
 
Turn the page to start the study. 
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Please read the following statements and answer the questions on 
a 1 to 6 degree scale (1 strongly disagree – 6 strongly agree). 
Please provide your answer by circling a number:  
 
1) A person’s moral character is something very basic about them, and it 
can’t be changed much. 
 
Strongly disagree 1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6 Strongly agree 
 
                                      
2) Whether a person is responsible or sincere or not is deeply ingrained 
in their personality. It cannot be changed very much. 
 
Strongly disagree 1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6 Strongly agree 
 
 
3) There is not much that can be done to change a person’s moral traits 
(e.g. conscientiousness, uprightness and honesty). 
 
Strongly disagree 1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6 Strongly agree 
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Please read the following story very carefully before you answer 
the questions  
Mr. X is a self-employed bricklayer who works as an independent contractor 
specialized in the restoration of house roofs. On two occasions, two of the 
roofs that Mr. X has repaired collapse around 15 years after the reparation 
took place. The accident causes substantial losses to Mr. X’s clients. Mr. X’s 
clients complain and claim that Mr. X has not taken the appropriate amount 
of care when repairing the roof thus putting their life and properties at risk. 
On both occasions Mr. X denies not having done his work properly and 
replies to his clients that he does not care about their health or property, that 
it is probably their fault and that he will not pay any damages.  On both cases 
the victims sue Mr. X and the evidence at trial reveals major flaws in the way 
in which the roof had been repaired due to the carelessness with which the 
job had been executed. Thus, in both trials Mr. X is proven negligent and is 
ordered to pay damages.  
One day, Mr. X is asked by Mr. Y to repair his tailed house roof. 12 years 
after Mr. X had repaired the roof, a violent whirlwind hits the roof. When hit 
by the whirlwind the roof is severely damaged. In the state in which the 
accident occurred house owners are not required to insure their house and 
independent contractors are not required to buy liability insurance. In the 
case above, neither Mr. X nor Mr. Y were insured. Because Mr. Y believes 
that flaws in the roof reparation made the roof more vulnerable to the 
whirlwind, he decides to sue Mr. X for damages. 
At the trial, Mr. Y argues that Mr. X did not exercise due care when repairing 
the roof and that the roof would have not been damaged had it been properly 
repaired. Mr. X denies not having taken due care. In addition, Mr. X argues 
that he cannot be held liable for the accident because the whirlwind was so 
violent that it would have damaged the roof regardless how much care was 
exercised when repairing it. Meteorological data show that it was the first 
time in the last century that a whirlwind hit that area. The expert report 
establishes that it is possible for a badly repaired roof to last 12 years. 
However, in the present case the expert report is not able to establish 
whether Mr. X exercised due care when repairing the roof. 
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After you have carefully read the story above, please answer the 
following questions:  
 
1) To what extent do you think that Mr. X has a history of not repairing 
roofs properly? Please answer on a 1 to 7 degree scale (circling a number). 
 
 
2) What do you personally think was/were the cause/s of the accident? 
Please answer on a 1 to 7 degree scale (circling a number). 
 
 
3) If you were the judge presiding over this case, to what extent would 
you rule that Mr. X is responsible for the accident? Please answer on a 1 to 7 
degree scale (circling a 
number). 
 
 
4) If you were the judge presiding over this case, which percentage of the 
damage would you require Mr. X to pay? Answer this question indicating a 
percentage.  
            
0%   ______  100% 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Not at all	 Very much 
	1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7	
The only cause of the 
accident was the violent 
whirlwind	
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7	
The only cause of the 
accident was the conduct 
of Mr. X	
Mr. X is not responsible at 
all	
Mr. X is fully responsible	
0% Mr. X does not 
compensate the loss	
100% Mr. X compensates 
the full loss	
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7	
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Chapter IV 
Implicit Racial Biases in Tort Trials228 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The previous two Chapters have focused on the FAE, which is psychological 
phenomena that had a large influence on tort law and evidence law 
scholarship. In particular, Chapter II, has discussed some issues related to 
the misuse of psychological literature on the FAE to identify problems and 
policy responses to these problems in tort trials. Chapter III has provided an 
empirical analysis of the effect of the FAE on expert adjudicators’ decisions 
at trial. This Chapter expands the scope of the behavioral analysis by 
studying other psychological phenomena that, like the FAE, relates to 
ingroup-outgroup membership and that have recently received growing 
attention in behavioral law and economics, i.e. implicit racial biases (IRBs).  
IRBs are biases driven by automatic and/or unconscious attitudes and 
stereotypes that individuals hold towards a particular social group identified 
by race.229 So far, IRBs mostly have been studied in the context of the 
																																								 																				
228 This Chapter is partially based on: 1) G. Dominioni and A. Romano, Trial 
(Implicit Biases), The Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics, Springer, 
Forthcoming; 2) G. Dominioni and L. Visscher, Implicit Biases in Tort Trials, 
Unpublished Manuscript. I thank Ian Ayres for valuable discussion. I am grateful 
also to Pieter Desmet, Louis Visscher, Christoph Engel, Alexandre Biard and 
Alessandro Romano, as well as to the participants at the 20th Ius Commune 
Conference at Leuven University, the BACT Lunch Seminar at Erasmus University 
of Rotterdam, the Future of Law and Economics Conference at Erasmus University 
of Rotterdam, the European Association of Psychology and Law 26th Annual 
Conference at Toulouse University and the IAREP/SABE 2016 Conference at 
Wageningen University for valuable feedback on earlier versions of this paper. The 
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229 Kang J. et al., (2012) Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA Law Review 1129. 
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Eds.), Guilford Press . For criticism to this body of work see: Mitchell G. and Tetlock 
P.E., (2006) Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 Ohio State 
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economics of criminal law.230 The existing research has resulted in a prolific 
debate on the effects of, and the adequate responses to, IRBs.231 In this 
Chapter I will argue that the insights from that literature are also relevant for 
tort law.   
Building on recent findings in psychology and neuroscience I provide a 
systematic analysis of how IRBs can affect the creation, perception and 
evaluation of different types of evidence in tort trials. In doing so, I draw a 
parallel between this literature and the neoclassical approach to 
discrimination. Furthermore, I identify various criteria that help identifying 
in which type of cases we can expect the impact of implicit biases on trial 
outcomes to be greater. In addition, I discuss whether and to what extent 
implicit biases are likely to decrease accuracy in adjudication, i.e. whether 
they decrease the correspondence of courts’ decisions to the facts underlying 
the dispute at trial (e.g. whether a certain harm was actually suffered by the 
victim). In this connection, I show that IRBs in the courtroom can hinder the 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
Law Journal 1023 . For a response to these critiques, see: Jost J.T. et al., (2009) The 
Existence of Implicit Bias is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological 
and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies that No 
Manager Should Ignore, 29 Research in Organizational Behavior, 39. 
230 For a recent review of this literature see: Dominioni G. and Romano A., Trial 
(Implicit Biases), Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics, Springer, 2017.  
231 Graham S. and Lowery B.S., (2004) Priming Unconcious Racial Stereotypes 
About Adolescent Offenders, 28 Law and Human Behavior 483; Jolls C. and 
Sunstein C., The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 California Law Review, 2006; Bagenstos, 
S. (2007) Implicit Bias, ''Science'' and Anti-Discrimination Law, 1 Harvard Law 
Review, 1; Levinson J.D., (2007) Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, 
Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 Duke Law Journal; Faigman D.L. et al. 
(2008) A Matter of Fit: The Law of Discrimination and the Science of Implicit Bias, 
59 Hastings Law Journal 1389; Rachlinski J.J. et al. (2009) Does Unconscious 
Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 Notre Dame Law Review 1195,; Levinson J.D. , 
et al., Guilty By IRBs: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 Ohio State 
Journal of Criminal Law, 2010, 187; Levinson J.D.  and  Young D., (2010) Different  
Shades  of  Bias:  Skin  Tone,  Implicit  Racial  Bias,  and  Judgments  of  Ambiguous  
Evidence,  307 West Virginia Law Review, 112;  Vieira A. and Glaser A., Taming the 
Biased Black Box? On the Potential Role of Behavioral Realism in Anti-
Discrimination Policy, 35(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2015, 121. 
The judicial branches of California, Minnesota and North Dakota have launced 
programs to train judges on IRBs and on techniques aimed at counteracting their 
influence on courts’ decision-making. See:  http://www.ncsc.org/ibeducation. 
According to The Wall Street Journal in 2014 one fifth of large employers with 
diversity programs in the US provided employees with a training on implicit biases, 
see on this:  Lublin, J.S.  Bringing Hidden Biases Into the Light: Big Businesses 
Teach Staffers How ‘Unconscious Bias’ Impacts Decisions, The Wall Street Journal, 
2014.  
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achievement of deterrence even when they increase accuracy. This analysis 
aims to inform scholars and policy makers in, respectively, the study and the 
choice between tort law, regulation and Pigovian taxes for addressing issues 
of distributive justice and efficiency in a wide spectrum of settings, ranging 
from environmental liability to product liability. Lastly, I discuss various 
debiasing and insulating strategies that could help reducing the effect of 
these biases in European tort trials.  
The Chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the economics of 
discrimination. Building on Section 2, Section 3 introduces the scientific 
work on IRBs and draws a parallel with the economics of discrimination. 
Section 3 illustrates how IRBs affect the creation and evaluation of evidence 
in tort law trials. The effects of IRBs on the functioning of tort law systems, 
with a particular focus on accuracy and welfare maximization, are discussed 
in Section 4, which also addresses the issue of the magnitude of these effects. 
Section 5 discusses debiasing and insulating strategies that could be 
implemented to reduce the effect of these biases on trial outcomes. Section 6 
concludes.  
2. The Economics of Discrimination: an Introduction 
Neoclassical law and economics literature describes individuals involved in 
trials (for instance, judges, prosecutors and lawyers) as rational agents.232 A 
clear example of this approach is the efficient prosecutor model, according to 
which prosecutors maximize either deterrence or convictions.233 With the 
growth of the field, the analysis has been refined to account for more 
nuanced dynamics of human decision-making. As I will show in the 
following, the legal scholarship on IRBs in trial settings can be seen as an 
extension of this endeavor. 
																																								 																				
232 McAdams R, Ulen T (2009) Criminal Behavioral Law and Economics. In: N. 
Garoupa (eds.) Criminal Law and Economics, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 403. 
233 Garoupa NM (2012) The Economics of Prosecutors. In: Harel A, K Hylton (eds). 
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Important works in law and economics conceive group-based discrimination 
as the outcome of a rational mental process.234 In this connection, law and 
economics traditionally distinguishes between two types of discrimination: 
taste based and statistical.235 Taste based discrimination refers to 
discrimination based on a conscious attitude towards a certain social group 
and that is not related to the socially identified purpose of the judgment 
performed. Thus, for instance, in the context of a trial, a judge may decide to 
find a defendant negligent when she identifies him as an outgroup for a 
reason that has nothing to do with the purposes of tort law (e.g. efficiency or 
corrective justice), but instead with her distaste towards outgroup members. 
This distaste may sometimes be grounded on misinformation about the 
prevalence and/or the causes of this prevalence of a certain trait (e.g. 
recklessness) among individuals belonging to different racial groups. For 
instance, a judge may consciously associate Black people as being on average 
more reckless than Whites and (mistakenly) believe that these differences 
have a biological basis. On the ground of this belief a judge may consciously 
hold a more positive attitude towards Whites than towards Blacks.  Here, by 
discriminating, the judge is maximizing her utility and therefore is behaving 
rationally, even though this behavior may not (and it is unlikely to) increase 
social welfare.  
Contrary to taste based discrimination, statistical discrimination is not based 
on negative attitudes. Like under taste based discrimination, also here the 
judge may consciously decide to be less lenient with a defendant belonging to 
a certain social group. Yet, statistical discrimination identifies this conduct 
when the agent behaves this way in order to achieve an aim other than 
express a negative attitude. For instance, imagine that at a certain point in 
history in a certain town, Black people are indeed on average more reckless 
when driving than White people. Here the judge may decide to be less lenient 
with Black defendants than with White defendants with the aim of improving 
the accuracy of her decisions (as explained above, accuracy is generally 
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accepted as a key aim of adjudication). This behavior could be considered 
rational in the sense that the judge maximize her utility by acting this way.   
This section has introduced discrimination as discussed in prominent works 
in the law and economics literature. The next section discusses the main 
psychological findings on IRBs and draws a parallel with the economics of 
discrimination. 
3. IRBs: an Introduction 
Contrary to consciously held racially-related beliefs studied in the economics 
literature mentioned above, IRBs are biases driven by automatic attitudes 
and stereotypes.236 The term bias indicates a shift in the way in which 
individuals respond to a particular stimulus within a continuum of possible 
responses.237 In this connection, a bias is implicit when it is automatic 
and/or unconscious.238 While automatic means that the shift requires little 
attention and that it is not easily controllable, unconscious indicates that it is 
not traceable through introspection.239  
IRBs can refer both to attitudes and to stereotypes. The latter are 
associations between a group of individuals and a trait.240 Thus, for instance 
a person may associate Eastern Asians with great math skills. Conversely an 
attitude is a mental association between a group of individuals and either a 
positive or a negative valence.241 For instance, an individual may have a 
general negative attitude towards persons of color. Despite being related, it is 
important to mark the difference between attitudes and stereotypes. Both 
phenomena can be either positive or negative, and holding a negative 
stereotype towards a racial group does not prevent an individual from having 
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association, which can be either positive or negative. 
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an overall positive attitude towards this group and vice versa.242 Thus, a 
person may associate persons of color with crime (a negative stereotype), but 
have a positive attitude towards them. Similarly, a person may have a 
positive stereotype towards Eastern Asians by associating them with 
hardworking, but have an overall negative attitude towards them.  
Implicit attitudes and stereotypes are identified with the use of indirect 
measurement procedures. Thanks to these techniques it is possible to 
identify attitudes and stereotypes that self-reported measures may fail to 
determine due to, for instance, social desirability concerns or 
unawareness.243 Indeed, substantial evidence shows that self-reported 
measures are often uncorrelated with implicit measures.244 In this 
connection, discrimination based on IRBs can be different from the one 
performed on the basis of consciously held beliefs and attitudes. This is 
because a subject may end up discriminating an individual even when she 
would prefer not doing so.245 Because of this, the type of discrimination 
deriving from implicit biases is fundamentally different from the one 
debated by neoclassical law and economics. 
The main indirect measurement procedures adopted in implicit social 
cognition are the Implicit Association Test (hereafter IAT), affective priming  
and  in functional magnetic resonance imaging (hereafter fMRI).   
In affective priming subjects are exposed to two types of stimuli (a target and 
a prime) and they are asked to categorize the target as either positive or 
negative. To perform the task the only relevant stimulus is the target, 
therefore the prime should not affect the behavior of the subjects. For 
instance, in studies on implicit racial attitudes, subjects are first exposed to 
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pictures of Black faces and White faces (the prime). This exposure occurs 
subliminally, meaning that pictures are shown for a very short time (e.g. 200 
milliseconds), so that they are processed only unconsciously. Subsequently, 
subjects are exposed to a series of words (the target) and are asked to 
categorize them (positive/negative). When priming with a racial stimulus 
facilitates the categorization of the words as negative the subject is said to 
hold a negative attitude towards the group.246 
The IAT allows testing the relative strength of implicit attitudes and 
stereotypes via the measurement of response latencies in the categorization 
of stimuli into classes.247 In particular, in a racial IAT part of the stimuli 
relates to racial groups (e.g. a name more commonly associated with a 
Black/White person), while the remaining stimuli relate to other concepts 
(e.g. good/bad). Subjects are repeatedly asked to categorize each stimulus 
(e.g. Black name) as belonging to one of two dyads. Thus, for instance, 
subjects are first asked to categorize good/bad concepts and Black/White 
names as belonging to either the Black/good or the White/bad dyad. And, 
subsequently, the task is repeated with Black/bad and White/good dyads. 
Differences in response time between different combinations of dyads 
indicate that a certain racial group is more easily associated with a certain 
concept. Another technique often employed in the implicit racial attitude 
domain is blood oxygen level-dependent contrast imaging in functional 
magnetic resonance imaging.248 This physiological measure identities 
variations in oxygen levels in the blood present in different parts of the brain, 
which are positively correlated with activations of these areas. Thus, for 
instance, exposure to Black faces has been shown to generate a greater 
activation of the amygdala in White patients (the amygdala is a part of the 
brain related to the processing of emotions). Therefore, this strand of 
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research indicates that the exposure to different racial groups can trigger 
distinctive emotional states.249 
IRBs are pervasive both in the general population and among judges. The 
large amount of data gathered through the online platform Project Implicit 
(http://implicit.harvard.edu), indicates that, in the period 2000-2006, 68% 
of the over 1 million participants in the race IAT showed stronger 
associations between people of color and bad than between whites and bad. 
Only 14%, part of the black participants in the sample,250 showed the reverse 
pattern.251 Interestingly, black participants were the only group that did not 
show a strong pro-white preference.252 While most participants to these 
studies were US citizens, also Europeans (both from continental Europe and 
the UK), took part in the IAT. The analysis of those data shows the absence 
of significant differences in responses provided by Europeans and US 
citizens.253	 It is important to stress that these results come from a self-
selected sample of visitors of the Implicit Project website and therefore they 
can-not be considered a sample representative of the distribution of attitudes 
of a particular population. However, the large size and the diversity of the 
sample makes it more representative of most samples used in laboratory 
experiments. This holds also with regards to the European population for 
which the availability of the website exclusively in English decreases the 
representativeness of the population.254 These considerations provide strong 
support that studies based on IAT are relevant also to understand the 
judgment and decision-making of Europeans.  
With regards to judges, despite the fact that society expects them to be free 
from these biases, there is no evidence that suggests that they are immune or 
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even differently affected by IRBs than the general population.255 In a three 
stages experiment consisting in a racial IAT, and two vignettes studies - one 
in which racial information was subliminally primed and the other in which 
it was made explicit- Rachlinski and co-authors found that a large majority 
(87.1%) of white participants showed an implicit attitude more favorable 
towards whites than towards people of color.256 These findings are consistent 
with results obtained with non-judges.  This was confirmed by the finding 
that also black judges did not show a clear preference for whites or people of 
color. 44.2% of them showed a preference for white individuals, but, in 
general, preferences were not particularly strong.257 
Similar patterns are observed in studies on medical doctors, confirming that 
large proportions of white individuals show implicit attitudes favorable to 
white people.258 Also these studies show that black people tend, on average, 
to be race neutral.259 These studies are of particular relevance here because, 
like judges, medical doctors are highly educated individuals that are 
expected to operate in a racially neutral manner. These data and the 
similarities between the two professions support the claim that judges are 
not differently affected by IRBs than the general population.  
Besides being pervasive, IRBs have been shown to influence both nonverbal 
behaviors (such as facial expressions and posture in the interaction between 
individuals belonging to different races), and conducts that are qualitatively 
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more deliberate (such as hypothetical decisions on guilt at trials and 
provision of medical treatments in hypothetical scenarios).260 In recent 
years, the predictive validity of measurements of IRBs on human behavior 
has been addressed in meta-analytical studies that have focused on data 
obtained with the IAT and priming procedures. All these studies show that 
measurements of IRBs predict behavior.261 
The implicitness, especially the uncontrollability and the unconsciousness 
characteristic, of these biases implies that, sometimes, individuals that 
would find it inappropriate to hold these implicit racial attitudes and 
stereotypes, will nonetheless involuntarily act upon them. Thus a person may 
think that he likes people of color and that it is appropriate to hold this 
attitude, but his implicit attitude might go in the other direction, leading him 
to act negatively towards them.262 
4. IRBs and Evidence in Tort Trials 
The occurrence of an accident can give rise to a legal dispute. When this 
happens, parties have the right to present evidence to the court and the court 
is expected to use this evidence to determine the truthfulness of the 
statements made by parties regarding facts that are relevant for the case.263 
Evidence law regulates when, how and what evidence can be presented by 
whom and how courts are required to process this information.  
Evidence at trial may regard both brute facts and facts evaluatively 
determined. Brute facts are those that have only an empirical dimension,264 
such as the collision of two vehicles. With regards to brute facts, the evidence 
provides information to the court regarding whether and how the fact 
occurred. Conversely, facts evaluatively determined have an evaluative 
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dimension that is established by legal norms.265 Thus, for instance, a 
particular conduct (which has an empirical dimension) can be considered 
reasonable or not (the evaluative dimension). In this case the evidence is 
concerned with whether and how the fact occurred and subsequently the fact 
is evaluated according to the relevant legal norm.  
The contention of this section is that studies in implicit social cognition show 
that IRBs can affect courts’ perception of both brute and evaluative 
determined facts.  
4.1 The Presentation and Evaluation of Brute Facts  
Procedural rules distinguish between the moment in which parties present 
the evidence to the court and the time in which the latter is required to 
evaluate which of the facts have been proved. In this section, I shall follow 
this distinction for the purpose of the analysis.266 The contention of this 
section is that the influence of IRBs on courts’ assessment of the evidence 
can already begin in the phase of the trail in which evidence is presented. 
 4.1.1 Implicit Biases and the Presentation of Evidence	
A common distinction is usually drawn between two types of evidence 
depending on whether the item of evidence is created within or outside the 
trial. The latter is usually referred to as pre-constituted evidence and refers 
mainly to documents that are formed before the trial begins, such as a 
medical report on the injuries suffered by the victim of an accident. The 
former refers instead to items of evidence that do not exist before the trial 
begins and that are instead formed at the trial. Evidence that is created at the 
trial can take various forms such as witness testimony, party interrogations, 
decisory oaths, deeds, confessions, etc. I will argue in the following that 
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266 From a psychological perspective, some of the tasks performed by adjudicators 
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courts’ perception of both evidence created at trial and pre-constituted 
evidence can be affected by IRBs. 
4.1.1.1 Brute Facts, IRBs and the Creation of Evidence at the 
Trial  
A central feature of the evidence that is created at trial is that courts are 
required to evaluate whether the items of evidence so generated can be used 
as a reliable source for establishing whether a particular fact occurred. With 
regards to some type of evidence (e.g. testimony and parties interrogation) 
an obvious criterion that informs this evaluation is whether the person that 
reported the information is credible. 267  
Building on case law analysis, legal scholars have long argued that IRBs often 
lead white judges (or juries, e.g. in the US) to trust a testimony given by a 
black individual less than one provided by a white witness.268 This 
conclusion is supported by recent experimental findings. Stanley and co-
authors have tested whether a racial Implicit Association Test (IAT) predicts 
explicit evaluations of the trustworthiness of faces.269 They find that 
individuals that showed a strong implicit bias in favor of whites tended to 
consider black faces less trustworthy than white faces.270 These findings 
suggest that in the context of a trial, the evidence provided by a black party 
to a white judge could be, ceteris paribus, less likely to be found credible than 
the evidence provided by a white party.   
The influence of IRBs on the outcome of the interrogation of a party can go 
beyond the issue of trust and credibility. Experimental evidence shows that 
IRBs affect body language, with higher degrees of pro-white implicit biases 
correlated with greater nonverbal unfriendliness towards people of color.271 
Building on these results, in the medical literature it has been shown that 
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negative nonverbal cues predicted by a racial IAT contributed to decrease the 
quality of communication between white physicians and black patients.272 
Studies in psychology suggest that nonverbal behavior can affect trust, 
cooperation and likeliness between individuals.273 This indicates that judges’ 
nonverbal behavior and the responses to this behavior may affect how 
parties’ interrogation are carried out, potentially concurring to determine: 
the answers given by the party, the (subsequent) questions asked by the 
judge; the tone used to ask these questions; the willingness of a judge to let a 
party explain herself; the party behavior during the interrogation,274 etc. In 
this context, nonverbal behavior driven by IRBs influences the evidence 
perceived by the judge not only by affecting the perception itself,275 but 
influencing the evidence that is actually presented.  
Overall this literature suggests that IRBs are likely to make it more difficult 
for members of racial minorities to provide courts whose members belong to 
the racial majority with information that support their claims. In addition, 
once presented, there is also a non-trivial probability that the evidence will 
be perceived in a biased way.  
Legal systems differ in terms of the evidentiary function of the 
interrogation.276 For instance, under Italian law, the interrogatorio libero 
can only provide judges with argomenti di prova, which is an item of 
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evidence that has the lowest degree of probative value.277 A similar regime 
regulates the comparution personnelle in France.278 However, other forms of 
parties’ interrogation provide items of evidence with a higher degree of 
probative value, such as the Italian interrogatorio formale and the 
Parteivernehmung in Germany.279 Depending on the regime regulating 
parties’ interrogations and on the extent to which judges follow these rules 
when deciding cases, the influence of IRBs on courts’ perception of evidence 
provided during an interrogation may have a variable importance in 
determining the outcome of the case.  
4.1.1.2 Brute Facts, IRBs and Pre-Constituted Evidence  
The second way in which parties can provide evidence to support their 
claims is to present evidence that was created outside the trial. My 
contention here is that IRBs are likely to affect the creation of this evidence 
in a predictable way and the item of evidence so generated is likely to bring 
the effects of the bias to the decision of the court. In this connection, an 
example that is particularly meaningful in the realm of tort law concerns 
courts’ evaluation of the losses that need to be compensated to the victim.  
One of the constituents of a tort is that the victim has suffered a loss. The 
harm can take various forms, and the law often traces a general distinction 
between economic and non-economic losses. While the former refers to 
losses of money or other goods purchased in markets (income, properties, 
medical services, etc.), the latter identifies losses in utility deriving from the 
destruction of irreplaceable things, such as pain, emotional distress, loss of 
amenity, etc.280 
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Whether, and to what extent, a victim of a tort has suffered a loss is one of 
the facts that needs to be proved at trial. Medical reports often play a major 
role in providing courts with information on these facts both regarding the 
amount of medical expenses that a victim had to bear because of the 
accident, and the non-economic losses that a victim is likely to have 
suffered.281 This makes the study of the influence of implicit biases on the 
creation of medical reports relevant for the study of tort law. 
Substantial evidence indicates that in both the EU and the US health care 
system members of ethnic minorities often receive inadequate or inferior 
medical treatment compared to the one provided to white patients.282 
Experimental evidence suggests that IRBs are one of the causes of these 
discriminative treatments.283 The relevance of IRBs to determine patients’ 
treatment is debated in the literature. Some studies found strong evidence of 
the impact of IRBs on patient treatments,284 while others found mixed285 or 
no correlation between the two measures.286 Experimental research is now 
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16(6) JOP 558. 
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focusing on identifying the conditions under which IRBs affect medical 
treatments, with the aim of achieving a more accurate picture of the role of 
IRBs in determining the observed disparities in the health care sector.287 
Within the domain of pain medicine and treatment, a study with 86 
academic pediatricians it was found that IRBs affect pain treatments.288  The 
higher the implicit pro-white racial biases held by pediatricians, the lower 
was the prescription of pain narcotic to black patients. Conversely, the 
magnitude of the bias was not related to differences in pain treatment of 
white individuals.289 Similarly, Mathur and co-authors examined pain 
perception, empathy, and treatment suggestions of both people of color and 
whites confronted with vignettes describing patients in painful situations.290 
The evaluation was preceded by either a priming procedure or by a static 
image of either a black or a white patient. The results show that subjects 
responded more to the pain of white patients in the priming condition, 
meaning when the perception of patients’ racial group was unconscious.291 
However, the opposite result was obtained in the static image condition (i.e. 
when the image was processed consciously). These results suggest that 
existing disparities in health treatment are at least partially the result of 
implicit biases.292 And indeed, if consciously processed racial information 
lead to more favorable treatment of Black patients while unconsciously 
processed ones cause a bias against Blacks, it is plausible that unconscious 
judgments are the basis for the discriminative treatments administered to 
people of color. 
Findings of racially dependent differences in pain perception of in-
group/out-group individuals have also been confirmed by several 
neuroscientific studies. These studies have shown greater activations of 
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empathy related areas of the brain when the observer is exposed to 
images/videos showing members of his racial group suffering pain than 
when the person in pain is a member of a different racial group.293 In one of 
these studies it was shown that IRBs predicted the activation of the left 
anterior insula, which is considered to be a part of the brain that is involved 
in the perception of third parties’ pain.294  
Overall the existing empirical literature suggests that IRBs play a role in 
determining discriminative medical treatments in the health care system.295 
Pain perception seems to be particularly prone to be affected by IRBs. 
Furthermore, these studies testify that, in the context of a trial, the evidence 
that is brought to court, sometimes labeled in the literature as ‘objective’,296 
is not immune to the influence of IRBs. This evidence is also likely to 
influence the award of damages by courts. For instance, the assessment of 
the pain suffered by a victim as ‘moderate’ as opposed to ‘severe’ may affect 
the pain and suffering damages the court awards.297  
Medical reports are just an example of evidence created outside the trial that 
is not immune from IRBs. An extensive literature shows that US police 
officers are as affected as other individuals by IRBs.298 This literature 
suggests that IRBs are able to shift policemen’s visual attention. For 
instance, it has been shown that priming policemen with a black male face 
increases the speed with which they recognize the figure of a weapon that 
emerges out of a static image on a video.299 These results, coupled with the 
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the Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal for Change, 100(1) 
Northwestern University Law Review 87. 
297 Notice also that differences in medical perception of pain caused by IRBs may 
also affect the creation of evidence at the trial when medical experts are called to 
assess the medical conditions of a victim of an accident during the trial. 
298 For a review of this literature see: Kang J. (2012). 
299 Eberhardt J.L. (2004) et al Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 876. 
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literature on IRBs, trust and likeliness,300 suggest that police reports can be 
affected by IRBs. These reports, when presented as evidence at trial, are 
likely to impact courts’ decisions. An example of this is the report of a police 
officer regarding the dynamics of a car accident that is used at trial to 
support the claim that the accident occurred in a certain manner. This, in 
turn, can affect the determination of causation and negligence in a tort law 
trial. 
4.1.2 Implicit Biases and the Evaluation of Evidence 
Regarding Brute Facts 
After the phase relative to the presentation of evidence, procedural law 
requires judges to evaluate the epistemic status of the statements made by 
parties in light of the evidence that has been presented. In contemporary 
Civil Law and Common Law systems the principle of free evaluation of 
evidence is the core rule for the evaluation of evidence.301 According to this 
principle the evaluation of the evidence should be made by the judge on a 
case by case basis and according to her discretion.302 A significant number of 
studies have shown that this activity is likely to be influenced by IRBs.  
In establishing the truthfulness of a statement at trial, courts are often 
required to consider multiple and contrasting pieces of evidence. This may 
leave uncertainty regarding whether, given the evidence presented, the fact 
can be considered proven. Empirical studies suggest that the evaluation of 
ambiguous evidence is affected by IRBs.303 In a study by Levinson and Young 
it has been shown that in a robbery case, when evidence is ambiguous, 
showing a photo of an alleged offender with darker skin (compared to the 
one shown in the control group), increases the degree by which the evidence 
is evaluated as proving guilt.304 Racial IAT scores predicted evidence 
judgment.305 Conversely, explicit racial preferences (i.e. preferences 
consciously held) were not found to correlate with it.306 These results were 
																																								 																				
300 See supra section III.B.1.a. 
301 See: Taruffo M. (2014). 
302 Ibid. 
303 Levinson J.D. and Young D. (2010). 
304 Ibid.  
305 Ibid. 
306 Ibid. 
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corroborated in another study, which showed that implicit associations 
between person of color and guilt predicted judgments on the probative 
value of ambiguous evidence in a mock criminal case.307 Similarly, salience of 
race in establishing guilt has also been proven in the context of video-taped 
confessions in criminal cases. This evidence shows that confessions of 
members of minority groups are evaluated as being more voluntary (not 
coerced by the interrogator) than those of white individuals.308 Implicit 
stereotypes may account for this result.309 
Ambiguity of evidence is not the only factor that can affect courts’ evaluation 
of evidence in a racially biased manner. In another study, Levinson has 
shown that the racial group of a person can affect the way in which 
individuals recall legally relevant facts about her life, such as past conducts 
or experienced events.310 The result was found to be present solely when the 
relevant facts were more consistent with racial stereotypes.311 For instance, 
the study found that few minutes after reading a story about a physical 
aggression, individuals recalled more aggressive conducts when the 
aggressor had a ‘black name’ than when he had a ‘white name’.312 Explicit 
racial preferences did not predict the degree by which subjects recalled facts 
in a racially biased manner.313 Thus, this study provides preliminary 
evidence that when the facts of a case are in line with racial stereotypes, IRBs 
may affect judges’ memory with regards to facts that are legally relevant in a 
tort law context. In fact, when judges have to evaluate whether a particular 
fact has been proven, they are sometimes forced to use their memory to 
process the, often large, amount of items of evidence that parties presented 
at the trial. As that the study found differences in memory recalls already a 
few minutes after subjects had read the story,314 there might be a non-trivial 
probability that IRBs affect the memory of judges in the evaluation of 
																																								 																				
307 Levinson J.D. et al. (2007).  
308 Ratcliff J.J. et al. (2010) The Hidden Consequences of Racial Salience in 
Videotaped Interrogations and Confessions, 16(2) Psychol Public Policy Law 200. 
309 Ibid. 
310 Levinson J.D. (2007).  
311 Ibid. 
312 Ibid. 
313 Ibid. 
314 Ibid. 
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evidence at trial.315Lastly, as discussed in the previous section, harm is one of 
the necessary elements of a tort that needs to be proved at trial. In this 
connection, non-economic losses have an empirical reality that can only be 
ascertained by courts through an inferential process based on the evidence 
presented. In this context, pain perception can, and often does, play a major 
role in the evaluation of the existence and the quantum of non-economic 
losses. As seen above, substantial psychological and neuroscientific evidence 
suggests that pain perception is moderated by IRBs. This suggests that 
judges, like physicians in the creation of the item of evidence, may perceive 
the evidence presented at trial in a biased manner.316 This conclusion is 
supported by a recent study on jury eligible citizens in the US, in which it was 
found that subjects held implicit associations between race and value of life 
of the defendant in a capital punishment case, with lower value of life 
associated with people of color.317 This evidence suggests that there is the 
risk that the damages award for pain to a single victim is reduced twice by 
the effect of IRBs, both when the evidence is created and when the evidence 
is evaluated.  
4.2 The Evaluation of Facts Evaluatively Determined 
The evaluation of the evidence concerning brutal facts does not exhaust the 
type of evaluative tasks that a judge is called to undertake in order to reach a 
decision. Another form of evaluation that a judge has to make is concerned 
with so called facts evaluatively determined, meaning facts that are defined 
by legal norms that contain an evaluative term. In the following I will argue 
that also this type of evaluation is likely to be affected by IRBs. 
In a tort law context, under a negligence rule, a fact evaluatively determined 
that plays a major role in determining the outcome of a dispute is whether 
																																								 																				
315 Notice that memory-related implicit biases may affect also the evidence 
presented at trial, for instance when witnesses are called to report their memories 
on the relevant facts of the case. This can occur both when the evidence is created at 
trial (if the witness testimony takes place at trial) and outside the trial (for instance, 
when the witness reports her memories to the police).  
316 For a discussion on the discretion enjoyed by judges in awarding pain and 
suffering in various EU legal systems see: Karapanou V. LT Visscher L.T. (2010) 
Towards a Better Assessment of Pain and Suffering Damages, 1 Journal of European 
Tort Law 48. 
317 Levinson J.D. et al. (2010)1. 
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the alleged tortfeasor took due care by acting as a reasonable person. 
However, what a reasonable person would have done in that situation, often 
remains vague in legal practice. A growing strand of literature shows that 
when legal standards are vague, they can be unconsciously shifted to protect 
in-group members.318 Standard shifting is a result of motivated cognition, 
meaning the unconscious tendency to acquire, understand and elaborate 
information in a way that is consistent with the preferences of the 
observer.319 Experimental evidence shows that these preferences may derive 
from the desire to protect racially identified in-group members.320 This 
occurs as an unconscious reaction to the threat that an accusation of 
immoral/illegal conduct of one of the members of a group brings to the 
social status of the group as a whole.321 IRBs seem to have a role in 
determining standard shifting.322 In particular, Shoda and co-authors show 
that the greater the degree of dissonance between implicit and explicit biases 
held towards people of color, the greater the standard shifting.323 In other 
words, people whose explicit racial attitudes are relatively more positive and 
whose implicit racial attitudes are relatively more negative are more likely to 
engage in stronger standard shifting. This would be due to the fact that 
greater degrees of difference between the two measures lead to more 
effortful processing of information, which in turn leads to more motivated 
reasoning.324  
																																								 																				
318 Miron et al A.M. (2010) Motivated Shifting of Justice Standards, 20(10) 
Personality Social Psychology Bullettin 1; Leidner B. Castano E., (2012) Morality 
Shifting in the Context of Intergroup Violence, 42(1) European Journal of Social 
Psychology 82; Tarrant M. et al (2012) Social Identity and Perceptions of Torture: 
It's Moral When We Do It, 48(2) Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 513. 
319 Kunda Z. (1990), The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108(3) Psychological 
Bulletin 480.  
320 Miron A.M. (2010). 
321 Ibid. 
322 Shoda T.M. (2014) Having Explicit-Implicit Evaluation Discrepancies Triggers 
Race-Based Motivated Reasoning, 32(2) Social Cognition 190.  
323 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. See also: Shoda T.M. et al (2014) Implicit Consistency Processes in Social 
Cognition: Explicit-Implicit Discrepancies Across Systems of Evaluation, 8(3) Social 
and Personality Psychology Compass 135. 
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Legal scholarship on motivated cognition has grown rapidly in recent 
years,325 gaining recognition also in the literature on law and IRBs.326 The 
study by Shoda offers the missing link between the two strands of literature, 
showing how IRBs relate to standard shifting. This is a first study, and 
further evidence on the relationship between the two phenomena needs to be 
gathered before strong claims can be made.  
In a tort law context, besides altering the amount of evidence needed to 
consider a brute fact as proved,327 standard shifting can occur in the 
establishment of the due care standard. In practice, this shift may 
materialize in courts’ asking more evidence to prove that a conduct was 
reasonable when the alleged tortfeasor is an in-group member and the 
defendant is an out-group member than when both parties are in-group or 
out-group members.  
5. The Effect of IRBs on the Functioning of Tort Law 
In the previous section it has been argued that IRBs are likely to affect the 
type of evidence presented at trial, the way in in which judges perceive and 
evaluate it, and how decisions are consequently made in tort law contexts. 
Building on this analysis this section discusses how implicit biases can 
decrease the actual and perceived probability for a member of a 
discriminated group to obtain full compensation at trial. In addition, it 
analyzes how the existence of IRBs in trial settings can hinder the 
achievement of optimal deterrence. In particular, the analysis focuses on the 
distorting effects that IRBs have on the incentives that tort law provides to 
reduce negative externalities and the link between accuracy, deterrence and 
IRBs.  
																																								 																				
325 For a review of this literature see: Sood A.M. (2013) Motivated Cognition in Legal 
Judgments – An Analytic Review, 9 Annual Review Law Social Science 307. 
326 Kang and colleagues argue that motivated reasoning may affect the way in which 
white judges evaluate brute facts when one of the parties at trial is black and the 
other party and the judge are white. In particular, they claim that standard shifting 
can lead the white judge to require more evidence from the side of the black party to 
prove items of evidence that support her statements, see: Kang J. (2012). 
327 Ibid. 
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5.1 Setting the Stage 
The analysis of the effect of IRBs on the deterrent capacity of tort law has, as 
a natural antecedent, the description of a society in which tort law regulates 
the behavior of its members.  
In the following, for reasons of simplicity, to better capture the effect of IRBS 
on trial systems, I will make some assumptions regarding the society in 
which my analysis takes place. In particular, I will assume that this society 
has the following characteristics: first, there are only two racial groups. I will 
refer to one of the two groups as to non-discriminated group and to the other 
one as to discriminated group. Second, all judges in the society are members 
of one of the two groups. In the following, I will assume that judges are all 
members of the non-discriminated group. Third, a proportion of victims and 
tortfeasors are members of the non-discriminated group and the remaining 
part are members of the discriminated group. Fourth, members of the two 
groups establish the affiliation of an individual to one of the two groups by 
looking at some trait of the physical appearance of the observed individual 
(such as skin color, facial traits, etc.) or other relevant characteristics such as 
the name of the person.  
To the extent that the society described above represents a good 
approximation of the relevant aspects of a society in a given country, the 
conclusions reached below will accurately describe the effects of IRBs on the 
functioning of tort law in that society.  In this regard, looking at the 
composition of judiciaries in Europe, existing studies suggest that the 
presence of non-white judges within the EU is very limited. Given that exact 
data on the number of non-white judges are not available in most Civil Law 
countries, we need to find proxies for this measure. Ethnicity is arguably a 
good proxy for this. In this regard, a recent study by de Rechtspraak has 
concluded that in Germany, France and the Netherlands very few judges 
have a migrant background.328 For instance, in Germany, where people with 
Turkish origins are the largest ethnic minority, there are only five judges 
																																								 																				
328 Böcker A. and de Groot-van Leeuwen L. (2007), Ethnic Minorities 
Representation in the Judiciary: Diversity among Judges in Old and New Countries 
of Immigration, The Judiciary Quarterly, 22. 
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with Turkish names out of the 21.000 judges operating in the country.329 In 
addition, the analysis of the trends of law students/lawyers operating in the 
three countries confirm that members of minority groups are not numerous 
in the respective judiciary and suggests that, at least in the near future, these 
numbers are not likely to increase.330  These studies highlight that the 
assumptions made in here are a fair approximation of the reality prevailing 
in many contemporary societies throughout Europe.   
5.2 The Effects of IRBs on Deterrence 
In the following, I will discuss two main effects of IRBs in the courtroom, 
meaning, direct harm and signaling direct harm. This analysis is useful to 
study of the effects of IRBs on the functioning of tort law systems.  
5.2.1 Direct Harm and Implicit Biases  
Direct harm is here defined as a loss that stems directly from a behavior of a 
judge. In the context of the present analysis, direct harm can be defined as 
the difference between the situation that the member of the discriminated 
group experiences if the behavior of a judge is affected by IRBs, and the 
situation in which the same person would have been, had the behavior of the 
judge not been influenced by the bias. 
Based on the types of effect that they have, it is useful to distinguish three 
different types of direct harm caused by IRBs. First, direct harm can be 
measured as the difference in the likelihood that a member of a 
discriminated group obtains unbiased compensation at trial given the 
presence or the absence of IRBs in the judiciary (hereafter: probability 
																																								 																				
329 Notice that in Germany there are more than 2.5 million persons with Turkish 
origins and that in the country there are 25,5 judges per 100000 heads of 
population. However, my point here is not that individuals with Turkish origins are 
underrepresented in the judiciary (which is, however, arguably true). My point here 
is, instead, that they are very few. 
330 The analysis of trends in numbers of individual members of ethnic minorities 
studying law or working as lawyers is relevant for understanding the likely 
composition of judiciaries in the near future because legal education and having 
worked as a qualified lawyer for a certain number of years are prerequisite to 
become judges in many EU countries. Böcker A. and L. de Groot-van Leeuwen L. 
(2007). 
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harm).331  In Section 3 I have highlighted that, in the context of civil trials, 
IRBs are likely to affect the way in which judges decide on the epistemic 
status of the statements made by parties regarding brute facts and facts 
evaluatively determined. Thus, probability harm is a decrease in the 
probability that a statement made by a party will be considered as proved. In 
the context of tort law, this harm can materialize in a discriminated person 
losing a case that he would have not otherwise lost or receiving a lower 
compensation than in absence of the bias. 
Second, direct harm can also materialize in an immaterial loss that a 
member of a discriminated group suffers when experiencing an hostile 
conduct of a judge (hereafter: hostility harm). In this regard, as argued 
above, IRBs can cause both hostile verbal and nonverbal behaviors, which, 
once perceived by the member of discriminated group, will be a source of 
suffering.332  
Third, probability harm, like hostility harm, can give rise to a suffering of the 
member of the discriminated group when this individual perceives its effects 
and starts believing that he has been discriminated against (hereafter: 
discrimination harm). This suffering, coupled with the one arising from 
hostility harm, can be conceived as a cost that members of discriminated 
groups bear when they bring a case to trial. 
The three types of direct harm differ in many ways. For the purpose of the 
present work the most relevant difference is the observability of the harm by 
those who suffer it, which bring us to the second type of effect of IRBs in the 
courtroom, meaning signalling direct harm.  
																																								 																				
331 Biased compensation is every level of compensation that is lower than what 
would have been awarded in absence of the bias. Biased compensation is zero when 
IRBs lead the member of the discriminated group to lose a case. Alternatively, 
biased compensation is a positive level of compensation that is however lower than 
the one that would have been received otherwise.  
332 For a comprehensive study on the suffering caused by discriminatory nonverbal 
behaviors see: Sue D.W., (2008) Racial Microaggressions in the Life Experience of 
Black Americans, 39(3) Professional Psychology - Research & Practice 329; Sue 
D.W. (2010), Microaggressions in Everyday Life: Race, Gender, and Sexual 
Orientation, Wiley & Sons. ; Sue D.W. et al. (2007), Racial Microaggressions in 
Everyday Life Implications for Clinical Practice, 62(4) American Psychologist 272. 
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5.2.2 Implicit Bias and Signalling Direct Harm  
Signalling direct harm is defined here as harm that has the ability to show to 
actual/potential parties at trial that courts are racially biased. It will be 
argued in the following that two types of direct harm significantly differ in 
terms of their observability to users of a judicial system, with probability 
harm being less observable than hostility harm.333 
As noted in the previous section, discrimination that causes probability harm 
is a product of a decision made by judges when evaluating evidence. 
Members of discriminated groups may or may not be aware of being harmed 
in such way. They may observe that winning a case is (more) difficult (than 
in absence of the bias), but they may not realize that part of this difficulty is 
due to a bias that influences how judges make decisions. This is because how 
the judge reaches a decision on the evaluation of the evidence is not 
observable by third parties. In fact, this is often a mental process of the judge 
and in situations in which decisions are collegial, this deliberation often 
occurs in the secret of the chamber.334 The scarce, and not necessarily 
transparent, information offered by the motivation of the decision is often 
not informative in this regard.  
The low observability of probability harm does not imply that members of 
discriminated group cannot believe that they have lost a case because they 
have been discriminated against. It is in fact clear that an individual can 
always find various explanations for the “why” she has lost at trial. These 
explanations can be grounded on other beliefs. For instance, a member of a 
discriminated group can always explain having lost at trial with the racism of 
the judge, even when they do not observe the decision-making process of the 
judge. In these cases, the party previous belief “judges are racist”, might find 
greater confirmation in the increase in trials that members of discriminated 
groups lose because of the effect of IRBs.  
																																								 																				
333 I will not consider in this section the observability of discrimination harm. This is 
because discrimination harm, as defined above, is the result of the observation of 
probability harm. It makes therefore little sense to discuss the observability of 
probability harm and discrimination harm separately.  
334 This occurs both under the Italian and the Dutch system of civil procedure. 
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Contrary to probability harm, hostile harm is more likely to be observed. 
Lawyers and -occasionally- parties interact directly with judges. In these 
settings they can observe how the judge behaves towards them and, 
sometimes, towards the other party. For instance, depending on the 
procedural rules of a country, this can occur during a party interrogation.335 
In this context both verbal and nonverbal behaviors of the judge can signal to 
parties/lawyers whether the judge is negatively biased towards one of 
them.336 
Signalling probability and hostile harm can play an important role in 
determining how members of the society (in my case: tortfeasors and 
victims), forms their beliefs regarding their chances of suffering direct harm 
in the courtroom. Greater signals, both in terms of frequency and 
intensity,337 are likely to increase the belief in the population that members 
of discriminated groups will suffer direct harm at trial. This bring us to the 
issue of the size of direct harm and of its signal, which is discussed in the 
next section.  
5.3 Impact Size on Trial Outcomes 
The size of the impact of implicit biases on trial outcomes is debated in the 
literature.338 Most studies on the impact of IRBs on behavior have been 
carried out in laboratory settings where situational factors that may reduce 
the effect of IRBs on human behavior are not present.339 On the other hand, 
even if the influence of IRBs on human behavior in a single situation in real 
life circumstances is limited, the overall effect is not necessarily trivial.340 
																																								 																				
335 Taruffo, M. (2014).  
336 Experimental evidence shows that humans, and especially members of 
discriminated groups, are usually accurate in identifying hostile nonverbal 
behaviors that were predicted by racial IAT scores. See on this: Richerson J.A. and 
Shelton J.N. (2005) Brief Report: Thin Slices of Racial Bias, 29(1) Journal of 
Nonverbal Behavior 75. 
337 Intensity refers here to different degrees by which a particular signal is able to 
communicate to the member of the minority group the existence of discrimination 
at court. For instance, one could immagine different types of hostile non-verbal 
behaviors and be able to categorize them as being more or less hostile.  
338 Mitchell G. PE Tetlock P.E. (2007). 
339 Ibid. 
340 Greenwald A.G. et al. (2015) Statistically Small Effects of the Implicit Association 
Test Can HaveSocietally Large Effects 108(4) Journal of Personality and Social 
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This is because single small effects can have a non-trivial impact when the 
same person is repeatedly subject to the effect of the bias (so called 
cumulative effect).341  
In the trial settings the cumulative effect is determined by the number of 
occurrences in a trial in which IRBs may influence the creation, perception 
and evaluation of evidence, as compared to the situation in absence of the 
bias. Thus, for instance, the creation of a biased medical report by a 
physician that is subsequently used as evidence at trial is one occurrence of 
IRBs, the court’s biased perception of the report during the presentation of 
evidence is a second, et cetera. The cumulative effect in a trial in which the 
judge and one of the parties are white and the other party is a member of a 
discriminated group is found by comparing the expected probability for an 
individual to fail to obtain full compensation given that he is either a 
member of a discriminated group or not.  
Imagine a hypothetical scenario in which a victim sues a tortfeasor for 
damages. In order to win the case she will have to prove five facts.342 When 
the victim bears the burden of proof, the failure to prove one or more of 
these facts results in  losing the case. Imagine also that the victim brings to 
trial five items of evidence, each of which is meant to prove the truthfulness 
of one of the statements concerning each of the five relevant facts. In 
addition, the victim has a certain probability of proving that each fact 
occurred as she stated.343 Because of the effect of IRBs on courts’ perception 
and evaluation of evidence, this probability is lower when the victim is a 
member of the discriminated group than if she is a member of the non-
discriminated group. Since this probability is lower for each fact that has to 
be proved, and that the proof of each fact is a necessary condition to obtain 
compensation, even small decreases in the probability to prove each 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
Psychology 553; Kang J. (2014) Rethinking Intent and Impact: Some Behavioral 
Realism About Equal Protection, 66(3) Alabama Law Review 627. 
341 Greenwald A.G. et al (2015); Kang J. (2014). 
342 For simplicity I will assume here that the activity of the tortfeasor is not able to 
affect the probability of the victim to win the case.  
343 One can argue that claims can only be formulated in probabilistic terms anyway, 
see Romano A. (2016) God's Dice: The Law in a Probalistic World, 41(1) University 
of Dayton Law Review 57. 
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individual fact can substantially reduce the overall chances for a member of a 
discriminated group to win at trial.  
Notice also that, in a tort law trial, the proof of one fact can be relevant for 
the establishment of multiple constituents of a tort. Thus, for instance, as 
mentioned above, the police report regarding the dynamics of a car accident 
can be used at trial to prove both causation and negligence. In this case, 
when a particular conduct is regulated by negligence law the effect of the bias 
on the probability to obtain compensation can be even larger than when the 
report is used to prove a single necessarily element of the tort. This is 
because the decrease in probability to prove each fact will be repeated for 
multiple tort elements that need to be proved. In other words, even if the 
plaintiff was able to prove one element with the use of this information, there 
is still a possibility that the same information might not be sufficient to prove 
the other element.  
In addition, keeping the effect of IRBs constant (for instance, imagine that 
IRBs decrease the probability to prove each fact by 1%), any increase in the 
number of occurrences leads to decrease in the probability to obtain 
compensation. In this connection, it is important to highlight that the 
number of occurrences may not be independent from the type of case 
handled at trial. For instance, given what is discussed above, the more facts 
the victim needs to prove at trial, the more often the IRBs can occur. 
Similarly, the number of occurrences is likely to be positively correlated with 
the number of occasions in which a certain relevant fact (e.g. whether the 
victim suffered pain) is perceived and evaluated by an individual that is in a 
position to affect the outcome of the trial (e.g. the doctor or the judge). One 
could therefore reasonably expect the IRBs to have a larger cumulative effect, 
on average, in a complex environmental liability case in which a substance 
released by a factory might have lead individuals living in the surrounding to 
develop a lethal disease than in a car accident involving only two vehicles 
that was captured by a traffic camera.  
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Besides the number of occurrences, also the stakes of the case may affect the 
impact of IRBs. It is sometimes argued in the literature that IRBs are more 
likely to affect trial outcomes in low-stakes proceedings in which judges are 
less compelled to endure a thorough deliberation to decide the case.345 If that 
indeed is true, this implies that the likely effect of IRBs depends both on the 
number of occurrences and the stakes.  
 
In ‘low stakes, many occurrences’-cases, the impact is expected to be the 
largest, while in ‘high stakes, few occurrences’-cases the impact is expected 
to be the lowest. A prototypical example of the former case could be a 
medical malpractice case in which causation is uncertain and the plaintiff 
has suffered a mild loss of which the exact magnitude has to be assessed by 
experts. An example of the latter would be a case in which two expensive 
yachts collided and the accident was captured by a surveillance camera 
installed at the port. In the other two situations (‘high stakes, many 
occurrences’ and ‘low stakes, few occurrences’), an intermediate impact is to 
be expected. An example of ‘high stakes-many occurrences’ is an 
environmental liability case in which causation and negligence are highly 
uncertain and the plaintiff has suffered a large loss. A ‘low stakes - few 
occurrences’-example is a case in which the defendant kicked a ball through 
the plaintiff’s window. In this connection, it is worth noticing that pre-
constituted evidence is often created at a point in time in which the size of 
the stakes at trial are still unknown. Therefore, the alleged debiasing effect of 
the high stakes condition may not apply for all the agents (e.g. witnesses, 
physicians, policemen, etc.) involved in the creation of items of evidence.  
																																								 																				
344 Clearly this table presents a simplified view on the interactions between number 
of occurrences and stakes at trial and their effect on the impact of IRBs on trial 
outcomes. It is plausible that this effect is more accurately represented by a 
continuous variable and the effect may be non-linear. 
345 See: Grossman G. et al. (2016). 
Table 2:  Impact of Implicit Racial Biases on Trial Outcomes344 
 Low Stakes High Stakes 
Low N. Occurrences Medium Low 
High N. Occurrences High Medium 
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In addition, the more IRBs decrease the actual probability for a member of a 
discriminated group to obtain full compensation, the larger will be the 
perceived discrimination experienced by members of discriminated groups. 
This, in turn, may further decrease the amount of damages that members of 
discriminated groups receive.  
This section has discussed the cumulative argument in the context of tort 
trials. The analysis has highlighted that IRBs can have a substantial effect on 
the probability of a member of a discriminated group to obtain 
compensation. In addition, I have identified some characteristics of tort 
trials that could be used as proxies to understand which type of claims are 
likely to be more affected by these biases. In the next section I consider the 
significance of this analysis for the achievement of optimal deterrence.  
5.4. IRBs and Deterrence 
As discussed in Chapter II, tort law is a legal tool that can be used to steer 
human behavior. By imposing liability, policymakers may try to influence the 
investments in precautionary measures and levels of activity of individuals 
that, through their conducts, impose negative externalities on third parties. 
In this perspective, tort law has, therefore, a deterrent function. This section 
inquiries whether and how, IRBs in the judiciary alter the deterrent capacity 
of tort law. Since from an economic perspective optimal deterrence is seen as 
a primary aim of tort law, this analysis is of relevance also for law and 
economics scholarship. 
5.4.1 IRBs and Tort Law When the Victim is a Member of a 
Discriminated Group 
In this section I focus on the situation in which the victim is a member of the 
discriminated group. One of the distinguishing characteristics of tort law is 
that it’s functioning relies on victims’ initiative to bring a case to trial and on 
their ability to win at trial.346 A party's willingness to litigate a case depends 
																																								 																				
346 De facto, victims often ask relief for the suffered harm directly to the tortfeasor 
before bringing the case to trial. This may end up in an attempt to settle the case 
outside courts. The case of settlements is not considered in the present work.  
122	
	
on the expected value from litigation.347 The greater the expected benefit and 
the lower the costs (measured in utility), the more an individual is willing to 
litigate a case.  
In the previous section it has been argued that IRBs in the judiciary expose 
members of discriminated group to the risk of suffering direct harm in the 
form of (1) a lower probability of winning a case; (2) a higher probability of 
receiving a lower compensation; (3) a higher probability of suffering an 
immaterial harm derived either from an hostile behavior of a judge or from 
an enhanced belief of being discriminated against. Implicit biases will also 
signal them the existence of this risk. Thus direct harm and signaling direct 
harm reduce both the actual and the perceived expected value of litigating a 
case. This implies that IRBs are likely to reduce both the number of cases 
that victims bring to court and victims’ probability to win or receive unbiased 
compensation at trial.  
Notice, in addition, that the direct harm suffered by a victim is often not 
independent from the racial group of the alleged tortfeasor.348 This is 
particularly true with regards to decision harm.349 This is clear, for instance, 
in the case of motivated reasoning, in which the judge may shift the standard 
of proof to protect in-group members. More in general, the expected benefit 
of litigating a case is also dependent on the ability of the adversary to 
effectively convince the judge of the truthfulness of the version of the facts 
that is more favorable to her. In this regard, the membership of the 
tortfeasor to the same racial group of the judge puts the member of the 
																																								 																				
347 Landes W. (1971), An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 Journal of Law and 
Economics 61. 
348 In line with this statement substantial evidence from the field shows that, in the 
criminal context, sentencing decisions are not independent from the race of the 
victim, with crimes perpetuated against white victims being punished more harshly 
than crimes in which the victim is a person of colorcolor. See on this: U.S. Gov’t 
Accountability Office, GAO GGD-90-557, Death Penalty Sentencing: Research 
Indicates Pattern of Racial Disparities, 1990,5; Glaeser E.L. and Sacerdote B., 
(2003) Sentencing in Homicide Cases and the Roles of Vengeance, 32 Journal of 
Legal Studies 363. 
349 It could be that judges, in order to protect the members of their own group 
automatically/unconsciously inflict more hostility harm to members of 
discriminated group when the adversary is an ingroup. However, to my knowledge, 
there is no evidence of this phenomenon. Therefore, the probability for a victim to 
suffer harm might be independent from the racial group of the adversary.  
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discriminated group in a situation of even greater disadvantage than if the 
tortfeasor belonged to the discriminated group.  
The reduction in number of cases brought to trial and in the likelihood for a 
member of a discriminated group to receive unbiased compensation implies 
that, ceteris paribus, tortfeasors are more likely to escape liability in 
presence of an implicit bias than otherwise. In addition, tortfeasors who are 
member of the non-discriminated group are more likely to escape liability 
than tortfeasors of the discriminated group.  
The economics of tort law tells us that both under strict liability and 
negligence the ability of the tortfeasor to escape liability reduces his 
incentives to take precautionary measures.350  In the context of the present 
analysis, this implies that when the victim of an accident is a member of a 
discriminated group, tortfeasors will receive lower incentives to take 
precautionary measures and/or lead him to increase his activity level than in 
absence of the bias. Notice that these effects are greater when the tortfeasor 
is a member of the non-discriminated group than when both parties are 
members of the discriminated group. In both cases, if in absence of the bias 
tortfeasors had incentives to take optimal care and/or optimally engage in 
the activity level, IRBs decrease the efficiency of the system. To illustrate, 
consider the graph below.  
																																								 																				
350 Kahan K. (1989) Causation and Incentives to Take Care Under Negligence Rule, 
18 Journal of Legal Studiesp 427; Kaplow L. and Shavell S., (2002) Economic 
Analysis of Law, in Handbook of Public Economics (A.J Auerbach and M. Feldstein 
Eds.), Vol. 3, Elsevier Science B.V., p. 1669. 
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Figure	1	social	cost	of	accidents	when	victim	is	member	of	discriminated	group. 
Imagine an activity regulated via a negligence rule. In absence of IRBs, 
judges impose liability at level X* where the social cost of accidents is the 
lowest (C*). If the court due to IRBs sets a too low due care standard at X1, 
the injurer will follow this too low level, because then his care costs are only 
C1 instead of C2. However, at X1 total accident costs (C3) are higher than at 
X (C*)  
Notice, in addition, that the variation in the deterrent effectiveness of tort 
law depends also on the distribution of the harm across the racial groups 
composing the population of victims. A population of victims is here defined 
as the group of individuals that are legally entitled to ask damages to a 
tortfeasor for a given harm. In a society as the one described in Section 4.1, 
the population of victims can be differently composed in terms of 
percentages of members of the discriminated and the non-discriminated 
group. Given what discussed above, the greater is the proportion of the harm 
imposed on members of the discriminated group in the population of 
victims, the more IRBs in the judiciary will decrease the effectiveness of tort 
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law to achieve deterrence. To illustrate, take the example of a company that 
discharges toxic waste in an area inhabited by both members of a 
discriminated group and members of the non-discriminated group. This 
activity imposes an expected harm of 100 to a population of victims. Imagine 
also that the expected harm can be distributed in two different ways: either 
10% to the discriminated group and 90% to the non-discriminated group, or 
vice versa. Imagine also that IRBs decrease the expected liability of the 
tortfeasor by 10%.351 In the first scenario, the tortfeasor will expect to pay 99. 
Conversely, in the second scenario he will expect to pay 91. Thus, the 
deterrent capacity of tort law is lower in the second scenario than in the first 
one. 
In addition, sometimes the variation in the deterrent effectiveness of tort law 
depends directly on the composition of the population of victims. This 
occurs, for instance, when the expected harm is equally distributed among 
the population of victims. Imagine, for instance, a factory that discharges a 
certain amount of toxic wastes in an area inhabited by both members of the 
discriminated group and members of the non-discriminated group. This 
conduct increases the probability for the inhabitants of this area to contract a 
disease by 5% and the disease is likely to inflict a harm of 100 to each 
inhabitant of the area (independent of group membership). In this scenario, 
ceteris paribus, the greater the proportion of victims belonging to the 
discriminated group, the lower the expected liability of the tortfeasor.  
This analysis suggests that in the Western world IRBs decrease the 
regulatory effectiveness of tort law in territorial areas inhabited by large 
communities of non-white individuals more than in white inhabited areas. 
For instance, the decrease in expected liability for a white polluter will be 
higher in Saint-Denis (one of the “black” banlieues of Paris), than in the 5th 
Arrondissement (one of the upper-class “white” neighborhoods of Paris). 
Indeed, there is substantial evidence showing that members of discriminated 
																																								 																				
351 This number is put here as a mere example. To my knowledge, no study has 
quantified the decrease in expected liability given by racial biases, which could be 
either higher or lower than this number. For a discussion on the potential size of the 
influence of IRBs on courts’ decisions see above Section 4.2.3.  
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groups tend to be more exposed to man-made environmental hazards.352 
While there are various factors that can explain these findings (e.g. housing 
prices,353 lower political power of ethnic minorities,354 racism among 
regulators355), the present analysis suggests that IRBs are likely to be one of 
them. Notice also that the higher exposure of minorities to harm from 
pollution need not to be necessarily the result of a conscious choice made by 
polluting entities (so-called targeting).356 Conversely, a polluter may simply 
experience a different liability cost of his activity depending on the racial 
composition of the area in which he is located, which in turn may influence 
his choice to stay or relocate elsewhere.  
The same occurs with regards to product liability. Here the larger is the 
proportion of consumers of a product that belongs to the discriminated 
group, the more IRBs are likely to decrease the expected liability of the 
manufacturer. For instance, this could be observed with regards to cosmetic 
products destined to people of color or to food products that are largely 
consumed by members of discriminated groups. Similarly, IRBs will 
decrease more the deterrent capacity of tort law in sectors of the economy in 
which large proportions of victims are likely to be non-white. Such as in the 
agricultural sector in Italy, in which a large proportion of the workforce has 
non-European origins.357  
																																								 																				
352 Lester J.P. et al. (2001), Environmental injustice in the United States, Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press; Mohai P., (2009) Environmental Justice, 34 Annual Review of 
Environment and Resources,  405.  On the role of tort law in environmental racism 
see: Bullard R.D. and Wright B., (2008) Disastrous Response to Natural and Man-
Made Disasters: An Environmental Justice Analysis Twenty-Five Years after 
Warren County, 26 Journal of Environmental Law 217 Avraham, R and Yuracko, K. 
. (Forthcoming2017). 
353 Hamilton J.T. (1995), Testing for Environmental Racism: Prejudice, Profits, 
Political Power?, 14(1) Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 107. 
354 Bullard R.D., (2000) Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press., 3; Pellow, D.N. (2002) Garbage wars: The struggle 
for environmental justice in Chicago, Mit Press. 
355 Pulido L., Rethinking Environmental Racism: White Privilege and Urban 
Development in Southern California. 90(1) Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers, 2000, 12. 
356 On the targeting racial minorities by polluting companies in the US see: 
Avraham, R nad Yuracko, K.. (Forthcoming2017). See also Chapter V. n 
357 For a recent study on the employment of immigrants in the Italian agricultural 
sector see: INEA, (2012) Indagine sull’Impiego degli Immigrati in Agricoltura in 
Italia. 
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5.4.2 IRBs and Deterrence When the Tortfeasor is a Member 
of a Discriminated Group 
The previous section has inquired the effect of IRBs in the judiciary, when 
the victim of a tort is a member of the discriminated group and it was 
concluded that the ability of tort law to deter undesirable activities is not 
independent of the racial group to which the tortfeasor and the victim 
belong. A similar conclusion is reached with regards to the situation in which 
the tortfeasor is a member of the discriminated group.  
In particular, as above, when the victim is a member of the discriminated 
group, the expected liability of the tortfeasor is lower than in absence of the 
bias. This also implies that when the victim of the tort is a member of the 
non-discriminated group, the expected liability of the tortfeasor increases. In 
addition, because of IRBs this expected liability will be higher when the 
tortfeasor is a member of a discriminated group than otherwise. As explained 
above, this will be due to the fact that direct harm is not independent from 
the ability of the adversary to effectively convince the judge of the 
truthfulness of the version of the facts that is more favorable to her. When 
the victim belongs to the same racial group of the judge, the tortfeasor is in a 
position of even greater disadvantage than if he belonged to the non-
discriminated group.  
This implies that for every possible composition of the population of victims 
in terms of proportion of members of the non-discriminated and 
discriminated group, ceteris paribus, the expected liability of the tortfeasor 
member of the discriminated group is always higher than the one of the 
member of the non-discriminated group. This can have significant 
consequences for the wellbeing of members of discriminated groups. In 
addition, this can have a broader impact on the wellbeing of the society as a 
whole. For instance, when in absence of the bias judges correctly apply the 
marginal Hand formula, the bias may decrease social welfare. To illustrate 
what I discussed in this paragraph, let’s consider Figure 1, below. 
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Figure	2:	The	effect	of	IRBs	on	social	cost	when	the	tortfeasor	is	a	member	of	a	discriminated	group.		 
If in absence of IRBs judges correctly apply the marginal Hand formula to 
determine negligence, tortfeasors have an incentive to take the level of 
precautions X*, which is also the one that minimizes the social cost of 
accidents (C*). However, when due to IRBs judges require minority 
members to take a level of precautions equal to X2, the latter will have an 
incentive to adapt to this level of care to avoid paying also for the losses 
suffered by victims. As shown in the graph, care costs at X2 are higher than 
at X*, and therefore IRBs disadvantage minority members. In addition, the 
social cost of accidents is higher at X2 than at X*. This inefficient incentive 
disappears at higher levels of due care. For instance, when biased judges 
increase the due care level to X3, the tortfeasor prefers to invest in a care 
level of X* and bear the whole social cost of accidents instead of investing in 
precautionary measures at the C4 level. While this does not decrease social 
welfare, it redistributes resources from tortfeasors to victims because in this 
situation the tortfeaosor bears also the expected accident losses. 
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In addition, when the tortfeasor is an entrepreneur or a self-employed 
person, the effect of IRBs in the judiciary is to create an uneven playing field 
between enterprises run by members of different racial groups, thus 
reducing competition in the market. Indeed, it is well known that non-white 
entrepreneurs face more difficulties than their white competitors in running 
their business in the EU.358 While several factors may account for these 
results, the analysis proposed here suggests that IRBs in the judiciary may 
contribute to worsen an already uneasy situation.  
5.5 Stereotypes and Deterrence 
In the previous section it has been argued that IRBs in the judiciary may 
decrease the ability of tort law to optimally deter tortfeasors when the 
victims of the tort are members of discriminated groups. Here, I shall defend 
this conclusion against possible critique concerning the accuracy of 
stereotypes and the importance of accuracy in courts’ adjudication for the 
achievement of deterrence and social welfare maximization.  
5.5.1 On the (In)Accuracy of Stereotypes 
As discussed in Chapter II, law and economics scholarship suggests that 
accuracy in courts’ adjudication is a major factor influencing deterrence.359 
Higher degrees of accuracy in adjudication lead to more deterrence because, 
generally, tortfeasors’ decisions to engage in an harmful activity become 
more expensive when courts correctly establish liability at trial (unless 
inaccuracy leads to excessive liability).360 In addition, inaccuracy in the 
establishment of liability makes the choice of not engaging in the harmful 
activity more expensive.361 If implicit stereotypes increased courts’ accuracy 
in assessing facts at trial, one could argue that IRBs can increase the 
																																								 																				
358 On issues related to the development of entrepreneurship among members of 
ethnic minorities in Europe see: OECD-European Union, (2013) The Missing 
Entrepreneurs: Policies for Inclusive Entrepreneurship in Europe, OECD 
Publishing. 
359 Posner R.A., (1973) An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial 
Administration, 2 Journal of Legal Studies 339; Kaplow L., (1994) The Value of 
Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23(1) The Journal of Legal 
Studies, 348; Garoupa N. and Rizzolli M. (2012), Wrongful Convictions Do Lower 
Deterrence, 168(2) Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 224. 
360 Kaplow L. (1994). 
361 Ibid. 
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deterrent capacity of tort law. In this section I argue that this conclusion is 
highly unlikely to hold.362 
Psychologists have long debated the issue of stereotype accuracy,363 and the 
discussion has more recently moved to the realm of implicit racial 
stereotypes in legal settings.364 Some commentators have noticed that 
implicit racial stereotypes may actually be accurate in the sense that they 
may have predictive value.365 The alleged accuracy of these stereotypes 
would be the result of people’s observation of empirical realities that would 
be translated into mental models subsequently used to understand reality.366 
Proponents of the inclusion of the results obtained in the literature on IRBs 
in policy-making do not deny the existence of this possibility.367 However, 
several authors have highlighted various reasons for which it is highly 
unlikely that implicit stereotypes can increase the accuracy of a judgment.  
Kang offers various arguments to support the inaccuracy of implicit 
stereotypes.368 First, he argues that information regarding racial stereotypes 
is mainly provided indirectly, through mass media, education and 
experiences reported by others. Since it reflects popular culture, this 
information is unlikely to be highly accurate.369 Recent findings have 
confirmed that both explicit stereotypical consistent information and more 
subtle information (nonverbal language) provided through television is able 
to influence implicit stereotypes against racial minorities.370 The observed 
																																								 																				
362 To be clear, I am not suggesting that if IRBs increased courts’ ability to deter 
tortfeasors we should not try to eradicate these biases from the courtroom. As 
discussed above, other, more compelling, reasons exist to counteract these biases.  
363 See: Judd C.M. and Park B., (1993) Definition and Assessment of Accuracy in 
Social Stereotypes, 100(1) Psychological Review 109; Jussim L. et al., (2009) The 
Unbearable Accuracy of Stereotypes, Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping and 
Discrimination, (T.D. Nelson Eds.), Taylor and Francis, 199. 
364 See: Greenwald A.G. and Krieger L.H. (2006); Mitchell G. and Tetlock, P.E. 
(2006); Kang, J. (2010).  
365 Mitchell G. and P. E. Tetlock (2006).  
366 Ibid. 
367 Greenwald A.G. and L.H Krieger L.H. (2006). 
368 Kang J. (2010). 
369 Kang J. (2010). 
370 Weisbuch M. et al., (2009) The Subtle Transmission of Race Bias Via Televised 
Nonverbal Behavior, 326 Science, 1711; Arendt F. and Northup T., (2015) Effects of 
Long-Term Exposure to News Stereotypes on Implicit and Explicit Attitudes, 9 
International Journal of Communication, 2370. 
131	
	
human tendency to prefer sharing stereotypical consistent information over 
stereotypical inconsistent information adds to the list of reasons why we may 
be skeptical of the accuracy of implicit stereotypes.371  Second, substantial 
empirical evidence shows that individuals tend to see illusory correlations 
between two events when these events are salient, such as a minority 
member and a negative event.372 This, in turn, leads to overestimating the 
frequency by which these events occur together.373 Third, there is some 
evidence suggesting that we tend to recall information in a manner that is 
consistent with the stereotypes we hold.374 In addition, Kang highlights that 
empirical evidence suggests that, for motivational reasons, humans tend to 
exaggerate positive traits of in-groups and negative traits of outgroup.375 
Last, various studies suggest that we tend to exaggerate the homogeneity of 
outgroup members.376 These arguments support the claim that stereotypical 
accuracy in the domain of implicit biases is unlikely to be very high. Notice 
that accuracy is almost always a matter of degrees. Thus, for implicit 
stereotypes to increase deterrence, it would not suffice for them to be 
somewhat accurate. Conversely, they would need to be accurate to a degree 
that increases the accuracy of courts’ decisions 
5.5.2 Beyond Accuracy: Implicit Stereotypes and the 
Economics of Character Evidence 
Implicit stereotypes are, to a certain extent, similar to character evidence. As 
character evidence, they lead the adjudicator to believe that a certain 
individual has a higher/lower propensity to engage in certain conducts 
(depending on whether he is identified as belonging to a certain racial group 
or another). When seen through these lenses, it appears that even a perfectly 
accurate implicit stereotype may lead to decreases in social welfare. Below, I 
will formulate this argument by referring to the law and economics literature 
on the use of character evidence. 
																																								 																				
371 For a review of this literature see: Y. Kashima and Others, Grounding: Sharing 
Information in Social Interaction, in Social Communication, (Klaus Fiedler Eds.), 
Psychology Press, 2007. 
372 Kang J. (2010). 
373 Kang J. (2010), 
374 Kang, J. (2010); Levinson J.D. (2007) 373. 
375 Kang J. (2010), On the Outgroup Homogeneity Bias see Below Chapter V.  
376 Kang J. (2010). 
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Traditionally, the economic argument on the ban on character evidence has 
been in line with the discussion on character evidence and accuracy. From 
this perspective, whether character evidence should be admitted at trial, 
ultimately depends on whether it increases accuracy in fact-finding.377 
However, Sanchirico has more recently highlighted that the problems related 
to the use of character evidence and deterrence may go beyond the accuracy 
issue.378 In fact, the problem lies also in the predictive nature of character 
evidence. In this connection, predictive evidence refers to items of evidence 
that exist regardless of whether the act under scrutiny at trial has been 
committed or not.379 This type of evidence is usually distinguished from trace 
evidence, meaning any item of evidence that tends to be created by the 
tortious conduct object of the trial,380 such as the testimony of a witness 
regarding the speed of an alleged tortfeasor in a car accident case. If the 
object of the trial is identified in welfare maximization vis-à-vis accuracy, the 
distinction between trace and predictive evidence becomes of particular 
importance because tort law generally applies to unwarranted consequences 
of otherwise beneficial behavior. In this connection, propensity evidence can 
be seen as a sign that the alleged tortfeasor derives a greater benefit from 
engaging in the conduct object of the trial than the individual for which such 
evidence could not be gathered.  As long as the individual internalizes the 
cost of his activity, he will receive incentives to behave in a socially welfare 
maximizing manner.381 Any attempt to deter him more because of his 
character, would result in a decrease in social welfare.382  
Bridging these insights on character evidence with the debate on the 
accuracy of implicit stereotypes highlights that even if judges were relying on 
a perfectly accurate implicit stereotype, social welfare could be decreased 
compared to a state of the world in which implicit stereotypes did not affect 
																																								 																				
377 See Chapter III for a debate on this issue.  
378 Sanchirico, C. W. (2001). Character Evidence and the Object of Trial. Columbia 
Law Review, 1227-1311. 
379 Uviller H.R., Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Logic, and Justice 
in the Courtroom, 130 University of Pennsylvania Law Review  847. 
380 Ibid. 
381 Sanchirico, C. W. (2001). Character Evidence and the Object of Trial. 101(6) 
Columbia Law Review 1227. 
382 Ibid. 
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courts’ decisions. Indeed, to the extent that a stereotype mirrors a higher 
propensity of members of a racial group to engage in an activity, one may 
infer that the stereotype captures the preferences of the members of that 
group.   
Thus, Sanchirico’s perspective on character evidence leads to a different 
conclusion from the discussion on the accuracy implicit stereotypes and 
deterrence. In particular, when seen through the lenses the view proposed by 
Sanchirico, implicit stereotypes may decrease social welfare even when they 
increase the accuracy of adjudication. 
5.5.3 Beyond Accuracy: Other Relevant Aspects 
The conclusion reached in Section 4.4 does not rely solely on the arguments 
that implicit stereotypes decrease the accuracy of courts’ decisions and that 
IRBs act as forms of character evidence. Three other reasons support the 
abovementioned conclusion.  
First, not every conduct of a court that is based on a (even) perfectly accurate 
implicit stereotype, necessarily leads to an improvement of courts’ accuracy. 
To illustrate, imagine that an accurate implicit stereotype leads a judge to 
have an hostile nonverbal behavior towards a victim during a party 
interrogation. It is not clear in this context whether the accurate implicit 
stereotype would increase the accuracy of the decision of the court. This is 
because it is not necessarily the case that a nonverbal behavior triggered by 
an accurate implicit stereotype will lead the discriminated individual to 
provide courts’ with more accurate information.  
Second, as discussed above, the mere belief of being discriminated against 
imposes a cost on members of discriminated groups that want to bring a case 
to trial, thus reducing the expected liability of the tortfeasor. This cost is not 
necessarily attenuated by the high accuracy of implicit stereotypes. This is 
because, even assuming that members of discriminated groups know about 
the increase in accuracy of courts’ decisions, it is not necessarily true that 
believing of being discriminated against hurts less when discrimination 
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increases courts’ accuracy at trial.383 This implies that even when implicit 
stereotypes increase courts’ accuracy, they might not increase tort 
deterrence. 
Lastly, notice also that implicit stereotypes account only for a fraction of 
direct harm and signalling, being the remaining part a result of implicit 
attitudes. Contrary to stereotypes, implicit attitudes are not evaluable in 
terms of accuracy. This implies that even if implicit stereotypes were able to 
increase courts’ accuracy at trial, they would account only for a fraction of 
the effect of IRBs on tort deterrence and would therefore not necessarily 
overturn the finding that IRBs reduce the capacity of tort law to deter 
undesirable activities.  
It is important to highlight that to the extent that IRBs decrease courts’ 
accuracy, the deterrent capacity of tort law would be undermined well 
beyond what suggested by the analysis proposed above.384 
5.6 Implicit Racial Biases in the Cathedral: Issues of Optimal 
Deterrence 
In the previous two sections it was concluded that the deterrent effectiveness 
of tort law is a function of the racial group to which the tortfeasor, the victim 
and the judge belong. Tort law is, however, only one of the possible legal 
tools that could be used to deter undesired activities. Law and economics 
shows that both Pigovian taxes and regulation can, at least partially, 
substitute liability law in this endeavour.385 The analysis proposed in this 
work highlights that the optimal combination of these various instruments is 
not necessarily independent from the racial composition of judiciaries, 
population of victims and population of tortfeasors.  
Whether the existence of IRBs in the courtroom necessarily calls for a 
broader role for regulation and taxation is, however, a complex question, 
																																								 																				
383 Whether this is the case is an empirical question that goes beyond the scope of 
the present work. To the best of my knowledge, no study has inquired this issue 
empirically.  
384 See above, Section 5.  
385 Shavell, S. (1987), 277-290; Rose-Ackerman, S. (1991); Ogus, A. (2007) 377-389. 
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which this work does not aim to answer.386 Here it will suffice to notice that 
this question is not only of interests for law and economics scholars, but also 
for legal scholars more in general. Indeed, whether regulation or taxation 
could effectively reduce the necessity to rely on an unjust tort law system to 
prevent accidents is a non-trivial question to be addressed. 
6. Policy Responses 
The previous Section has illustrated that IRBs in tort trials are likely to 
decrease social welfare. In light of this, it can be interesting to discuss which 
policies could be implemented to reduce the effect of these biases on trial 
outcomes. I will start by discussing remedies aimed at tackling the effect of 
IRBs on trial outcomes. Subsequently, I highlight some of the limits of this 
approach and other potential policy pathways.  
6.1 Debiasing and Insulating Implicit Biases 
Behavioral scientists generally distinguish between two types of strategies 
that could be implemented to prevent biases in decision-making: debiasing 
and insulating. Insulation refers to legal techniques that foreclose the 
possibility for an individual to make biased decisions.387 Conversely, as 
mentioned in Chapter II, debiasing improves the decisionmaking of the 
individual without preventing him to make a decision.388 I shall follow this 
distinction in discussing this subject matter.  
Debiasing can take various forms in the context of judicial decision-making. 
In this connection, psychological research indicates that making a person 
accountable can decrease the influence of implicit racial biases on 
judgment.389 Legal systems have a plethora of options to create 
accountability in the courtroom. For instance, requiring judges to motivate 
and publish their decisions, the appeal system as well as the publicity of the 
																																								 																				
386 For a discussion on the optimal use of tort law and other regulatory tools in 
presence of biases different from implicit racial ones, see: Faure M.G., (2009) The 
Impact of Behavioral Law and Economics on Accident Law, Boom Juridische 
uitgevers, 46-49.  
387 Jolls C. and Sunstein C.R., (2006) Debiasing Through Law, 35(1) Journal of 
Legal Studies 199. 
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389 Kang, J et al. (2012).  
136	
	
trial are all institutional and procedural features that make judges 
accountable for their choice. These features are generally already well 
present in European tort trials. Yet, it is important to stress that legal 
systems can vary in terms of the strength of accountability mechanisms put 
in place. For instance, the decision style employed by the French Court de 
Cassation (Court of Cassation), characterized by short and not necessarily 
transparent motivations, may be less effective in inducing judges to feel 
accountable compared to, for instance, the relatively longer motivations 
usually written by the Italian Corte di Cassazione (Court of Cassation). Of 
course, shorter motivations can have some advantage over longer ones, as 
they make, for example, the trial faster. Thus, my argument is not that, 
because of implicit biases, we necessarily should require courts to write long 
decisions. Conversely, my, more mild, claim is that the literature on implicit 
biases suggests the existence of a trade-off between employing stronger (and 
maybe more costly) accountability mechanisms and the achievement of 
different tort law goals.  
Besides accountability, two other structural interventions that could 
decrease racially biased decision-making relate to time and diversity in the 
courtroom. In terms of time, since implicit biases are the product of 
automatic mental processes which are particularly likely to affect human 
decision-making in situations in which thorough deliberation is limited, 
providing judges with sufficient time to decide a case may help avoiding 
racial biases. This is an aspect that should be taken into account when 
discussing policies aimed to speed up the functioning of tort law systems.  
On the diversity side of the coin, psychological research indicates that 
exposure to positive examples of members of discriminated groups may help 
reducing implicit biases. Various authors have therefore highlighted the 
importance of guaranteeing diversity in the judiciary.390 Increasing diversity 
in European judiciaries is unlikely to be an easily (also from a political point 
of view) implementable policy. In this connection, an alternative (and more 
easily implementable) measure pointing in the same direction that is 
suggested in the literature is to introduce images of positive examples of 
																																								 																				
390 Kang et al (2012); Smith R.J. and Levinson J.D. (2012). 
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member of racial minorities in the working environment of judges (e.g. on 
the walls or as screensavers).391 Psychological evidence indicates that such 
exposure can reduce implicit biases. Yet, it is still highly debated whether 
such debiasing strategy has long term effects in the real world. In particular, 
Rachlinski and co-authors have found no statistically significant differences 
in the biases held by judges coming from court districts with significantly 
differences in magistrates racial composition.392 Further research in this 
direction is therefore needed.  
In addition, training judges about implicit biases and how to avoid them 
could be a successful debiasing strategy. Such training could focus, for 
instance, on highlighting the importance that negative and positive 
emotional states, as well as cognitive load, have in causing implicit biases.393 
This could facilitate judges in recognizing optimal situations in which to 
make decisions. More simply, increasing awareness among judges about 
these biases as well as decreasing judges’ confidence in their objectivity, may 
make them more motivated to avoid biased decision-making. Indeed 
research indicates that motivation is sometimes effective in hindering 
IRBs.394 Importantly, even though in recent years European courts have 
started receiving education on the possible existence of biases in their 
decision-making,395 this exposure remains often generic (on cognitive biases 
generally) and sporadic. Maybe, there is therefore something to learn from 
the US experience, in which various courts have stated a pilot project aimed 
at training judges in avoiding implicit biases.396 
On the insulating side of the coin, a potential way of preventing judges to 
make racially biased decisions, is to hide from them the information relative 
to the racial group of tortfeasors and victims. In this connection, compared 
to criminal law settings, tort trials may often make parties’ racial group 
																																								 																				
391 Kang et al. (2012). 
392 Rachlinski, J. J. Et al. (2009). 
393 Ibid. 
394 Ibid. 
395 See: Rumiati R., (2014) Errori Cognitivi Sistematici di Rilevanza Forense nel 
Giudizio Umano, available at: 
http://ufficigiudiziari.roma.it/appello.it/form_conv_didattico/Relazione%20Cassa
zione2014%20da%20pubbl.doc 
396 See: http://www.ncsc.org/ibeducation 
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unknown to the judge. In fact, in civil procedures it is the lawyers that tend 
to appear in court,397 while parties may never meet the judge. Of course, 
judges may sometimes (maybe unconsciously) infer race from some of the 
items of evidence presented (e.g. via pictures, names, nationality of the 
parties). For this reason, studies on IRBs invite policymakers to carefully 
think what type of race-relevant information judges should get when 
deciding civil cases. The information flow could be regulated via the 
admissibility and relevancy criteria of evidence. Yet, how exactly to do this is 
an analysis that goes beyond the scope of the present contribution. This 
holds even more because the existing empirical literature offers only limited 
insight in the effect of race salience, which could be hindered if the 
information flow towards the judge was limited, on trial outcomes.398 
Lastly, an insulating strategy that is sometimes already in place in several 
European tort systems concerns preventing judges from making decisions in 
situations of high ambiguity. As discussed above, implicit biases affect 
decision-making more easily when a person faces ambiguous information. In 
trial settings the degree of ambiguity is often linked to the norm enforced by 
the court. In this regard, tort law is a relatively dynamic area of the law in 
which vague unwritten norms have to be concretized ex post by the court in 
the individual case. The court often has leeway in determining, for instance, 
whether the defendant acted unlawfully and what the due care standard for 
particular conduct is. This ambiguity is not always present in other areas of 
the law. In criminal law, for example, due to the principle of nulla poena sine 
lege, ex ante it is clear which behaviors constitute crimes. These differences 
suggest that even though most literature on IRBs focuses on criminal law, 
this is not necessarily the area of the law in which IRBs have the largest 
societal effects. A reduction of this ambiguity in tort law settings can be 
achieved when a more concrete tort/negligence standard is established via 
legislation/regulation. Thus, by directly intervening in shaping tort law rules, 
the legislator could insulate the judge from making decisions in situations of 
																																								 																				
397 For evidence on IRBs among lawyers see: Eisenberg T. and Johnson S.L. (2003) 
Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty Lawyers, 53 DePaul Law Review 1539. 
398 Sommers S.R. and Ellsworth P.C., (2009) Race Salience in Juror Decision-
Making: Misconceptions, Clarifications, and Unanswered Questions, 27(4) 
Behavioral Sciences and the Law 599.  
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high ambiguity. To a lesser extent, a similar effect could be achieved over 
time, via precedents, by judge made law. 
6.2 Looking Beyond Behavioral Strategies: Traditional 
Instruments to Solve a New Problem? 
The previous Section has highlighted various policies that could reduce the 
effect of IRBs on trial outcomes. This Section discusses two limits of these 
interventions and a possible alternative path to address issues arising from 
the effect of IRBs on trial outcomes.  
A first limit of the interventions highlighted in the previous Section is that, as 
shown in Section 3, the effect of implicit racial biases on courts’ decisions can 
often occur through the creation of evidence outside the trial. This implies 
that any measure that aims to tackle the issue of implicit racial biases 
directly in the courtroom alone will not eradicate the problem of 
discrimination at trial. Second, a failure to recognize the role of biased pre-
constituted evidence, can greatly hinder the effective and efficient 
intervention on the effect of implicit racial biases on trial outcomes.  
To illustrate, imagine a society in which a limited amount of resources can be 
allocated to the prevention of implicit racial biases. Imagine also that in this 
society the impact of implicit racial biases on trial outcomes is determined 
20% by courts’ perception and evaluation of evidence (Factor 1) and 80% by 
items of evidence created outside the trial (Factor 2). The resources can be 
allocated only to one of the two factors, and they will reduce the impact of 
the selected factor by 10%. In this case, deciding to act directly on courts’ 
perception and evaluation of evidence would neither be the most effective 
nor the most efficient way of dealing with the problem.  
My contention here is not that policies aimed at reducing the impact of 
implicit racial biases in the courtroom are necessarily not effective/efficient 
or not worth pursuing. These policies move, in fact, in the right direction. My 
point is that we should not miss the broader picture of the actual way in 
which trial outcomes are determined. Going back to the example above, 
which of the two aforementioned policies would be more effective/efficient 
may depends on various factors, such as: the situations in which implicit 
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racial biases are more likely to affect human decision-making;399 the degree 
by which courts rely on pre-constituted evidence to decide cases;400 the 
ethnic composition of judiciaries and medical staff (e.g. with regards to the 
effect of the bias on the determination of pain and suffering)401; the use of 
group decision-making to create items of evidence within and outside the 
trial; etc. Determining which of the two options is the best is not an easy 
task, but more research in this direction could provide some insight for a 
more informed policymaking.402 
A possible pathway to address these issues is to explore the possibility of 
using alternative legal regimes to reduce the influence of implicit racial 
biases in the society. Economic analysis of law coupled with psychology 
allows comparing the effect of implicit racial biases on different substitutable 
legal tools and consider whether to opt for a different combination of them. 
For instance, as mentioned above, the availability of tax law and regulation 
implies that tort law in only one of the instruments that can be used to 
prevent accidents. In this perspective, if taxation and/or regulation were 
found to be immune from, or at least less affected by, implicit racial biases, 
they could be seen as special forms of insulating strategies that prevent 
biased judges from making biased decisions by reducing society’s reliance on 
tort law to regulate certain activities. In this connection, while it is not clear 
whether regulation (and it’s enforcement by governmental authorities)403 are 
necessarily less biased than judges, Pigouvian taxes with their uniform 
																																								 																				
399 For an analysis of the situational factors that increase the influence of implicit 
racial biases in the courtroom see for instance: NCSC, Helping Courts Address 
Implicit Bias: Strategies to Reduce the Influence of Implicit Bias, available at: 
http://www.ncsc.org. 
400 The role of pre-constituted evidence in determining trial outcomes varies from 
legal system to legal system.   
401 In this regard, recall that black individuals tend, on average, to have less strong 
implicit preferences than white individuals. 
402 The previous section was focused on implicit racial biases and tort law trials, 
however, the this argument would equally apply also to other contexts (such as 
criminal cases), in which part of the evidence used at trial is produced outside the 
courtroom. 
403 On implicit biases in regulation see for instance: Godsil R.D., (2012) 
Environmental Law: a Tale of Two Neighborhoods, Implicit Bias and 
Environmental Decision Making, in Implicit Racial Biases Accross the Law, 
Cambridge University Press (Levinson and Smith Eds.), 192. 
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application to polluting entities might be a relatively less affected by implicit 
biases than tort law. 
7. Conclusions 
This Chapter contributes to the ongoing legal debate on IRBs by focusing on 
European tort trials. I provide a systematic analysis of how IRBs can affect 
the creation, presentation and evaluation of evidence in tort trials. Overall, 
the study suggests that IRBs can affect courts’ decisions in several stages of a 
trial in relation to all the main elements of tort law (losses, causation and 
negligence). This analysis helps understanding how, in what measure and 
under which circumstances IRBs are more likely to affect the outcome of a 
trial in which a member of a discriminated group is present, either as 
plaintiff or defendant. In particular, the analysis suggests that IRBs’ expected 
influence is greater when: i) the number of judgments within a trial that can 
be influenced by them is larger; ii) the stakes of the trial are lower. My study 
also highlights that IRBs can reduce social welfare by altering the deterrent 
capacity of tort law. This can occur also in situations in which implicit biases 
improve the accuracy of judicial decisions. Lastly, I discuss various policies 
(and their limits) that could be put in place to reduce these unwarranted 
effects. In this respect, the analysis shows that some remedies are available 
and some of these are already put in place in the context of tort law trials in 
some European countries. The analysis, however, highlights also that the 
effectiveness and efficiency of these interventions is often still unknown. 
What is certain however, is that given the likely pervasiveness of IRBs in the 
creation of items of evidence outside the trial, interventions limited to the 
courtroom will not completely eradicate the problem.  
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Chapter V 
Gender and Race-Based Statistical Tables in 
European Tort Trials: A Behavioral/Comparative 
Law and Economics Perspective404 
1. Introduction 
The previous Chapter has analyzed the issue of racial discrimination at trial 
by looking at the role of IRBs. This Chapter expands the analysis of the 
behavioral law and economics of race at trial by looking at the role of race 
based statistical tables. In relation to accuracy, this Chapter refers to the law 
and economics of accuracy in damages assessments in tort law. 
The use of gender and race-based statistical tables (e.g. life expectancy; 
work-life expectancy and average wage tables) for the estimation of damages 
for future losses in US tort law has long been studied by legal scholars.405 
Traditionally, this scholarship has criticized this practice from the 
perspective of distributive justice. A recent concern raised by this literature is 
that the use of non-blended tables, i.e. tables that report data distinguishing 
between gender and racial lines, may lead to targeting of women and 
members of racial minorities.406  The targeting effect may per se perpetuate 
																																								 																				
404 I am grateful to Louis Visscher, Pieter Desmet, Michael Faure, Elena 
Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, Stephen Billion and Joe Rieff for useful comments on an 
early version of this Chapter. I thank Klaus Heine and Alan Schwartz for useful 
discussion. The usual disclaimer applies. 
405 JWriggins J.B., (2007) Damages in Tort Litigation: Thoughts on Race and 
Remedies, 1865–2007, 27 Review of Litigation 37; Chamallas, M., and Wriggins, J. 
B. (2010). The Measure of Injury: Race, Gender, and Tort Law. NYU Press; 
Greenberg L., (2001) Compensating the Lead Poisoned Child: Proposals for 
Mitigating Discriminatory Damage Awards, 28 BC Environmental Affairs Law 
Review 429; Chamallas M., (1998) The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort 
Law, 146 University of Pennsylvania Law Review . 463; Lamb S.R., (1996) Toward 
Gender– Neutral Data for Adjudicating Lost Future Earning Damages: An 
Evidentiary Perspective, 72 Chicago-Kent Law Review,  299 . See also Gibson E., 
The Gendered Wage Dilemma in Personal Injury Damages, in Tort Theory 185 (Ken 
Cooper–Stephenson & Elaine Gibson eds., 1993); Cassels J. (1992), Damages for 
Lost Earning Capacity; Women and Children Last, 71 Canadian Bar Review 447; 
Ken Cooper–Stephenson, K. Damages for Loss of Working Capacity for Women, 43 
SASK.L.REV. 7 (1978–79). 
406 In this context, targeting refers to the redirection of unintentionally created 
expected harm. In other words, this term identifies losses imposed as a by-product 
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and worsen existing inequalities among gender and racial groups, thus 
making the use of non-blended tables even less warranted from a distributive 
justice standpoint.407 Yet, traditionally tort law scholars adhering to the 
corrective justice and welfare maximization schools of thought have 
supported this practice. Starting from these premises a recent paper by 
Avraham and Yuracko has put forward various arguments to prove that the 
use of non-blended tables is not warranted for the achievement of corrective 
justice and efficiency.408 In this connection, despite the debate on the use of 
non-blended tables has developed mainly in the US, this issue is of clear 
relevance also for European tort law. Indeed, this is an issue that in recent 
years has received considerable attention in several European countries.409 
The present work contributes to this literature by: i) providing a comparative 
analysis on the employment of non-blended tables in the US, England, 
France and Italy. These last three are major traditions in European tort law 
and thus the analysis can provide some insight on how European courts deal 
with this issue. This analysis complements the legal scholarship in the 
related field of insurance law that, in recent years, has given substantial 
attention to the use of gender-based insurance premium pricing.410 
Especially after the ECJ decision that has found this practice to be 
inconsistent with the unisex price principle established by the EU legislation 
on equality between genders.411 ii) analyzing the welfare effects of the two 
approaches (blended vs non-blended tables) from a behavioral law and 
economics standpoint.  
The main findings of this Chapter are the following. First, with some 
exception, gender and race-based tables have a minor role in the 
establishment of damages in France, Italy and England. Thus, on the basis of 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 										
of an otherwise socially beneficial activity. Avraham, R and Yuracko, K. . 
(2015Forthcoming2017). Torts and Discrimination, Ohio State Law Journal.  
407 Avraham, R and Yuracko, K.  (Forthcoming2017). Torts and Discrimination, 
Ohio State Law Journal... 
408 Avraham, R and Yuracko, K. (Forthcoming2017). Torts and Discrimination, Ohio 
State Law Journal... 
409 See for instance, the judicial debate that took place recently in both Italy and 
England (Sections 3.2-3.3).  
410 See, for instance: Tobler, C. (2011). Case C-236/09, Association belge des 
Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL, Yann van Vurgt, Charles Basselier v. Conseil 
des ministres. 48 Common Market Law Review 2041. 
411 Test-Achats case (C-236/09). 
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this analysis, courts’ practice regarding the employment of non-blended 
tables seems to be of less controversial nature in the Old continent than in 
the US. Second, taking a behavioral perspective on this issue highlights that 
the welfarist case for this practice is much weaker than previously thought. 
This is because a behavioral approach to the issue strengthens many of the 
neoclassical arguments put forward by Avraham and Yuracko. In this sense, 
the present work complements and supports his recent claim that law and 
economics scholarship should back the use of blended tables.  
The remaining part of the Chapter unfolds as follows: Section 2 discusses the 
role of accuracy in the determination of damages at trial. Secion 3 describes 
the link between the employment of non-blended tables and targeting. 
Section 4 provides a comparative analysis of the use of gender and race-
based tables in the US, England, France and Italy. Section 5 discusses the 
arguments in favor of and against this practice from a neoclassical law and 
economics perspective. Section 6 assesses the welfare effects of this practice 
via the lenses of behavioral law and economics. Section 7 concludes.  
2. The Economics of Accuracy in the Determination of 
Damages 
Many of the economic arguments in favor and against the use of blended 
tables relate to how accurate these tables are. This section introduces the 
economics of accuracy in the determination of damages to set the ground for 
the discussion that will follow.  
Law and economics scholarship has long explored the role of accuracy in the 
determination of damages in tort trials for the creation of social welfare.412 A 
main result in this literature is that accuracy is generally an important 
element of a well functioning tort law system, but that various caveats apply 
to this general finding.413  
																																								 																				
412 Kaplow, L., and Shavell, S. (1996) Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages. 39(1) 
The Journal of Law and Economics, 191. 
413 Kaplow, L., and Shavell, S. (1996). 
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The first caveat refers to whether inaccuracies in adjudication are systematic 
or not.414 The behavioral incentives provided by tort law to tortfeasors to 
invest in precautionary measures and reduce the activity level, operate ex-
ante, i.e. before the accident takes place.415 From an ex-ante perspective, the 
injurer can adjust her conduct to the incentives only based on the damages 
that she expects to pay from engaging in a certain activity. From this it 
follows that an ex-post increase in the accuracy of damages awarded does not 
necessarily improve the quality of the incentives set by tort law. Generally, as 
long as the average of damages awarded corresponds to the actual average 
loss suffered by victims, the behavioral incentives will be appropriate.416 
Conversely, a systematic discrepancy between these two averages may 
reduce social welfare. In particular, a systematic underestimation of the 
losses suffered by victims will send a too low price signal to the tortfeasor, 
potentially inducing her to invest too little in precautionary measures and 
engage too much in the activity. A mirror image situation occurs when 
damages awarded systematically overestimate the actual losses suffered by 
victims. Here the tortfeasor would receive too high incentives to invest in 
precautionary measures and to reduce her activity level. Thus, only 
systematic departures from the average loss caused by tortious activities can 
matter for deterrence. 
A second caveat that limits the welfare benefits of accuracy in adjudication 
are the costs related to accuracy.417 In particular, to increase accuracy in 
adjudication additional information is often needed. Obtaining, processing 
and storing this information can be costly and for this reason not every 
increase in accuracy brings a society closer to greater welfare. It is for this 
reason that damages are often established in abstract.418 An example of a 
determination of damages that is often carried out at an abstract level relates 
to material harm to cars.419 Here, for instance, the damage is assessed by 
																																								 																				
414 Ibid. 
415 As above, for simplicity I will discuss here only the behavioural incentives to 
tortfeasors, i.e. the behavioural incentives needed in unilateral accidents. 
416 Ibid. 
417 Ibid. 
418 Faure, M., & Visscher, L. (2011). The Role of Experts in Assessing Damages–A 
Law and Economics Account. 2(3) European Journal of Risk Regulation 379. 
419 Ibid. 
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considering the cost that a mechanic would charge to repair the car, 
regardless of whether the reparation actually takes place.420 
Having briefly discussed the economics of accuracy in determination of 
damages in tort trial, the next section discusses targeting incentives that may 
arise from the use of non-blended tables. 
 2. Race and Gender-Based Statistical Tables and 
Targeting 
Governmental authorities in most Western countries gather population data 
related to: i) life expectancy, namely the average residual number of years 
that a person at a certain age is expected to live; ii) work-life expectancy, i.e. 
the average residual number of years that a person at a certain age is 
expected to work; iii) average wage. These data are organized in tables and 
made available to the public. Courts often rely on these tables to estimate 
various types of damages in tort trials.421 For instance, life-expectancy tables 
are often used to estimate the future medical costs of treatments that a 
victim of a tort has to endure throughout the course of her life as a 
consequence of the accident. Similarly, work-life expectancy tables can be 
used to estimate the future losses of earning capacity. 
As highlighted in the literature, the use of gender and race-based statistical 
tables (i.e. statistical tables that differentiate between male and female and 
between members of different racial groups) can lead to targeting of specific 
racial and gender groups.422 Indeed, as long as the social cost of a particular 
activity is established according to these tables and this cost is further 
reflected in the due care standard and/or the damages awards set by courts, 
the private costs of the tortfeasor will vary depending on social group 
harmed by the activity.  
Let us start with the analysis of targeting in relation to the standard of 
negligence. From a law and economics perspective, under a negligence rule 
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421 See below Section 3, for a discussion of the use of these tables in various Western 
countries.  
422 Avraham, R and Yuracko, K.  (Forthcoming2017). 
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courts should set the due care standard on the basis of the (marginal) Hand 
formula.423 Within this framework, the higher the expected harm of an 
activity, the more precautions the tortfeasor has to take in order to escape 
liability. Thus, to the extent that tortfeasors are able to predict the racial or 
gender group of the potential victims of their activity, economic theory 
suggests us that they receive incentives to target the social group that is less 
costly to harm. For instance, imagine that a company has two factories that 
produce the same good. One factory is located in a neighborhood inhabited 
predominantly by Black people and the other is located in a predominantly 
White area. Imagine also that both factories need maintenance in order to 
reduce the probability of industrial disasters to occur. Yet, the company has a 
limited budget that allows maintenance work only in one of the two factories.  
If the average income of Whites is higher than income of Blacks and loss of 
income is a foreseeable loss, harming a White person is ceteris paribus more 
expensive. In this situation the polluting company receives an incentive to 
invest in maintenance in the factory located in the neighborhood inhabited 
by White people. This is because, under a strict application of the marginal 
Hand formula, the due care standard is lower when the victim is a Black 
person than when it is a White person.  
In addition, and maybe more importantly given that a strict application of 
the marginal Hand formula seems not to be common in contemporary 
European tort law,424 this incentive to targeting will be present also when 
courts fix the due care standard without considering the social cost imposed 
by an activity. To understand why this is the case, imagine that courts were 
imposing the same standard of care to all conducts (e.g. maintenance of 
factories’ equipment) occurring in a certain area. Even in this case, if 
tortfeasors are sometimes asked to compensate the victim (either because 
their actual or perceived care level was lower than the due care standard), 
																																								 																				
423 For a discussion of whether and to what extent European courts indeed establish 
the due care standard according to the Hand formula see: Kerkmeester H. and 
Visscher L., Learned Hand in Europe: a Study in the Comparative Law and 
Economics of Negligence, German Working Papers in Law and Economics, (6), 
2003. De Moot P.B. et al. The Learned Hand Formula: The Case of the Netherlands, 
4(2) Global Jurist Advances, 2004. 
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their expected liability is lower when they target the social group that is 
cheaper to harm. 
The large literature on environmental racism provide a clear example in 
which targeting can be at play. As explained in Chapter III, environmental 
racism refers to the phenomenon by which member of racial minorities are 
disproportionally exposed more to environmental hazards than members of 
non-racial minorities.425 Clearly there are various political, economic and 
ideological factors that can account for this phenomenon. Yet, as it is argued 
in the following, the lower cost of harming minority members is not 
necessarily a negligible one.426 Besides environmental racism, these 
dynamics can occur also in other settings where racial disparities in exposure 
to harm have been documented, such as medical malpractice and lead 
paint.427 Similarly, as highlighted in Chapter III with regards to the effect of 
IRBs on the functioning of tort law systems, trends of this type might be 
observed in the context of product liability when certain products are 
marketed to a specific social group identified by race or, given the broader 
scope of the present Chapter, gender. Companies are indeed often able to 
predict with a certain degree of accuracy whether a particular product will be 
marketed prominently to males or females. Research indicates that, it is 
sufficient to change the color of a product or other details related to the 
packaging to shift the consumption of a product from one gender group to 
another.428  
Notice that given the current gaps in socioeconomic status (SES) across 
gender and racial groups in many Western societies, the differences in 
damages awarded are not necessarily trivial. Thus, targeting incentives might 
be non-negligible. For instance, according to the US Census Bureau, in 2015 
the average yearly income of a White male was 60,448 dollars which was 
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considerably higher than the average yearly income of a Black male (38,846 
dollars) as well as of a White female (36,275 dollars) and a Black female 
(30,710 dollars) in the same year.429 Imagine that a judge is called to assess 
the loss of future earning capacity of a Black and a White two years old child 
on the basis of these tables. Even ignoring potential differences in terms of 
work-life expectancy (which in reality is lower for Black people and for 
Women compared to White men),430 by multiplying the abovementioned 
sums for a work-life expectancy of 35 years, the resulting damages awards 
would be respectively of: 2,115,680 (White male); 1,359,610 (Black male); 
1,269,625 (White female); 1,074,850 (Black female). These differences can 
be non-trivial in terms of the incentives that they provide to potential 
tortfeasors. Indeed, in this example, shifting the externality from a White 
men to a Black women can reduce the expected liability of a tortfeasor by 
about 50%. 
An assumption underlying this reasoning is that tort law has actually a 
deterrent effect. This is indeed a debated issue among scholars. While 
economic modelling provides compelling reasons why we should expect tort 
law to have a deterrent effect, various authors are skeptic of the predictive 
validity of these results. In particular, it has been argued that many accidents 
are the product of momentary lapses in attention, that can not be avoided by 
the imposition of liability.431 Against this claims, empirical evidence from the 
field provides some support to the economic intuition in the field of product 
liability and car accidents.432 This, suggests that, at the margin, the use of 
non-blended tables can provide targeting incentives. 
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It is important to stress that targeting is not necessarily the result of the 
employment of race and gender-based statistical tables. Indeed, even if these 
tables were not employed and damages awards were based solely on the 
current income of the victim, it could still be cheaper for a tortfeasor to harm 
members of a particular racial or gender group.433 Yet, the use of statistical 
tables is often identified in the literature as a factor that leads to further 
discrepancies in the award of damages (and potentially the setting of the due 
care standard) across racial and gender groups.434 This is because the 
employment of these tables expands differences in damages awards along 
racial and gender lines to situations in which the current situation of the 
victim would not suggest to do so (e.g. when the victim is an infant). In 
addition, the use of these tables is controversial also in light of the potential 
flaws that the construction and use of these tables.435 Because of these 
reasons this practice has received particular attention in the literature. 
Building on this strand of research, in the following I will focus exclusively 
on targeting that may derive from the employment of statistical tables.   
3. Gender and Race-Based Statistical Tables: A 
Comparative Analysis 
Having explained the dynamics that lead to targeting, the next section 
discusses the employment of gender and race based statistical tables in 
various jurisdictions. Since a large part of the literature on the employment 
of group-specific statistical tables comes from the US, the starting point of 
this analysis is the US tort law practice. The analysis is then extended to 
three European countries: England, France and Italy. The purpose of this 
section is to understand whether issues arising from the employment of 
these tables in US trials are present also in European tort law. I focus on 
England, France and Italy in order to account for potential discrepancies that 
																																								 																				
433 On the lower compensation that female victims may receive in Italy see: Franco 
D’Amico, Disparita’ uomo-donna: il gap e’ anche economico e si ritrova 
nell’indennizzo per infortuni sul lavoro, ANMIL, 2013. Notice that part of this lower 
compensation might be due to wage gaps determined by discrimination: Quintano, 
C., et al. (2013). A Cross-Country Analysis of Gender Pay Gap and Segregation. 2 
Italian Journal of Applied Statistics, 2. 
434 Wriggins J.B., (2007). Chamallas, M., and Wriggins, J. B. (2010).  
435 See below Section 4. 
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may arise from differences in the legal traditions (Common law-Civil law) 
within the European experience. Among the European countries that adopt a 
Civil-law system, I chose to compare Italy and France because in a legal 
analysis that is built along gender and racial issues, it can be interesting to 
compare countries in which different situations prevail in this respect. In this 
regard, France has experienced strong immigration from African countries 
starting from the 1950’s;436 while in Italy the phenomenon is much more 
recent.437 Relatedly, widespread socioeconomic inequalities between racial 
groups have persisted for a longer period in the recent history of France than 
in Italy. Similarly, women’s job market conditions (which are reflected in 
statistical tables) are quite different in these two countries. With women 
scoring relatively better in terms of employment rate in France than in Italy 
and a much lower gender pay gap in Italy than in France.438  Thus, the rate at 
which courts have been confronted with racial/gender issues related to 
socioeconomic measures reflected in statistical tables might be very different 
in the two countries.  
3.1 Gender and Race-Based Statistical Tables in the US 
As recently highlighted by Avraham,439 gender and race play a major role in 
determining damages under US tort law. This role is largely due to the 
employment of gender and race-based statistical tables. This Section 
discusses US courts’ use of these tables as a basis for the comparative 
analysis that will follow.  
A victim’s life expectancy is a major component for the establishment of two 
types of damages: i) future expenses that the victim will have to bear because 
of the tort (e.g. medical bills); ii) damages for future pain and suffering. In 
this connection, under US tort law life expectancy is usually determined 
based on the life expectancy tables provided by the US Federal 
																																								 																				
436 Vladescu, E. (2006). The Assimilation of Immigrant Groups in France–Myth or 
Reality?. 5(39) Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, 1. 
437 European Commission, (2006) European Migration Network Impact of 
Immigration on Europe’s Societies. 
438See:http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Gender_statistics 
439 Avraham, R and Yuracko, K. (Forthcoming2017). 
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Government.440 These tables differentiate life expectancy depending on 
gender and (certain) racial/ethnic groups. In this regard, notice that, in the 
US, females have on average a higher life expectancy than males 
(respectively about 81 and 76 years) and Black people a significantly lower 
one than White people.441  Without distinguishing by gender, Black people 
have a life expectancy of 75 years compared with the 79 years of White 
people.442  
Starting from the values contained in these tables, forensic economists called 
to provide expert testimony in court adjust these life values based on the 
particular circumstances of the case.443 For instance, if some aspect of the 
(pre-accident) health condition of the victim suggests that her life expectancy 
is lower than average, the abovementioned value will be adjusted 
accordingly. In performing these adjustments expert testimony rely often on 
statistics (e.g. relative mortality ratios which take into account, for instance, 
a particular medical condition or whether the victim is a smoker) that are 
further divided along gender and racial lines.444 This may provide additional 
room for gender and racial discrepancies in the determination of damages at 
trial.445 Lastly, the estimations based on these data can be further adjusted 
by jurors, which are called to adapt them to the specific situation of the 
victim.446 
																																								 																				
440 Singer, R. B. (2005). How to Prepare a Life Expectancy Report for an Attorney in 
a Tort Case. 37 Journal of Insurance medicine 43. 
441See: US Department of Health and Human Services, Health, United States, 2015, 
With Special Feature on Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities (Table 15). It is 
important to stress that not all racial minorities score worse than Whites when it 
comes to life expectancy. Noticeably, Asians’ longevity is significantly higher than 
that of any other racial group (86 years in 2009). See: http://kff.org/other/state-
indicator/life-expectancy-by-re/?currentTimeframe=0 
442See: US Department of Health and Human Services, Health, United States, 2015, 
With Special Feature on Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities (Table 15). It is 
important to stress that not all racial minorities score worse than Whites when it 
comes to life expectancy. Noticeably, Asians’ longevity is significantly higher than 
that of any other racial group (86 years in 2009). See: http://kff.org/other/state-
indicator/life-expectancy-by-re/?currentTimeframe=0 
443 Avraham, R and Yuracko, K. (Forthcoming2017). 
444 Ibid. 
445 Ibid. 
446 Ibid.  
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Similarly, the estimation of the losses for future earning capacity are highly 
influenced by the employment of work-life expectancy tables.447 These tables 
provide courts with information regarding the time period for which the 
victim was expected to earn a (higher) wage had the accident not occurred. 
Also these tables are often divided by gender and race. Based on these tables 
the computation of the losses for future earning capacity is obtained by 
multiplying the expected future yearly wages by the expected number of 
working years. This time period is shorter for females than for males and for 
Black people than for White people.448 The resulting sum is then sometimes 
adjusted by juries on the basis of the particular circumstances of the case.449  
Lastly, in situations in which the past earnings of the victim are not available 
(e.g. because she is too young to have a job) or when there are reasons to 
believe that her future earnings would have been different from the past 
ones, damages are sometimes based on the average national wage.450 Data 
on the average national wage is taken from the dataset provided by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, which differentiates average wages across gender 
and racial groups.451 As discussed above, these values are higher for males 
than for females and for Whites than for Blacks. The estimations resulting 
from this calculus are subsequently adapted based on the specific 
circumstances of the case.    
Along with these general trends, a few courts have recently moved towards 
the use of blended tables. For instance, in Wheeler and Tarpeh-Doe the court 
adopted a race-neutral approach to establish damages for a mixed-race tort 
victim. Similarly, in US v. Bedonie,452 the district court has ruled that the use 
of gender and race-based damages estimations may sometimes not be 
warranted and that it is for the alleged tortfeasor to prove that differentiated 
damages awards are justified in the specific case at hand. This approach has 
been subsequently endorsed by the Tenth Circuit, which, however, has also 
specified that it is in the discretion of the lower court whether to apply 
																																								 																				
447 Ibid. 
448 Ibid. 
449 Ibid. 
450 Ibid. 
451 Ibid. 
452 United States v. Bedonie, 317 F.Supp.2d at 1319 (2004).  
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differentiated estimations based on gender and race.453 Notice that in US v. 
Bedonie, the reasoning of the court was largely based on the observation that 
the use of gender/race based tables was ethically unwarranted as it would 
have led to discriminative outcomes and to the perpetuation of existing 
stereotypes.454 In a few other cases, the practice of using differentiated tables 
has been abandoned on a (partially) different ground, namely on the idea 
that gender and racial disparities captured by these tables are unlikely to 
accurately capture future socioeconomic trends.455  
In conclusion, as recently highlighted by Avraham and Yuracko, the use of 
gender/race blended tables to establish tort damages is more an exception 
than the rule in current US tort law. In the next section I analyze whether 
similar trends are observable in the Italian experience.  
3.2 Gender and Race-Based Statistical Tables in Italy 
The use of statistical tables to determine damages in tort trials is not foreign 
to the Italian experience. Yet, the relevance of race and gender for the 
establishment of damages is much more limited than under US law. 
To start with, with some exception,456 Italian authorities do not collect data 
on life expectancy, work-life expectancy and average wage divided by race or 
ethnicity. Maybe also due to this circumstance, under Italian law, the only 
relevant distinction in the employment of statistical tables in tort trials is 
gender.  
Generally, the compensation of losses for future earning capacity can take 
two main forms: a lump sum or a rent. When the lump sum approach is 
adopted, Italian courts have often relied on the following computational 
method.457 The decrease in the yearly net wage due to the accident is 
																																								 																				
453 United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, at 1126 (10th Cir. 2007). 
454 United States v. Bedonie, 317 F.Supp.2d at 1319 (2004). 
455 See for instance: Reilly v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 976, 997 (D.R.I. 1987).  
456 See for instance: Ministero della Salute, (2015) Piano d’Azione Salute per e con le 
Comunità Rom, Sinti e Caminanti, available at: 
http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/Documenti-e-
ricerche/piano_salute_RSC_2016.pdf 
457 For a full discussion of the methods used to calculate damages related to losses of 
future earning capacity see: Ronchi, E. et al., (2015) Guida Alla Valutazione Medico-
Legale dell’Invalidita’ Permanente, Seconda Edizione, Giuffre Editore, 2015.  
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multiplied by a capitalization rate.458 Until recently, Italian courts have 
adopted capitalization rates set by the Royal Decree (R.D.) 9 October 1922, n. 
1403. These rates were calculated on the basis of the mortality tables 
resulting from the 1911 census of the Italian population. For this reason, the 
capitalization rate was based on a life expectancy of 54,9 years, which was 
the expected life of an average Italian (not considering gender disparities), in 
1911. Italian courts have long adopted various strategies to obviate to the 
discrepancy between life expectancy and work-life expectancy. For instance, 
in order to account for differences between life expectancy and work-life 
expectancy, courts were expected to decrease the amount resulting from the 
abovementioned calculus by 20/30%. Yet, courts have often avoided to 
operate this reduction to make up for the life expectancy disparities between 
1911 and recent times. Indeed, nowadays life expectancy in Italy is 
considerably higher than in 1911 (about 80 years for males and about 85 
years for females).  Notice that since the capitalization rate adopted by R.D. 
n. 1403 did not distinguish between genders, the resulting amounts were 
equal for men and women. This feature is not present anymore in the 
approach recently adopted by the Corte di Cassazione (the Italian Supreme 
Court).  
In 2015 the Supreme Court has adopted a new approach under which lower 
courts are expected to use more recent life expectancy tables that provide 
different values for gender.459 This decision was adopted on various grounds, 
two of which were: i) to provide a more accurate estimation of the losses 
suffered by victims; ii) to provide different estimations for males and 
females. The Court did not impose a specific source to be used for the 
determination of these losses, yet it indicated as a possible source the criteria 
listed in the “Quaderni del CSM, 1990, n. 41” (hereafter CSM41). The CSM41 
contains updated capitalization rates that discern based on gender. 
																																								 																				
458 This capitalization rate already takes into account the discount rate to be applied 
for the time difference between when the lump sum is received and the time in 
which these wages would have been earned had the victim not been involved in the 
accident.  
459 Cass. Civ., Sez. III 14 ottobre 2015 n. 20615. 
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Following the suggestion by the Supreme Court, lower courts have stated 
abandoning the use of the tables contained in the R.D. n. 1403 in favour of 
the new approach. In particular, in a medical malpractice case the Tribunale 
di Como (the Court of Como) has recently issued a decision on the losses of 
future earning capacity on the basis of the criteria contained in the 
CSM41.460 The court estimated that the accident reduced the ability of the 
victim to earn by 15%. The calculus for the estimation of the losses was 
therefore the following: annual earnings (net of taxes) * gender-based 
capitalization coefficient (CSM41) * 15%. A similar calculus has been 
subsequently applied by the Court of Parma in a traffic accident case.461 
However, the Court of Parma decided to reduce the damages award by 20%, 
to account for the difference between life expectancy and work-life 
expectancy. Here the court made no reference to whether a different 
reduction would apply had the victim been of a different gender. Thus, 
despite in Italy work-life expectancy is higher for males than for females, this 
factor is not taken into account when determining damages awards.462  
Differences by gender are also not particularly relevant with regards to the 
determination of the wage applicable for the abovementioned calculation. In 
fact, courts usually rely on various measures of income (decreased by the 
residual earning capacity) that do not differentiate by gender. For instance, 
the national average wage or the average wage for the particular industry in 
which the victim was expected to work in the future.463 When the victim is a 
child and/or it is difficult to forecast the future employment of the victim, 
courts rely on measures of income adjusted on the basis of the 
socioeconomic status (SES) of the family of the victim, but no distinction is 
made for gender.  
																																								 																				
460 Sentenza n. 27/2016 pubbl. il 14/01/2016 RG n. 13000002/2013 Repert. n. 
2089/2016 del 14/01/2016 
461 Tribunale Parma sez. I Data: 25/05/2016 n. 726 
462 If the approach of not taking into account gender differences in work-life 
expectancy is maintained for future cases, courts’ practices to establish the social 
cost of accidents will differ from the one adopted by the Italian government for 
safety regulation. In fact, the Italian government takes into account the higher 
work-life expectancy of men (estimated in 35 years vs the 30 years for females)when 
making these estimations. See for instance: Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei 
Trasporti (2014), Studio di Valutazione dei Costi Sociali dell’Incidentalità Stradale. 
463 Ronchi E. et al. (2015). 
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Similarly, under current Italian practice, the use of gender-based statistical 
tables has only a residual role concerning the award of non-economic losses. 
These losses are in fact determined using computational methods that do 
take into account the age of the victim, but that generally do not differentiate 
across gender groups. This occurs, for instance, with regards to the danno 
biologico, which is awarded to victims that, because of the tort, have suffered 
a decrease in their enjoyment of life. This type of damages is a major 
component of pain and suffering damages compensated under Italian law. 
The danno biologico is determined on the basis of a strict calculation based 
on tables prepared by committees of lawyers, judges and actuaries at the 
court level. Among the various tables elaborated by lower courts, the Italian 
Supreme Court has indicated use the tables elaborated by the Tribunal of 
Milan as the preferable one.464 These tables provide invalidity points ranging 
from 1% to 100% (100% refers to permanent complete invalidity), to which 
corresponds a pecuniary value depending on the age of the victim (regardless 
of gender).  
In this context, the residual role played by gender is relegated to situations in 
which the circumstances of the case are peculiar to an extent that judges 
prefer to award damages partially departing from the abovementioned 
method. For instance, in a recent case the Tribunale di Padova (Court of 
Padova), has found that, in a specific case, the application of the Milano 
tables would have led to a too low damages award.465 This decision was 
motivated on two grounds: i) the victim at the time of the accident had an 
expected life of about 50 years (given that she was 35 and life expectancy for 
women in Italy is about 85 years); ii)  the significant negative impact that the 
accident had on the life of the victim. From the decision, the temporal factor 
(i.e. the life expectancy of the victim), seems to have influenced the decision 
of the court. In this connection, it is not clear whether the court would have 
reached the same conclusion had the victim been a male (whose residual life 
expectancy would have therefore been around 45 years and thus shorter than 
the one of the victim of the accident). In this case, the court explicitly 
mentioned that the substantial residual life expectancy of the victim was a 
																																								 																				
464 The use of these tables: Cass. Sez. 3, Sentenza n. 20895, 15/10/2015. 
465 See for instance: Tribunale di Padova sez. II, 20/05/2016 n. 1579. 
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relevant criteria to justify the application of a different calculation than the 
one usually adopted, but did not specify the year threshold after which such 
treatment would have been justified. In this sense, gender-based life 
expectancy tables may sometimes impact court decisions on damages for 
non-pecuniary losses. Yet, their impact is (at best) relegated to exceptional 
circumstances.  
Lastly, gender-based statistical tables on life expectancy are sometimes used 
to establish future expenses due to the accident. Here the higher life 
expectancy of females often translates into higher damages awards. 
3.3 Gender and Race-Based Statistical Tables in England 
As under Italian law, English courts do not make use of race-based statistical 
tables to award damages. Thus, in the following I will focus solely on the 
gender side of the issue.  
In the English practice, damages awards for future losses of income capacity 
and future expenses are usually awarded in the form of lump-sums.466 
Generally, the estimation of losses of future earnings is carried out on the 
basis of the so called Ogden Tables.467 A Working Party of actuaries, lawyers, 
accountants and other interested parties, produces and regularly updates 
these tables. The Ogden Tables provide a detailed set of procedures to be 
followed in the estimation of lump sum damages for losses of earning 
capacity and future expenses. The basic procedure suggested by the Working 
Party consists in multiplying the annual expected loss/expense by a 
multiplier which gives the present capital value of the loss/expense. 
Multipliers differ depending on whether the loss is expected to: i) continue 
for the whole life of the victim; ii) continue until the retirement of the victim; 
iii) start from the retirement of the victim. Given the higher life expectancy of 
females, multipliers are higher for females than for males. The estimated 
																																								 																				
466 van Dam, C. (2013) p. 361. 
467 The 7th (and more recent) edition of these tables is available at: 
https://www.gov.England/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data
/file/245859/ogden_tables_7th_edition.pdf See for instance: Royal Victoria 
Infirmary and Associated Hospitals NHS Trust v B (A Child) (2002) EWCA Civ 348; 
(2002) P.I.Q.R. Q10 (CA (Civ Div)); Kate Emma Woodward v Leeds Teaching 
Hospitals NHS Trust Case No: HQ11X00916 High Court of Justice Queen's Bench 
Division (2012) EWHC 2167 (QB) WL 3062483. 
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sum is then adjusted for factors other than mortality (i.e. education, 
disability and employment status). This is done by multiplying the previously 
established sum by a number tailored to these factors. Here the multipliers 
are generally higher for men because of their longer work-life expectancy. 
The sum obtained in this way is then adjusted on the basis of the specific 
circumstances of the case. 
Gender plays a role also in establishing the wage that the victim was 
expected to have earned had the accident not occurred. This issue was 
discussed in length in Van Wees v Karkour,468 in which the judge established 
that the gender wage gap reported in official statistical tables should be 
reflected in damages awards. Yet, the court also argued that these tables 
capture only a snapshot of reality and that the wage gap will decrease in the 
future. This factor had also to be taken into account when awarding 
damages. In addition, when the victim is a child and thus the circumstances 
of the case leave high uncertainty regarding her loss of earning capacity, the 
awards are tailored on the SES of the parents of the victim.469 Here no 
difference is made on the basis of gender.  
As under Italian law, the estimation of non-economic losses is mainly carried 
out without making reference to the pre-accident life expectancy of the 
victim.470 In fact, courts usually determine pain and suffering damages on 
the basis of the “Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages in 
Personal Injury Cases”.471 The guidelines are not binding, yet in absence of 
particular reasons that suggest to adopt a different computational method, 
																																								 																				
468 Van Wees v Karkour (2007) EWHC 165 (QB). Notice that gender based tables 
were also accepted as a legitimate source of information in the more recent case: 
Kate Emma Woodward v Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust Case No: 
HQ11X00916 High Court of Justice Queen's Bench Division (2012) EWHC 2167 
(QB) WL 3062483. However, here the judge decided not to rely on these numbers 
because these tables (which focused only on one industry) were not applicable to the 
case. 
469 ‘Children as Victims under the Law of England and Wales’, in M. Martin Casals 
(ed.), Children in Tort Law, Part II: Children as Victims, 68. 
Martin Casals (ed.) (2006) Children in Tort Law, Part II: Children as Victims, 
Vienna: Springer, 2006. 82. 
470 Rogers W.V.H., England – Non-Pecuniary Loss Under English Law, in (W.V.H. 
Rogers eds.) Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss in a Comparative Perspective, Tort 
and Insurance Law, 2, 61. 
471 McKay, Colin and Great Britain Judicial Studies Board. 2010. Guidelines for the 
Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases. Oxford University Press. 
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courts tend to follow them in assessing pain and suffering awards.472 The 
guidelines contain ranges of awards per type of injury that are based on the 
amount of damages awarded in previous cases. It is worth noting that the 
damages awards for pain and suffering contained in these tables are often 
calibrated on the basis of the age and the life expectancy of the victim.473 Yet, 
the Guidelines do not provide different ranges of awards based on gender. 
Thus, in general, the higher life expectancy of a female may be reflected in 
the damages awards in a particular case, but this higher award may be 
reflected in subsequent cases regardless of whether the victim is a male or a 
female.  
3.4 Gender and Race Based Statistical Tables in French Law  
Similarly to the Italian and the English experience the racial group of the 
victim has no bearing in the determination of losses in French tort trials. Yet, 
gender influences the determination of the losses via the use of statistical 
tables.  
The life expectancy of the victim influences damages awards for future losses 
of income capacity and future expenses. Lump-sums are the common way in 
which these types of damages are awarded in French law.474 The 
determination of these type of damages is obtained by multiplying the 
expected loss of income (or the expense) by a capitalization rate indicated in 
the tables published on the Gazette du Palais on April 26th 2016 (n° 16). 
These capitalization rates are based on the life expectancy of the French 
population in the period 2006-2008 and take into account an inflation rate 
of 1,04%. The tables provide different rates depending on the period for 
which the victim is expected to suffer the loss. For instance, depending on 
whether the victim was expected to receive the last wage at 62 or 68 years, 
the rate applicable for the calculation varies (ceteris paribus it is higher at 68 
than at 62).  The tables distinguish between male and female with the latter 
having a higher rate which reflects their longer life expectancy. Contrary to 
																																								 																				
472 Rogers W.V.H. (2006). 
473 Avraham, R and Yuracko, K. (Forthcoming2017). 
474 Mornet B., L’Indemnisation des Préjudices en Cas de Blessures ou de Décès, 
2015, p. 27, available at: https://www.avocats-toulouse.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/Referentiel-Mornet-2015.pdf 
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English law, the resulting sum is not adjusted on the basis of factors other 
than mortality. In addition, the loss is not adjusted on the basis of gender 
differences in work-life expectancy. As a consequence, everything else equal, 
the sum remains higher for females than for males.  
As under Italian law, gender based wage differences, while existent,475 are 
not reflected in damages awards. Instead, courts adopt either the French 
minimum wage (SMIC); the national average wage or the average wage of 
the industry where the victim was (expected) to be employed. No 
differentiation is made on the basis of gender. With regards to children or 
other situations in which it is difficult to estimate what would have been the 
average wage of the victim, damages are adjusted on the basis of factors such 
as her educational level and the SES of her family.476 
As to the estimation of non-economic losses, differences in life expectancy 
are generally not reflected in damages awards. Among the various types of 
non-economic losses compensated under French law,477 the age of the victim 
is considered only for the establishment of the “déficit fonctionnel 
permanent”. The quantification of this type of damage is made following a 
two step procedure. First, a sum determined on the basis of the age of the 
victim and the degree of invalidity caused by the accident (this invalidity is 
expressed as a percentage, with 100% being full invalidity). The tables that 
provide the resulting sums vary depending on the Court of Appeal (Court 
d’Appel) considered. Second, this sum is then multiplied by the invalidity 
point (not expressed as a percentage) to obtain the full amount of damages. 
For instance, following the tables established by the Court of Appeal of 
Tolouse in 2010, an invalidity point of 50% suffered by a victim of age 20, 
corresponds to a sum of 2810 euros, which is then multiplied by 50 resulting 
in a damage award of 140500 euros. Gender plays no role in this estimation.  
																																								 																				
475 See, for instance, the recent estimates made by the French National Institute of 
Statistics and Economic Studies: Morin T. and Remila, N. (2013) Le Revenu Salarial 
des Femmes Reste Inférieur à Celui des Hommes, INSEE, N° 1436. 
476 Mornet B., L’Indemnisation des Préjudices en Cas de Blessures ou de Décès, 
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477 Cannarsa, M. (2002). Compensation for Personal Injury in France. http://www. 
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3.5 Comparative Analysis on Targeting Incentives	
The previous section has discussed the employment of gender and race-
based statistical tables for the determination of damages under US, English, 
French and Italian tort law. When read in conjunction with the discussion of 
the relation between the use of gender/race based tables and targeting 
(Section 2), the analysis was aimed to provide a comparative assessment of 
whether and to what extent courts’ practice incentivizes to tortfeasors to 
target a specific social group identified either by gender or race. 
With regards to race, the analysis has shown that under English, French and 
Italian law courts do not use race-based statistical tables to determine the 
relevant measures of SES. Thus, contrary to the US experience, targeting 
based on the use of statistical tables is unlikely to take place in these three 
jurisdictions.  
Conversely, the analysis has highlighted that gender does play a role in the 
determination of damages across all the jurisdictions considered. Yet, the 
effect of gender is different in the three legal systems. We have seen that the 
employment of gender-based wage tables takes place both under US and 
English law. However, in the latter, courts tend to adjust the calculations 
based on these tables on the basis of the job market improvements that 
women are likely to experience in the coming future. This, in turn mitigates 
the targeting incentives provided by the gender wage gap captured by 
current statistics. The French and the Italian practice are instead insensitive 
to gender wage gaps, and therefore no incentives for targeting do exist in 
these jurisdictions.  
  Table 3: Use of Non-Blended Tables for Damages Awards 
 
 
Race  Gender 
Average 
Wage 
Life 
Expectancy 
Work-Life 
Expectancy 
 Average 
Wage 
Life 
Expectancy 
Work-Life 
Expectancy 
England No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
France No No No  No Yes No 
Italy No No No  No Yes No 
US Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
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Similarly, France seems to be the most pro-female jurisdiction, followed by 
Italy, when it comes to the employment of life and work-life expectancy 
tables. In this regard, the current practices followed by Italian and French 
courts take into account gender gaps only with regards to life expectancy, 
which is the only measure on which females score better than males. In this 
sense, the use of statistical tables in Italy may provide a marginal targeting 
incentive to tortfeasor to the disadvantage of males. In Italy this incentive is 
likely to be small especially because pain and suffering awards are generally 
not established on the basis of life expectancy tables. Thus the incentive 
exists solely with regards to future expenses (e.g. medical bills). In French 
practice, the incentive might be more substantial (yet, still limited) as life 
expectancy of the victim affects also the determination of loss of future 
income capacity. 
Conversely, both English and US law take into account gender gaps in life 
expectancy and work-life expectancy. Since gender gaps in these two 
measures go in different directions, whether a victim will receive higher 
compensation being a male or a female depends on the specific 
circumstances of the case. It is beyond the scope of the present work to 
establish whether overall this practice provides incentives for targeting one 
of the two groups. However, notice that the fact that life expectancy play less 
of a role in determining pain and suffering awards under English law limits 
the potential benefits that females derive from the use of gender based tables 
in tort trials.  
4. The Neoclassical Law and Economics Arguments in 
Favour and Against Targeting 
When viewed through the lenses of law and economics, the primary aim of 
tort law is to provide incentives to tortfeasors and victims to take optimal 
precautions and engage in their activity at an optimal level. Given this goal, 
conventional law and economics may support the use of gender and race-
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based tables. This view has been recently questioned.478 This section reviews 
these two opposing views on the subject matter.  
4.1 The Law and Economics Arguments Pro Non-Blended Tables 
Classical law and economics provides two prima facie arguments in favour of 
the use of non-blended tables, one relates to victims willingness to pay for 
reductions in expected losses, the second is concerned with the use of income 
as a proxy for productivity. 
Regarding the second argument, economists and economically minded legal 
scholars tend to see income as a proxy for productivity, which is often 
considered a social value.479 In this view, to the extent that female and 
minority members earn less and work for a shorter period than White males, 
targeting will reduce not only the private but also the social costs of the 
activity of the tortfeasor.  
Looking at the same issue from another perspective, targeting receives 
support from law and economics because if blended tables were adopted, tort 
law could provide distorted price signals to tortfeasors regarding the amount 
to be invested in precautionary measures. This would occur if the optimal 
amount of precautions that a tortfeasor should take is determined on the 
basis of how much a victim would be willing to pay to avoid being exposed to 
the risk of suffering the loss. Notice that in law and economics this is a very 
common way of determining the optimal investments of tortfeasors as it is 
often held that investments in precautions should be tailored to reductions 
in expected losses.480  
If the willingness to pay (WTP) of a victim is accepted as the preferable way 
of establishing care investments of tortfeasors, the use of blended tables may 
provide distorted incentives by decreasing tortfeasors’ ability to discern 
between differences in WTP of different victims. In fact, the WTP to avoid 
injuries or death is generally positively correlated with the wealth of the 
individual. This is due to the stricter constraints that relatively less wealthy 
people have in terms of their spending capacity and, maybe, to the expected 
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higher losses in future earning capacity that high income earners face.481 
When damages awards do not distinguish between the WTP of the victims, 
tortfeasors will be incentivized to invest to an excessive (too little) extent in 
precautionary measures to avoid harming the less (more) wealthy. One could 
argue that this argument does not apply here because statistical tables 
capture income instead of wealth gaps. However, while the WTP of victims is 
more related to their wealth than to their income, since income and wealth 
are often strongly correlated, the argument is still relevant here.482  
Notice also that this issue is not solved completely by the use of gender/race-
based statistical tables, as relying on them can at best make the 
determination of damages closer to the average of each group considered. 
Thus, to the extent that groups are not completely homogeneous and 
tortfeasors are not able to target victim if not on the basis of group, some 
over/under-investment will take place. 
Based on these arguments conventional law and economics indeed favours 
targeting.483 Avraham has recently proposed several arguments on the basis 
of which targeting may not be efficient.484 In the next section I will briefly 
review these arguments which represent the basis of the behavioral analysis 
that follows.  
4.2 Neoclassical Arguments Against Non-Blended Tables 
A recent paper by Ronen Avraham and Yuracko, have put forward a powerful 
critique of the conventional law and economics view regarding the use of 
non-blended tables. This critique is built upon four main arguments that I 
review in the following.  
The first argument proposed by Avraham relates to the inaccuracy of non-
blended tables. Because of this, the use of non-blended tables might result in 
less accurate determination of damages than the use of blended ones.485 This 
argument is based on two main observations. First, tables of this type can in 
																																								 																				
481 Avraham, R and Yuracko, K. (Forthcoming2017). 
482 Porat A., (2011) 
483 Avraham, R and Yuracko, K. (Forthcoming2017). 
484 Avraham, R and Yuracko, K. (Forthcoming2017). 
485   Avraham, R and Yuracko, K. (Forthcoming2017). 
167	
	
fact only capture a snapshot of reality, and are thus unable to take into 
account the dynamic aspects of gender and racial groups SES. In particular, 
they do not consider trends showing improvements in the socioeconomic 
conditions of females and racial minorities that have taken place in the 
recent past. For instance, these tables do not capture the advancements that, 
also thanks to better educational achievements, young women have achieved 
in the labour market of several US metropolitan cities.486 The inability of 
these tables to capture dynamic trends, is manifest in their imprecision in 
forecasting future dynamics of racial group measures of SES. For instance, 
according to the projections released in 1995 by the Census Bureau, the life 
expectancy at birth of a Black male in 2015 was expected to be 62,5 years.487 
If we look at the actual life expectancy at birth of a Black man in 2014 it was 
72,5.488 Thus projections made about 20 years ago underestimated the 2015 
life expectancy of Black males by 10 years. Notice that forecasted measures 
are based on past trends. Thus, given the observed discrepancy between 
forecasted at actual values, this indicates that these tables are not 
particularly accurate in capturing dynamic trends.489  
Notice also that similar issues arise when focusing on gender gaps. For 
instance, statistical tables report that females tend to earn considerably less 
than males of the same age. However, several studies have shown that the 
gender income gap is narrowing in many industries as females are improving 
their job market positioning.490 
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The overall conclusion is that non-blended tables are likely to lead to 
systematic underestimations of the damages awarded to females and 
minority members. In this regard, as mentioned above, the economics of tort 
law highlights that systematic underestimations of damages awarded can 
lead tortfeasors to underinvest in precautionary measures and engage too 
much in the potentially tortious activity to the detriment of social welfare.  
Second, according to Avraham and Yuracko, the inherently lower accuracy of 
non-blended tables could be linked to the way these tables are built and 
used. In particular, they notice that by reporting means, these tables fail to 
account for the (often high) variability of these measures. 491In this 
connection, a clear example of a minority population that is often treated as 
a single group but that has a strong variability in terms of SES of its 
members are Asians in the US population.  This “homogeneous” racial group 
is in fact composed of different sub-ethnic groups, some of which score 
better than Whites on several dimensions of SES, while others are in more 
precarious conditions than the average Black person. Avraham and Yuracko 
argue that using blended tables may decrease the variance in damages 
awarded as they are built upon a larger number of observations than non-
blended ones. This, in turn, can be social welfare enhancing, when it leads to 
a large number of victims to be miscompensated by a little, than when it 
leads to a smaller amount of larger miscompensations. Yet, whether 
increasing the number of observations necessarily lead to lower the variance 
in damages awarded is however not mathematically guaranteed. As such, the 
argument is not very powerful. 
Similarly, the use of means, which are particularly sensitive to outliers, may 
fail to capture skewed distributions in SES measures across racial and gender 
groups. This, according to Avraham and Yuracko can be problematic because 
if the distribution of the socioeconomic measure considered is positively 
skewed for the relatively better positioned group and the opposite is true for 
the disadvantaged group, it can be that statistically significant differences 
between the means of the two distributions are not mirrored in statistically 
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significant differences between modes and medians.492 This suggests that the 
use of means might be less justified than previously thought. This is 
particularly true in the context of tort law, where the courts apply a more 
likely than not standard to reduce errors in adjudication. They therefore 
suggest using modes or medians as alternative measures. 493  
In a nutshell, Avraham and Yuracko’s first argument is that the use of non-
blended tables may lead to unwarranted targeting, i.e. to targeting that is not 
justified on the basis of the actual social costs of the activity of the tortfeasor.  
A second argument put forward by in the literature relates to the dynamics 
that lead to gaps in SES between the considered groups.494 In particular, he 
argues that the lower socioeconomic standing of minorities and women in 
society is a result of market failures.495 For instance, he highlights that 
employers perceive lower job attachment by female and minority members, 
and thus offer jobs that take less into account the needs of these segments of 
the population.496 As a consequence, job attachment of women and minority 
members may be further eroded. To the extent that employers’ perception do 
not reflect innate preferences of females (which may on average have a 
stronger preference to be directly involved in child raising) and minority 
members, this labour discrimination is inefficient.497 The result of this 
vicious circle, when mirrored in damages awards may provide an ex-ante 
incentive to members of minority groups and females to reduce investments 
in human capital. This, according to Avraham could be inefficient, as it may 
lead potentially productive member of society to underinvest in productive 
skills.498 However, while these incentives might well be present, they are 
unlikely to be particularly strong. Indeed, as Avraham himself recognizes, it 
is hard to believe that the use of non-blended tables may induce members of 
discriminated groups or their agents (e.g. parents towards children) to 
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underinvest in productive skills. The argument, while logically strong, 
remains weak.499   
Third, in Avraham’s view it is ethically inappropriate to consider the WTP of 
victims to reduce the expected losses from accidents. Recently, law and 
economics scholars have put forward various arguments against the use of 
WTP to establish amounts that victims are willing to invest to reduce 
expected losses.500  As noted above, the WTP of a person is largely 
determined by their wealth. In this connection, the wealthy person WTP will 
be higher than the one of a less wealthy person, partially because the former 
has a greater possibility to spend her (greater) wealth in activities from 
which she derives utility. Porat and Tabbach have recently shown that 
efficiency does not require considering the increase in WTP linked to the 
desire to spend wealth when setting damages. This is because wealth is an 
inherently transferable good and the law should not be concerned with who 
enjoys it, but only about its production.501 Avraham goes further than this. In 
his perspective, for ethical reasons differences in human capital linked to 
belonging to a certain racial or gender group should not be taken into 
account when establishing damages awards.502 
The last argument proposed by Avraham is linked to trade-offs between 
efficiency and fairness. In particular, he identifies three arguments on the 
basis of which efficiency should not be the only criterion for the 
establishment of damages. First, as most people value fairness, one could 
think giving fairness lexical priority in the social welfare function.503 The 
problem with this argument is that many people would not agree with always 
giving lexical priority to fairness over efficiency. 504 Second, rule 
utilitarianism may dictate avoiding targeting even if in some circumstances it 
would be better not doing so. 505 According to rule utilitarianism it is better 
to follow rules that generally lead to higher social welfare than to try to 
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establish in each single occasion which of a set of actions will lead to the 
highest social welfare. In this view, avoiding targeting might generally lead to 
higher social welfare if, for instance, this practice could undermine social 
cohesion.506 Yet, the rule utilitarianism argument is limited in two ways:507  
i) whether avoiding targeting generally leads to higher social welfare is an 
empirical question; ii) rule utilitarianism may actually dictate targeting 
disadvantaged individuals (for instance, if indeed their contribution to 
society is likely to be extremely limited). Lastly, contrary to traditional law 
and economics wisdom, sometimes it might be better to address inequalities 
via private law and via the tax system.508 This is the case, for instance, when 
relying on the former is more expensive than acting via tax law. Yet, as 
Avraham himself recognize, this is unlikely to be the case with regards to the 
choice between employing blended and non-blended tables.509 Indeed, both 
types of tables are freely available and thus not costly to adopt for the 
establishment of damages.   
In sum, existing literature has so far highlighted various arguments 
according to which law and economics should not support the use of non-
blended tables. Yet, as recognized by the same literature, none of these 
arguments is fatal to the traditional view according to which the use of 
blended tables is unwarranted. 	
5. A Behavioral Perspective of the Use of Blended vs Non-
Blended Tables 
In the following I elaborate on the ideas put forward by Avraham and show 
that some of the arguments he proposes are stronger when the neoclassical 
analysis is complemented with a behaviorally informed one. In particular, I 
will draw insights from studies on the outgroup homogeneity bias, 
willingness to accept (WTA) - willingness to pay (WTP) gap and anchoring.  
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5.1 Outgroup Homogeneity Bias and Non-Blended Tables 
As discussed in the previous section, one of the reasons why the use of non-
blended tables may decrease the efficiency of tort law systems compared to 
blended tables is that the former are inherently less accurate as they may fail 
to capture the variability of socioeconomic indicators within different racial 
groups. While it is certainly true that these tables do not report the variance 
of the measures, the main weakness of Avrahm’s argument is that the same 
holds for blended tables. Consequently, it is impossible from a theoretical 
perspective to know which type of table will generally lead to a higher 
underestimation of the variance in the measure considered. The main 
contention of this section is that behavioral economics supports the idea that 
the use of non-blended tables is likely to ease the systematic underestimation 
of the variance within the racial/gender group that is the least represented in 
the judiciary. In addition, I will argue that this systematic underestimation 
may lead to decreases in social welfare. The arguments proposed here are 
based on studies on the outgroup homogeneity bias. I will start by briefly 
introducing this bias and subsequently I will apply these insights to the use 
of tables in tort trials.  
The outgroup homogeneity bias refers to the phenomenon by which 
individuals tend to perceive the members of groups to which they do not 
belong as being: i) more homogeneous than they really are; ii) more 
homogeneous than the group to which the individual belongs to.510 Given 
that in the present section I focus on accuracy, in the remainder of the paper 
I will refer to the effect of this bias only in terms of the first effect described 
above.  
In the context of this strand of literature a group can be any type of group, 
from groups artificially created in the lab (e.g. individuals wearing blue or 
red t-shirts) to social groups, such as gender, ethnicity or race.511 Existing 
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research indicates that this phenomenon is robust and that the strength of 
this bias depends on various factors.512 For instance, the size of the outgroup 
moderates the bias. In particular, ceteris paribus the larger the size of the 
outgroup, the larger  the bias. In addition, the bias is moderated by the actual 
variability of the outgroup. The less the actual variability, the smaller the 
bias. Similarly, the perceived homogeneity of groups is stronger when the 
evaluation is carried out on the basis of a stereotypical trait.513 Last, but not 
least, the bias seems to be generally stronger when the observer’s SES is 
higher than the one of the outgroup members.514 Importantly, it has been 
shown that a social status effect takes place also in the context of evaluating 
the heterogeneity of racial minorities.515 
The outgroup homogeneity bias has been shown to have a strict and self-
reinforcing link with the behavior of the observer. In particular, building on 
existing psychological evidence Alter and Darley have shown that the 
perceived homogeneity of a group is positively related to collective treatment 
of the group. In other words, the more we perceive a group to be 
homogeneous, the more we tend to behave uniformly towards the 
individuals belonging to this group.516 Importantly, this effect has been 
shown with regards to the allocation of punishment and rewards.517 In turn, 
the collective treatment of the group reinforces the perceived homogeneity of 
the group, potentially leading to a vicious circle.518 In this connection, 
various strands of research indicate that perceived group homogeneity 
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fosters higher punishments for actions (e.g. crimes) committed by 
individuals belonging to that group.519 
When applied to the use of statistical tables in the context of tort law, the 
literature on outgroup homogeneity bias suggests that adjudicators may have 
a systematically biased perception of the variability of outgroup members in 
terms of the measures captured by the tables. In fact, psychological research 
indicates that outgroup homogeneity bias is triggered in situations where the 
personal identity of the target individual (in a tort law case, the victim) is 
made salient.520 Indeed, the use of non-blended tables enhances the saliency 
of the racial/gender group to which the victim belongs, thus potentially 
triggering the bias. In legal systems in which courts have (and make use of 
their) discretion to adapt damages awards depending on the specific 
circumstances of the case, the use of non-blended tables may therefore lead 
to systematic biases in the estimation of damages across groups of victims. 
To illustrate, imagine a society composed of two groups (X;Y). A judge that 
belongs to group X is called to award damages for loss of future earning 
capacity of a victim of a tort. If damages are established on the basis of 
blended tables the bias is not triggered. This applies especially in all those 
cases in which the race of the victims would remain otherwise unknown to 
the judge, such as proceedings in which parties do not appear in front of the 
court.521 Conversely, the use of non-blended tables will trigger the bias thus 
leading to forecast future losses for members of the group Y without taking 
into account the actual variability within this group. Notice that, this could 
occur repeatedly in the establishment of damages, making it a non-trivial 
issue. For instance, the bias could be triggered both when the damage is 
calculated on the basis of these tables and subsequently when it is adapted to 
the specific circumstance of the victim (e.g. considering gender/race based 
relative mortality ratios based on smoking habits). 
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The degree by which the underestimation of the variability of the losses 
suffered by individuals belonging to a certain racial or gender group occurs 
depend on the demographic composition of the judiciary within a legal 
system. As discussed in Chapter I, judiciaries in the Western world are 
predominantly composed by White individuals. This seems to be particularly 
true for European judiciaries. This suggests that it is the variance of the 
losses suffered by members of racial minority groups that are more likely to 
be systematically miss-estimated. The fact that outgroup homogeneity bias is 
particularly strong towards minorities and given the self-reinforcing effect of 
collective treatment, it is plausible that this effect is not negligible.  
Shifting our attention towards gender groups, here the bias is likely to be less 
systematic in several legal systems. In fact, in many Western judiciaries there 
is not a large gender gap and sometimes women are the majority of judges 
sitting in lower courts.522 Yet, this only implies that the underestimation of 
the variability of the socioeconomic measure considered will occur for both 
groups, just in a less systematic manner.  
What are the welfare effects of the use of non-blended tables? Generally, 
from a law and economics perspective damages awards should be set equal 
to the actual harm suffered by victims. Yet, for optimal prevention to take 
place what matters is only average accuracy. Changes in the perceived 
variability of the harm suffered by outgroup members do not necessarily lead 
to changes in the perceived average harm inflicted to this group. In this 
sense, the outgroup homogeneity bias may not have welfare implications. 
Nonetheless, recent law and economics scholarship has highlighted that the 
homogeneity bias can sometimes lead to decreases in social welfare.523 In 
particular, this occurs when courts impose liability under a negligence rule in 
a situation in which multiple victims are involved.524 For instance, imagine 
that a court has to establish whether to make a tortfeasor (A) liable for some 
losses suffered by B and C.525 The expected harm suffered by B and C is 
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respectively 60 and 10. While their cost of precautions is 30 and 50 
respectively. If the precautionary costs of the tortfeasor were 50 and the 
judge does not distinguish the different losses/costs sustained by single 
victims, the A would be made liable. Indeed, she could have avoided a loss of 
70 by investing 50. However, the opposite result would be obtained if judges 
were able to distinguish the specific situation of each victim. In this scenario, 
B would invest 30 to avoid the loss of 50, while C would prefer to bear the 
loss of 10. In this situation the total cost of the accident is 40, which is lower 
than the one we would have if A was made liable. The use of non-blended 
tables may therefore lead to decreases in social welfare. Since the bias would 
be triggered less frequently if blended tables were used, this negative welfare 
consequence of adjudication would be a less compelling problem.  
To sum up. This section has argued that the employment of non-blended 
tables may trigger the outgroup homogeneity bias. In turn, this bias may 
decrease the efficiency of tort law systems by exposing tortfeasors to bear 
either too high or too low expected liability.  
5.2 WTA-WTP Gap and Non-Blended Tables 
As mentioned above, the third critique moved by Avraham to the 
employment of non-blended tables relates directly to the use of peoples’ 
WTP for establishing the right amount of safety measures to be taken. While 
Avraham’s argument is mainly grounded in non-welfarist considerations, the 
present section argues that behavioral economics provides arguments in 
favour of using the WTA measure. This, in turn, strengthens the case for the 
use of blended tables.  
In principle, the evaluation of positive and negative changes in welfare linked 
to the consequence of an action (e.g. investing in safety measures) could be 
conducted on the basis of the WTP or the WTA of the individuals involved. 
Standard economic theory employs WTP under the assumption that the two 
measures provide very similar values (net of the potential effect of income 
and wealth).526 A number of studies have shown that this assumption often 
does not correspond to reality. Indeed, a substantial amount of research in 
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psychology and behavioral economics has identified systematic divergences 
between the two measures, with WTA being much larger than WTP.527 An 
earlier review found that WTA/WTP ratio to be 6.7 and a more recent one 
3.28.528 Scholars interested in cost-benefit analysis have long discussed the 
implications of the choice of the best measure to be used in cost-benefit 
analysis.529 While consensus is far from being reached,530 the practice of 
evaluating policies solely on the basis of WTP is not anymore an obvious 
choice. Of particular interest for the present work is that research on the 
WTA/WTP gap highlights that gains and losses are often not evaluated in 
absolute terms, but in terms of variations that occur starting from a 
reference point (for instance, but not necessarily, the status quo).531 As 
explained by Knetsch, this reference dependence implies that positive 
changes can be either gains (in the domain of gains, meaning when there is a 
potential welfare improvement compared to the status quo) or reductions of 
losses (if the domain is that of losses, i.e. when there is a potential reduction 
in welfare compared to the reference point). Conversely, a negative change is 
either a foregone gain (in the domain of gains) or a loss (in the domain of 
losses).532 According to Knetsch, WTA is the most appropriate measure to 
evaluate reductions in losses and the WTP the most suitable to measure 
foregone gains.533 This is because these two measures are those that would 
bring the victim to the same situation in which she was before the 
accident.534 Of course this view is contestable and it does not provide a clear 
answer to whether optimal care in a tort law context should be determined 
considering victims’ WTA or WTP. In fact, it is not clear whether victims 
perceive a loss in earning capacity as a forgone gain or a loss (that could be 
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reduced). Yet, this literature is relevant for the present discussion because it 
weakens the case for the use of WTP in tort law contexts and provides an 
alternative measure that could be used instead. Notice that if WTA is 
adopted, tortfeasors would be generally required to take more precautionary 
measures and/or decrease more their activity level compared to a state of the 
world in which cost-benefit analysis is based on WTP. Thus, it is possible 
that in the current state of affairs the social cost of several human activities is 
too high. 
In addition, a major difference between WTP and WTA is that the latter is 
not constrained by wealth. For this reason, when compared with WTP, WTA 
is more likely to vary less across individuals with different levels of wealth.535 
As a consequence, using WTA instead of WTP is often seen as a practice that 
would lead to a more equitable distribution of hazards.536 As highlighted 
above, a more equal distribution of tort losses across racial and gender 
groups would be achieved if damages were calculated using blended tables 
than otherwise. In this sense the employment of blended tables may better 
approximate the result that would be achieved had WTA been adopted. 
Indeed, under both regimes (blended tables and WTA), the distribution of 
losses across social groups would be more homogeneous than if non-blended 
tables or WTP were employed. Whether this is the case is of course an 
empirical question which the present work cannot answer. Yet, once this 
possibility is considered, it is not anymore obvious that the employment of 
non-blended tables will necessarily lead to welfare improvements compared 
to the use of blended ones. In particular, this would depend on whether: i) 
WTA is a better measure for cost-benefit analysis in the realm of tort law; ii) 
which type of tables better approximate WTA. 
In addition, since the employment of blended tables would reduce the 
burden suffered by members of disadvantaged groups, their use may lead to 
better spreading of losses. Loss spreading is widely recognized as the 
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to Pay for Joint Programs: A More Equitable Value Measure for the Less Wealthy. 
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536 Breffle, W. S., Eiswerth, M. E., Muralidharan, D., & Thornton, J.et al. (2015). 
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secondary goal of tort law,537 and refers to the optimal allocation of the risk 
of losses given the risks  preferences of victims and tortfeasors.538  Generally, 
loss spreading leads to higher levels of social utility when risk-averse 
individuals, i.e. individuals that dislike being exposed to pure financial risk, 
bear lower expected losses. For a risk averse individual (as most humans 
are), the marginal utility of money decreases for any increase in wealth.539 
This is because, the reduction in utility that derives from losing a certain 
financial loss is greater than the increase in utility that follows a gain of an 
equal amount.540  
It is generally agreed in the literature that risk averse individuals’ decrease in 
utility due to a loss is positively correlated with the size of the loss relative to 
the personal wealth. In other words, the larger is the loss relative to the 
assets of a risk averse person, and the greater is the decrease in utility 
suffered.541 For this reason, a redistribution of expected losses from the less 
privileged to the most affluent members of a society, as it would happened if 
blended tables were used instead of non-blended ones, may sometimes 
increase social welfare. 
To sum up, this section has argued that the literature on the WTP/WTA gap 
supports the employment of blended tables in two ways: i) it generally 
weakens the case for the use of WTP measures in tort law. ii) to the extent 
that WTA has to be considered the right measure, it is not clear anymore 
whether non-blended tables are superior to blended ones in terms of social 
welfare maximization. The fact that the employment of WTA leads to more 
equitable distribution of losses across social groups suggests that the use of 
blended tables may better approximate the result that would be obtained if 
WTA was used as a measure. In addition, when read in conjunction with the 
literature on loss spreading, it seems that the use of blended tables may also 
generate welfare benefits by leading to a more equitable redistribution of 
losses. 
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5.3 Anchoring and Non-Blended Tables 
The previous section has highlighted how the group homogeneity bias and 
the WTA-WTP gap can support the claim that blended tables are indeed 
more appropriate to establish damages in tort trials. This section expands 
the behavioral informed analysis of the employment of non-blended tables in 
tort trials by looking at a widely studied phenomenon, namely anchoring and 
adjustment. I will argue that, given the existence of this phenomenon, the 
use of non-blended tables is even less warranted than otherwise.  
Anchoring and adjustment refers to the phenomenon by which individuals 
make evaluations that are biased by irrelevant information (the anchor).542 
For instance, in a classical experiment on anchoring and adjustment 
individuals provided systematically different estimates of the percentage of 
African countries that are part of the United Nations depending on whether 
they were previously exposed to one of two numbers that were manifestly 
irrelevant for the completion of the task.543 Research indicates that this 
phenomenon is due to the fact that individuals’ judgement is initially 
affected by the anchor and the following adjustment (which is logically 
warranted given the irrelevance of the information) is not sufficient to avoid 
the contamination.544 
Legal scholarship is not unfamiliar with the existence of this bias.545 Indeed, 
this bias has been replicated with US and EU judges.546 In addition, this 
effect has been found both with regards to numeric judgments as well as 
concerning judgments of ambiguous legal standards.547 This phenomenon is 
therefore of clear relevance for the study of judicial decision-making. In the 
context of the present paper, anchoring is a relevant phenomenon because 
statistical tables can provide an anchor for the establishment of other 
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typologies of damages and spread even further inequalities in awards 
between social groups 
Legal systems provide different taxonomies of damages. As illustrated in 
Section 3, depending on the country considered, gender and race-based 
tables are used to calculate one or more types of damages but not others. For 
instance, as illustrated above, under Italian, French, English and US law 
statistical tables are used for determining the losses of future earning 
capacity. In this context their use might be warranted because indeed work 
life expectancy is a relevant factor to establish the likely amount that the 
subject would have earned had the accident not occurred. Yet, imagine if the 
estimation of these losses would provide an anchor for the determination of 
economic damages that the victim had to bear as a consequence of the 
accident. This could occur, for instance, with regards to goods that despite 
having a market value, this value does not correspond to a specific sum to 
which the judge can make reference, but to a range from which the judge, 
with some discretion, picks a number. Indeed, as discussed above the 
determination of damages often occurs in the abstract. Notice that, many 
goods belong to this category, as there is no exact market value for instance 
with regards to: houses, used cars (by definition any car that circulate is a 
used one), data stored in hardware, etc. For damages aimed at compensating 
these types of losses, the influence of the tables has a less obvious reason to 
take place.  
How is this discussion related to the use of (non-)blended tables? The 
starting point of the analysis is that regardless of whether ones uses blended 
or non-blended tables, anchoring can affect the decision of the judge.548 
However, the effect of the anchor is likely to be different depending on the 
type of table used. In fact, contrary to blended tables, non-blended ones are 
likely to provide different anchors and therefore lead to different estimation 
of damages across racial and gender groups. In particular, social groups that 
are disadvantaged by the employment of these tables will be further 
penalized by the bias as their damages awards for type of damages unrelated 
																																								 																				
548 Notice that effect of anchoring may also change the expectations of the victim. 
However, since here I focus on unilateral accidents the attention is here on the 
decision of the judge and the incentives to tortfeasors. 
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to socioeconomic status would be relatively lower than those of non-
disadvantaged individuals. This can spread social inequalities beyond what 
warranted by the conventional law and economics view of the use of 
statistical tables. In fact, the lower anchors provided by the tables for victims 
member of disfavoured racial and gender groups might bias the estimation of 
the other types of damages downwards compared to the anchor provided by 
members of advantaged groups. This type of disparity in damages awards 
would not occur if blended tables provide the anchor. 
What are the potential welfare effects of the use of non-blended tables? As 
argued above, when courts establish damages on the basis of non-blended 
tables anchoring has the effect of redistributing resources from 
disadvantaged groups towards advantaged ones. This redistribution would 
occur beyond what suggested by standard law and economics analysis. 
Because of this the presence of anchoring makes it unclear under which 
policy regime (blended vs. non-blended tables approach) social welfare 
would be higher. The answer to this questions remains indeed an empirical 
one, which goes beyond the aim of the present work. Yet, in the following I 
will put forward a two theoretical arguments that suggest that, given the 
presence of anchoring, social welfare is likely to be higher if blended tables 
are used than otherwise.  
The first argument relates to loss spreading. As discussed above, loss 
spreading suggests being careful in setting up a tort law system that redirects 
expected losses from relatively wealthy individuals to the relatively 
disadvantaged.An anchor based on blended tables does not disfavor any of 
the social groups, while anchoring relative to non-blended tables further 
increase losses suffered by members of economically disadvantaged groups. 
Because of this, when anchoring is considered, non-blended tables may lead 
to lower social welfare states compared to blended ones.   
The starting point of the second argument is that neoclassical economics is 
per se not against policies that increase equality. Indeed, as long as members 
of a society have a preference for fairness, mainstream law and economics 
accept the incorporation of distributive justice concerns into the social 
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welfare function.549 As noted by Avraham, this fact provides an argument in 
favour of the use of blended tables, yet, only under the condition that in this 
society there is a sufficient number of individuals that are neither sexists nor 
racists or that believe that welfare maximization always trumps inequality 
regardless of whether this inequality is a product of discrimination. In the 
following, I argue that starting from these premises, literature on anchoring 
overcomes the limit highlighted by Avraham. 
As discussed above, in presence of anchoring it is unclear which of the two 
policy choices would yield higher social welfare, even though the loss 
spreading argument points in favour of the use of blended tables. Because of 
this, a strict welfarist cannot have strong preferences in favour of one of the 
two options. Thus, the chances that a society would support the use of non-
blended tables is much smaller in presence of anchoring than otherwise. This 
possibility is further reduced when one considers a person could support the 
use of blended tables only when  his/her preferences are sufficiently strong, 
that s/he would prefer a legal system that worsen the position of minority 
groups and women to an extent that has no connection with any logical 
argument. Indeed, as explained above, the effect of anchoring on the 
determination of damages for which tables should not be used is foreign to 
any logic (e.g. for material harm to cars). This, in turn, may further reduce 
the strength of the argument against the use of blended tables.  
In a nutshell, the effect of anchoring on the determination of damages is 
likely to foster social inequalities to an extent that is not justified neither 
from a logical nor from a welfarist perspective. This, in turn, is likely to 
increase the losses suffered by members of disadvantaged groups, thus 
leading to less efficient loss spreading. In addition, the illogic and potentially 
welfare decreasing effect of anchoring should reduce the support that 
blended tables can find in a given society. Thus, to the extent that individual 
preferences for fairness should be considered in the welfare function of a 
society, the standard law and economics argument against the use of blended 
tables is less tenable than usually assumed.  
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This Section has taken a behavioral approach to the study of the welfare 
effects related to the employment of (non-)blended tables in tort trials. 
Overall, the analysis has shown that various strands of literature suggest that 
the employment of non-blended tables vis-à-vis of blended ones may lead to 
decreases in social welfare. Therefore, the welfarist case for the use of non-
blended tables is much weaker than usually assumed in law and economics. 
This analysis complements and supports the recent claim put forward by 
Avraham that the use of non-blended tables in tort trials is not defendable 
from a law and economics perspective and should therefore be abandoned in 
favour of gender and race neutral tables.  
6. Conclusion 
The US courts’ practice to employ gender and race based statistical tables for 
the assessment of tort law damages has been heavily criticized in the recent 
past. While earlier criticisms came mainly from the perspective of 
distributive justice, recent scholarship has argued that this practice is 
(and/or should be) against the achievement of corrective justice and 
efficiency.  
The present work has built upon and expanded this literature from two 
perspectives. First, given how controversial the use of these tables is, I have 
analysed whether similar practices take place under European tort law. More 
specifically I have focused on three major European jurisdictions: England, 
France and Italy. The analysis has shown that these European courts do not 
differentiate between racial groups in the employment of statistical tables. In 
addition, the role of gender is generally more limited in these two 
jurisdictions than in the US. This is especially true with regards to the Italian 
legal system.  
Second, as explicitly recognized by this literature, the welfarist case against 
the use of these tables in tort trials has various weaknesses. The present work 
has expanded the welfare analysis by taking a behavioral perspective on the 
issue. On this ground it has been argued that the welfarist case for the use of 
non-blended tables is weaker than generally assumed.  
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Overall this study suggests that the employment of non-blended tables in 
tort trials is likely to reduce social welfare. As such, even from a pure 
welfarist perspective, it should be abandoned in favour of blended tables. In 
this connection, the English, the French and the Italian practice seem to be 
more in line with this recommendation than the US one.    
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Chapter VI 
Concluding Remarks 
1. Main Findings 
As announced in Chapter I and as it is manifest from the Chapters that 
followed, the core issue that underlies the development of this thesis is the 
interplay between accuracy and the behavioral economics of evidence law in 
tort trials. The topic has been touched upon at various points and from 
different perspectives throughout the various Chapters. In these concluding 
remarks, I will bring this work to a synthesis that contributes to three 
streams of literature on accuracy and behavioral law and economics. The 
first one is concerned with whether behavioral law and economics can 
increase our understanding of human behavior vis-à-vis neoclassical law and 
economics. The second focuses on whether behavioral law and economics 
suggests that we should trust less courts’ ability to make accurate decisions 
at trial. The last one focuses on whether behavioral law and economics 
provides arguments to review the central role that accuracy in adjudication 
has within contemporary legal scholarship. Chapter.  After having elaborated 
how this thesis relates to each of these three strands of literature, I present 
some suggestions on how this work could be expanded. First of all, however, 
I will briefly summarize the main findings of each Chapter. 
 1.1 Summary of Single Chapters 
Each of the previous Chapters has contributed to a stream of literature on 
the behavioral law and economics of tort law, evidence law and judicial 
decision-making. In particular, Chapter II discusses various issues that 
derive from the employment of results in judgment and decision-making 
(JDM) to evaluate courts’ accuracy at trial when little attention is paid to the 
truth standards adopted in JDM. The starting point of this analysis is that 
both legal and behavioral scholarship adopt coherence and accuracy as truth 
standards to evaluate performance in decision-making. In addition, legal 
scholars often build on behavioral findings to make predictions about courts’ 
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performance and identify strengths and weaknesses of different rules and 
court practices. The Chapter highlights that in doing so, legal scholars often 
misinterpret behavioral findings by ignoring differences between studies that 
adopt either coherence or correspondence as truth standards. This often 
leads to erroneous identifications of policy problems and solutions. Chapter 
III tests via a quasi-experiment whether individuals trained in law are 
influenced by: i) their stable individual propensities to commit the 
fundamental attribution error (FAE); ii) contextual factors that may trigger 
the FAE at trial. The analysis is performed with law students and individuals 
that are attending a post-master course that prepares to enter the Italian 
judiciary. The results suggest that all subjects, regardless of level of legal 
training, are influenced by their stable tendencies to commit the FAE when 
making decisions at trial. Yet, individuals that undertake a judicial career are 
better able to apply rules that aim at limiting the influence of contextual 
determinants of the FAE.   
Chapter IV presents an analysis of the effect of implicit racial biases (IRBs) 
on the functioning of tort law systems. It argues that IRBs are likely to exist 
in tort law settings and in European trials. I provide an analysis of how the 
biases are likely to affect the evaluation of different types of items of evidence 
and courts’ decisions. Since IRBs can influence trial outcomes at various 
stages of the trial, their effect can be non-trivial. In addition, the Chapter 
highlights various factors that can help understanding in which cases IRBs 
are more likely to have an impact on the functioning of tort law systems. 
Lastly, the Chapter discusses a series of available remedies to the distortions 
created by IRBs. 
Chapter V proposes a comparative and behaviorally informed analysis of use 
of gender and race-based statistical tables to award tort damages.  The 
Chapter shows that generally, contrary to the US, European courts tend to 
use blended tables. The behavioral side of the analysis complements and 
supports recent scholarship in law and economics in arguing that the use of 
non-blended tables is not in line with social welfare maximization.  
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1.2	The	Interplay	Between	Accuracy	and	Behavioral	Law	and	Economics	
Moving to the overall analysis relating to the interplay between accuracy and 
behavioral law and economics, this thesis has addressed three main issues. 
The first issue addressed here is whether integrating economic insights with 
behavioral ones improves our ability to predict how certain legal rules and 
institutions affect behavior. The second question addressed here is whether, 
once behavioral insights are taken into account, we should be more skeptical 
of the accuracy of courts’ decisions. Lastly, the thesis has analyzed whether 
behavioral insights can inform the debate on the role of accuracy as an aim of 
adjudication.  
Concerning the first issue, the analysis shows that indeed a behavioral 
approach can provide a useful complement to neoclassical economics in 
describing the behavior of judges and other trial participants and thus the 
functioning of tort law systems. This complementing role was highlighted in 
Chapter IV, which discusses the relevance of IRBs in tort trials. The analysis 
shows that these biases are likely to affect the evaluation of different types of 
items of evidence (and thus, ultimately, tort trial outcomes) in a predictable 
manner. In particular, implicit biases can reduce the expected benefit for 
members of discriminated racial minorities to bring a case to trial. As a 
consequence of this, minority members are likely the be exposed to a higher 
degree of expected liability as well as of negative externalities than in 
absence of the bias. In other words, via tort law, implicit biases shift the 
expected distribution of resources from one racial group to another, to the 
advantage of members of non-racial minorities. This shift is likely to distort 
the deterrent effect of tort law depending on the expected distribution of the 
harm across different populations of victims. In this connection, I argue that 
there is a positive correlation between the proportion of the expected harm 
suffered by members of racial minorities and the decrease in the deterrent 
effect of tort law. The analysis has also highlighted that the distortive effect 
of implicit biases may vary depending on the type of case considered, with 
greater effects related to cases in which the stakes are low and the number of 
occurrences in which the bias can affect trial outcomes higher. In addition, 
the Chapter has discussed various policies that could be implemented if 
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these distortive effects were considered worth redressing. In this connection, 
careful attention towards human cognition and motivation can provide 
precious insights on which policies are likely to be more effective. On a 
related note, Chapter V has discussed the welfare effects of the use of 
blended vs non-blended (i.e. race/gender based) statistical tables for the 
compensation of future losses in tort trials. Also here, taking a behavioral 
perspective has shown to provide guidance to policymakers regarding the 
effects of this important tort law practice on judges and tortfeasors’ behavior. 
An overall result of the thesis is that, in the context of European judiciaries, 
the behavioral phenomena considered here all point into the direction that 
members of racial minorities are likely to be impaired in their ability to 
obtain compensation at trial. In this sense, behavioral economics is able to 
provide policymakers with a clear-cut prediction on the functioning of tort 
law systems in Europe.  
While behavioral insights can be relevant for policymaking, this work has 
also shown that legal scholars should be careful in complementing law and 
economics with behavioral studies to inform the law. Chapter II has warned 
against some problem that derive from the misuse of behavioral findings to 
inform policymaking. In particular, the issue addressed in this Chapter is 
that legal scholarship that uses findings from behavioral sciences to evaluate 
the performance of trial systems pay sometimes too little attention to 
differences in truth standards adopted in studies on JDM. This lack of 
attention can create confusion regarding why, whether and under what 
circumstances a behavioral phenomenon can be considered problematic and, 
if so, what are the appropriate policies that could be adopted to address these 
concerns.    
In a similar vein, the experiment performed in Chapter III provides support 
to the claim that legal scholars should be careful in translating findings 
obtained with laypeople to describe the behavior of judges. In particular, the 
Chapter has highlighted that individuals enrolled in a school that prepares to 
become judges are less prone to commit the FAE in trial settings than law 
students when this error is triggered by contextual factors (i.e. character 
evidence). Yet, the Chapter has also shown that when the FAE is triggered by 
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individual propensities the two groups do not differ. This indicates that 
making parallels between expert and non-expert is sometimes warranted. 
These findings highlight the potential of behavioral law and economics to 
complement neoclassical studies in understanding how judges make 
decisions.  
The second main issue addressed in this thesis is whether, once behavioral 
insights are taken into account, we should be more skeptical of the accuracy 
of courts’ decisions. Accuracy in adjudication is often seen as a major 
criterion to evaluate the performance of trial systems. This is true also from a 
law and economics perspective, for instance, when accuracy refers to the 
imposition of liability. The analysis has highlighted mixed results. On the 
one hand, various strands of research in behavioral law and economics 
indicate that human decision-making is sometimes inaccurate. In this 
regard, Chapter II and III have discussed the role of the FAE in trial settings. 
Building on existing literature, Chapter II has highlighted that the FAE may 
reduce the accuracy of courts in the imposition of liability. This hypothesis 
found support in Chapter III, where it was shown that individuals with a 
background in law are likely to commit this error when they have a 
predisposition to do so. In addition, Chapter V has argued that the use of 
non-blended statistical tables in trial settings may trigger the outgroup 
homogeneity bias, according to which individuals underestimate the 
variance in a certain characteristic of outgroup members. Overall, these 
arguments point in the direction that indeed behavioral study should make 
us wary of fully trusting the accuracy of courts’ decisions. 
Despite these general results, the thesis has also highlighted that 
determining whether a particular behavioral phenomenon is likely to 
increase or decrease the accuracy of court’s decisions is often more difficult 
than assumed in a large part of the literature in behavioral law and 
economics. There are various reasons why this is the case.  
i) some behavioral phenomena are not evaluable in terms of accuracy, and 
therefore do not offer any hint regarding whether the outcome of a trial is 
likely to be more or less accurate depending on whether they are influenced 
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by them. This is the case, for instance with implicit racial attitudes, which are 
evaluable neither from a correspondence nor a coherence perspective. ii) 
behavioral phenomena that highlight errors in the way information is 
processed offer only limited help in understanding whether courts’ accuracy 
is improved or decreased by their influence. A bias of this type in the context 
of adjudication was discussed in Chapter V, where it was argued that 
anchoring may lead to unequal trial outcomes that go beyond what could be 
justified on the ground on traditional arguments in law and economics. 
There it was highlighted that studies on anchoring do not necessarily provide 
much insights on whether damages awards are made less accurate by this 
bias. Generally, it can happen that an illogical judgment increases the 
accuracy of a decision when, for instance, the judgment is made on the basis 
of inaccurate information. If the setup of procedural rules provides 
systematically inaccurate information to the judge, a bias may overall 
increase accuracy. iii) since trials are complex and iterative procedures in 
which trial actors interact with one another, biases that lead to increase 
accuracy with regards to single judgments made at trial, may decrease the 
overall accuracy of trial outcomes when, for instance, they impair the 
information flow between the defendant and the judge.  
From this discussion it does not follow that behavioral law and economics 
cannot provide important insights in evaluating the performance of trial 
systems from the perspective of accuracy. Instead, it highlights that the issue 
of accuracy at trial when seen through the lenses of behavioral economics is 
much more complex than often assumed in legal scholarship. As such, while 
behavioral studies can inform policymaking, more caution might be 
warranted in drawing prescriptive conclusions on the basis of behavioral 
findings related to single phenomena.  
The third main issue addressed by this thesis is whether a behavioral 
approach to adjudication can inform the debate on what should be the aim of 
adjudication. In this regard, while accuracy in adjudication is seen as a main 
instrument to reach social welfare maximization, scholars have long 
highlighted that the pursue of accuracy without consideration of the costs of 
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achieving it may lead to suboptimal outcomes.550 The behavioral analysis 
proposed here shows that the pursue of accuracy in adjudication can lead to 
suboptimal outcomes even in states of the world in which increasing 
accuracy is costless. In particular, I have proposed two examples of this type 
of situation. First, as highlighted in Chapter IV, even if implicit stereotypes 
increase the accuracy of trial outcomes, they may still reduce the deterrent 
effect of tort law when the discriminated individual is made liable on the 
basis of how the judge perceives him and not on the basis of his actions. 
Second, in the same Chapter it was argued that the imposition of liability on 
the basis of an implicit stereotype does not necessarily reduce the suffering 
imposed on members of racial minorities that derives from the feeling of 
being discriminated against. In this regard, this suffering may reduce the 
willingness of minority members to bring a case to trial and thus reduce the 
effectiveness of tort law in reducing the level of negative externalities in a 
given society.  
A fourth, major, yet latent, theme of this thesis is gender and (especially) 
racial discrimination in tort trials. This issue has been analyzed here from 
the perspective of ingroup-outgroup biases such as the FAE, implicit racial 
biases and the outgroup homogeneity bias. In addition, the thesis has 
highlighted that some biases that strictu sensu are generally unrelated to 
ingroup-outgroups, can become relevant in the discussion of discriminatory 
trial outcomes when certain aspects of the trial are considered. This was 
shown, for instance, in Chapter V with regards to the effect of anchoring on 
courts’ decisions in presence of non-blended tables.  
This thesis has highlighted that human cognition and motivation can play a 
significant role in allocating resources (e.g. money, health, freedoms) across 
racial groups. Given the current composition of European judiciaries, this 
distribution is likely to be mainly unidirectional, in favor of White 
individuals. Besides distributive concerns, these transfers are likely to reduce 
social welfare both from a static and a dynamic perspective. On the one 
hand, outgoup biases in the judiciary may lead to impose excessive liability 
on minority groups as well as reduce too much the expected liability of White 
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subjects. In addition, since minority members’ reduced access to justice is 
likely to perpetuate and worsen existing disparities among racial groups, 
outgroup biases can reduce social welfare from a dynamic perspective, i.e. by 
discouraging minority members’ investments in human capital. These trends 
are likely to be enhanced by certain procedural rules and practices as well as 
rules of substantive law. In this connection, Chapter V discusses the use of 
blended vs non-blended tables to establish damages for future losses and 
Chapter IV investigates the role of various features of procedural and 
substantive law such as the way in which, for instance, decisions are 
motivated and the vagueness of negligence standards. 
The geographical scope of the present inquiry has been Europe and the US. 
In the US racial issues have long played a prominent role in political and 
policy debates. A similar trend is now observable in Europe. In particular, 
following recent migratory fluxes from Africa and the Middle East, several 
European countries are facing the issue of finding adequate strategies to 
effectively integrate incomers and prevent the rise of social conflicts. As 
discrimination and segregation occur often along ethnic and racial lines, and 
as tort law is an important determinant of the creation and distribution of 
resources within a society,551 addressing discriminatory outcomes in trial 
settings is a compelling priority in Europe. In this connection, this thesis has 
shown that behavioral studies can offer important insights on how 
discriminatory outcomes can be avoided in trial settings and on the limits of 
these interventions. In this connection, Chapter IV has discussed quite 
extensively possible debiasing and insulating strategies in the context of 
IRBs. In addition, the same Chapter has highlighted the possibility of using 
alternative policy instruments to reduce society reliance on a biased tort law 
system. 
3. Future Research 
This thesis has contributed to the study of evidence law and tort law from a 
behavioral perspective in multifold ways. As often happens when doing 
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research, this inquiry has opened a new plethora of pathways for future 
research.  
First, this thesis has inquired various avenues to reduce the effects of implicit 
biases on trial outcomes. Yet, this analysis could be expanded in various 
directions. First, a similar analysis could be repeated with regards to the 
other types of outgroup biases than those that have been discussed here. 
Second, future research can also contribute to a better understanding of 
whether and under which conditions the debiasing mechanisms discussed 
above are effective strategies. As shown above, the existing literature has 
started delving in this direction. Results reached so far are informative, but it 
is still not clear whether, and to what extent, these interventions are effective 
in real life settings. For instance, as discussed above, one of the main 
recommendations to decrease implicit biases among judges relates to 
increase diversity in judicial bodies. Yet, Rachlinski and co-authors found 
little differences in the pervasiveness of implicit biases between groups of 
judges coming from jurisdictions with great differences in racial diversity in 
the judiciary.552  Further research could explore in more depth the conditions 
under which policies aimed at reducing implicit discrimination at trial are 
more likely to succeed.  
Second, Chapter V has highlighted that behavioral studies may offer a new 
way of doing comparative research in a functional way. There it has been 
shown that various institutional arrangements/rules are differently able to 
affect the emergence of a bias in legally relevant contexts. Indeed, different 
legal systems may adopt different court practices or embrace diverging styles 
with regards, for instance how to motivate a decision or on the level of 
scrutiny that a higher court has on lower courts. This type of research could 
be of high value for scholars interested in behavioral analysis of law. In fact, 
two major problems related to implementing debiasing/insulating 
techniques are that: i) these reforms  are often expensive; ii) it is often not 
clear what are the actual advantages brought by these reforms. Here 
comparative law can be of great help. On the one hand, comparative analysis 
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may help identifying new (maybe cheaper) debiasing/insulating strategies 
adopted in foreign legal systems. On the other hand, comparative law may 
fuel the production of new experimental research aimed at isolating 
differences across institutional arrangements in terms of their effectiveness 
in combating undesired behavioral phenomena. Notice that this approach to 
study the law is potentially compatible with various normative approaches. 
In fact, as a behavioral phenomenon might be seen as problematic according 
to various normative standards, this approach is open, but not restricted, to 
the efficiency canon. In this sense, it has the potential to become a fruitful 
ground of debate and collaboration between law and economics scholars and 
academics that adhere to different schools of taught. 
Third, this research can be expanded in various interesting directions also 
from an empirical perspective. First, the literature on outgroup biases at trial 
mainly concentrates on Blacks (and Whites). However, US and other 
countries are becoming prismatic societies, and therefore more attention 
should be given to other racial and ethnic groups (e.g. Hispanics and Asians). 
Moreover, European scholarship and policymakers could benefit from 
research conducted on behaviorally based discrimination against Arabs, 
Eastern Europeans and Roma people.553  
Fourth, the empirical research on the FAE and IRBs in the context of judicial 
decision-making could be expanded to incorporate other relevant features of 
adjudication. For instance, it can be interesting to test correlations between 
propensity to commit the FAE/IRBs and right-wing authoritarianism among 
judges.554 
Another pathway of research that remains largely unexplored regards 
implicit biases and the FAE in non-criminal settings. In particular, there is 
the need for further research in the fields of civil and administrative law. For 
instance, it has been argued that implicit biases may affect the application of 
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the standard of proof in civil cases.555 Similarly, I have argued that 
differences in vagueness of the standards set by criminal law and civil law 
trials can moderate the influence of IRBs on trial outcomes. Yet, these 
hypotheses await being tested. Chapter III moves in the direction of giving 
higher attention to human judgment and decisions making in civil trials. 
Hopefully, future research will head in this direction.   
In addition, with few exceptions, most studies on outgroup biases in the 
courtroom have been conducted with students. The field would benefit from 
having research conducted with professionals involved in trials. In 
particular, it would be important to analyze whether expertise affects the 
degree by which implicit biases impact behavior in trial settings. Chapter III 
has moved in this direction, but there are still scope for expansion.  
Lastly, Chapter III has delved into weather self-selection and training 
received in careers linked to adjudication may lead judges to be less affected 
by the FAE. Similar studies could be conducted with regards to other biases. 
This inquiry could be particularly interesting with regards to biases that are 
at least partially due to cultural or educational factors. Indeed, there is a lot 
to be learned regarding how to best select, train and educate judges and 
other trial participants to improve the performance of European judiciaries. 
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Summary of the Thesis 
 
This thesis contributes to various streams of literature in the behavioral law 
and economics of evidence in tort trials. Each Chapter addresses a selected 
topic in this area from either a theoretical or an empirical perspective.  
In particular, Chapter II addresses various issues that derive from the 
employment of results in judgment and decision-making (JDM) to evaluate 
courts’ accuracy at trial when little attention is paid to the truth standards 
adopted in JDM. This analysis focuses on the legal and JDM scholarship on 
the fundamental attribution error (FAE) as a case study. The Chapter 
concludes arguing that a sound development of behavioral law and 
economics would sometimes require legal scholars to be more attentive 
towards these issues. 
Chapter III tests via a quasi-experiment whether law students are 
outperformed by subjects that undertake a judicial career in avoiding 
committing the FAE in trial settings. The focus is both on individual 
propensities (implicit theories of moral character) and on contextual triggers 
(character evidence) of the FAE. We find that students are outperformed 
only with regards to avoiding the effect of the contextual trigger on their 
decision-making.  
Chapter IV presents a thorough analysis of the effect of implicit racial biases 
(IRBs) on the functioning of tort law systems. It shows how IRBs are likely to 
affect the perception, creation and evaluation of various item of evidence. It 
analyzes under which conditions IRBs are likely reduce more the deterrent 
function of tort law. In addition, it discusses a series of available remedies to 
the distortions created by IRBs.  
Chapter V proposes a comparative and behaviorally informed analysis of use 
of gender and race-based statistical tables to award tort damages.  The 
Chapter shows that, contrary to the US experience, in several European 
jurisdictions courts use blended tables for racial groups. Yet, with some 
notable differences across the countries considered, non-blended tables are 
often employed on both sides of the Atlantic when it comes to gender 
differences. The behavioral side of the analysis complements and supports 
recent scholarship in law and economics in arguing that the use of non-
blended tables is unwarranted for social welfare maximization.  
Chapter VI brings together the insights generated throughout the whole 
thesis to address the interplay of accuracy and behavioral law and 
economics. It argues that behavioral law and economics can have a role in 
policymaking as it sometimes allows to better predict the effect of legal rules 
and practices on the behavior of regulatees as well as how these rules will be 
enforced by courts. In addition, it argues that taking a behavioral perspective 
to the study of evidence reveals some limit of pursuing accuracy at trial for 
the achievement of social welfare maximization.  
220	
	
 
 
  
221	
	
Curriculum vitae 
 
Goran Dominioni 
goran.dominioni@edle-phd.eu 
 
 
Short bio  
 
Goran Dominioni holds an LLM in Law and Economics from Utrecht University and he 
is currently a PhD candidate of the European Doctorate in Law and Economics. In 
2017 he was visiting researcher at Cornell Law School. He conducts research for the 
World Bank Group. His research interests are: Tort Law, Behavioral Law and 
Economics, Judicial Decision-Making, Carbon Pricing.  
Education 
PhD Candidate – European Doctorate in Law and Economics, Joint degree at 
Erasmus University Rotterdam (NLD), Bologna University (ITA), and Hamburg 
University (DEU) 
2013-
2018 
Visiting Resercher – Cornell Law School, (USA) 2017 
International Max Planck Research School – Uncertainty Summer School, 
University of Jena (DEU) 
2016 
LLM Law and Economics, Utrecht University (NLD) (Cum Laude) 2013 
JD, University of Milan (ITA) 2012 
Socrates/Erasmus Exchange Progamme, West University of Timișoara (ROU) 2011 
U.S.-German Summer School International and Comparative Law, University of 
Giessen (DEU) 
2010 
Summer School in International and Comparative Law, Insubria University, 
Como, (Italy) 
2009 
Work experience 
Consultant, The World Bank Group, Washington D.C., (USA) 2017-
2018 
Intern, The World Bank Group, Washington D.C., (USA) 2017 
Prizes and awards 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Climate CoLab (USA), Honorable 
Mention 
2015 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Climate CoLab (USA), Judge Award and 
Public Choice Award 
2015 
Publications 
G. Dominioni, Biased Damages Awards, International Comparative, Policy & 
Ethics Law Review. 
2018 
G. Dominioni, A. Romano and A. Marasco, Deterministic Modeling of Inter-
Institutional Trust Across European Countries, Quality and Quantity. 
2017 
G. Dominioni and A. Romano, Trial (Implicit Biases), The Encyclopaedia of Law 
and Economics, Springer. 
2017 
Dominioni G., Enhancing Carbon Emissions Mitigation through Behavioral 
Insights: some Thoughts from the Carbon Forum North America 2017, Carbon 
Pricing Leadership Coalition, Blog Post. 
2017 
Drying Up Tax Havens - A Mechanism to Unilaterally Tax Maritime Emissions 
While Satisfying Extraterritoriality, Tax Competition and Political Constraints. 
Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics (RILE) Working Paper Series No. 
2014/06 (with D. Heine, S. Gäde, and B. Martinez Romera, and A. Pieters) 
2014 
Others 
Member – TRAMEREN (NYU Law School – Copenhagen University, Faculty of 
Law) 
Since 
2016 
 
 
 
 
222	
	
  
223	
	
 
  
EDLE PhD Portfolio 
 
 
Name PhD student :  Goran Dominioni   
PhD-period  :  2013-2017   
Promoters  : Professor Louis Visscher 
Associate Professor Pieter Desmet  
   
Co-promoter :    
  
 
PhD training 
 
Bologna courses        
 year 
Elementary Statistics 2013 
Introduction to the Italian Legal System 2013 
Game theory and the Law 2013 
BLE & Game Theory 2013 
Economic Analysis of Law 2013 
Behavioral economics law enforcement 2014 
Experimental Economics - topics 2014 
Specific courses        
 year 
Seminar ‘How to write a PhD’ 2013 
Academic Writing Skills for PhD students (Rotterdam) 2014 
Seminar Series ‘Empirical Legal Studies’ 2014 
Introduction to German Law 2015 
WTO Law: Economic and Legal Concepts 2014 
Risk Savvy 2014 
Introduction to Econometrics 2014 
Empirical Legal Studies 2016 
IMPRS Group Project 2016 
Social Choice 2016 
Seminars and workshops      year 
Bologna November seminar (attendance)  
BACT seminar series (attendance)  
EGSL lunch seminars (attendance)  
Joint Seminar ‘The Future of Law and Economics’(attendance)  
Rotterdam Fall seminar series (peer feedback)  
Rotterdam Winter seminar series (peer feedback)  
Presentations        year 
Bologna March seminar   
Hamburg June seminar   
Rotterdam Fall seminar series   
Rotterdam Winter seminar series   
Bologna November seminar   
Joint Seminar ‘The Future of Law and Economics’   
Attendance (international) conferences    year 
Invited - OECD-ITF & CPLC Expert Workshop, Paris, (FRA) 2018 
Presentation - BBL Seminar, World Bank Group, Washington D.C., (USA) 2017 
Presentation - Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Cornell Law School, 
Ithaca, (USA) 
2017 
Presentation - Berger International Speakers Series, Cornell Law School, 
Ithaca, (USA) 
2017 
224	
	
Invited - IETA - Carbon Forum North America 2017 
Presentation - Wink – The Nudge Conference, Utrecht University (NLD) 2017 
Invited - Innovate4Climate Conference, Barcelona, (ESP) 2017 
Presentation - 12th Italian Society of Law and Economics Conference, Turin 
University (ITA) 
2016 
Presentation Behavioral Insights in Research and Policy Making Conference 
(IAREP/SABE), Wageningen University (NLD) 
2016 
Presentation - European Association of Psychology and Law Annual 
Conference, Toulouse University - Jean Jaurès (FRA) 
2016 
Presentation - Transatlantic Maritime Emissions Research Network Conference, 
University of Copenhagen (DNK)  
2016 
Presentation - 20th Ius Commune Annual Conference, Leuven University (BEL) 2015 
Presentation - Climate CoLab Conference, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (USA) 
2015 
Presentation - 32nd Annual Conference of the European Association of Law and 
Economics, University of Vienna (AUT) 
2015 
Presentation - Closed Workshop on Taxing Bunkers Fuels (involving EU 
Commission), Transport and Environment (BEL) 
2014 
Teaching        year 
Tutor of the undergraduate-level course “Behavioral Approaches to Private Law” 
for the academic track Social & Behavioral Sciences of Erasmus University 
College 
2017 
Invited Lecturer of the graduate-level course “The Economics of Insurance and 
Tort Law” for students of the European Master in Law and Economics of 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
2016 
Invited Lecturer of the graduate-level course “Academic Research and Writing 
Skills” for students of the LL.M. in Commercial Law of Erasmus University 
Rotterdam 
2016 
Tutor of the undergraduate-level course “Behavioral Approaches to Private Law” 
for the academic track Social & Behavioral Sciences of Erasmus University 
College 
2016 
Invited Lecturer of the graduate-level course “Academic Research and Writing 
Skills” for students of the LL.M. in Commercial Law of Erasmus University 
Rotterdam 
2015 
Others         year 
PhD candidates representative (elected position), European Doctorate in Law 
and Economics 
2013-
2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
